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 This dissertation explores how low-income women and feminist activists 
negotiate Mexico City’s public abortion program against a backdrop of criminalization.  
In April of 2007, reforms to the Federal District Penal Code and Health Law outlined a 
regulatory framework for the Legal Interruption of Pregnancy (Interrupción Legal del 
Embarazo/ILE).  While the Mexico City reforms, based on a broader social policy of the 
right to health, were designed to foster access for low-income women, they coincided 
with the severe criminalization of abortion practices across the country. Countering the 
reforms, eighteen states made laws to protect “life at the moment of conception,” giving 
constitutional backing to new techniques of policing and prosecution.   
 Rather than characterize Mexico City as a liberal exception within an otherwise 
conservative Catholic country, this dissertation examines how governmental rationalities 
of criminalization and health intervention are entangled in the clinical setting. Drawing 
on the “awkward proximity” of feminist advocacy and ethnographic research, I focus on 
the brief affective encounters between women travelling from other states and 
acompañantes (advocates or companions) that facilitate access to public clinics in 
Mexico City.  Four chapters examine how the “exceptional legality” of abortion in 
Mexico City shapes trajectories of access and the texture of public clinic care, the 
gendered discourses of poverty and kinship mobilized in abortion debates, and the 














































 I could not have carried out this project without the support of my mentors in the 
Anthropology Department at Johns Hopkins University. I am most grateful to my advisor 
Deborah Poole, who gave me confidence, and challenged me to be more concrete and 
focused in my thinking, Veena Das, who found the importance of this work in the finest 
detail, and Clara Han, who gave so much of her time and care.  
 Jennifer Culbert and Rachel Sieder each shaped how I have thought about this 
project and I am very grateful for their engagement on the committee. I also thank Aaron 
Goodfellow who was part of the conversation earlier and whose generous mind still 
motivates me. Thank you Juan Obarrio, Naveeda Khan, Anand Pandian, Jane Guyer, 
Niloofar Haeri, and Mike Degani for making the Anthropology department an 
intellectually stimulating place. This work also grew in the seminars and discussions in 
the Program for the Study of Women, Gender, and Sexuality, Latin American Studies, 
Political Theory, Humanities Center, and the Critical Global Health Seminar. 
 I relied on the support of many people and institutions in Mexico. When I first 
began fieldwork in Mexico City, Joaquina Erviti at UNAM, and Ivone Szasz at the 
Colégio de México provided indispensable guidance.  Later the Centro de Investigaciones 
y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS-DF) hosted me as a visiting 
student-investigator. Thanks to Alejandro Madrazo at the Centro de Investigación y 
Docencia Económicas for his perspective on abortion law in Mexico, Rocía for her 
piercing feminist critique, and Oriana and Eugenia López Uribe for opening the many 
doors that made research in Mexico City clinics and feminist networks possible.  
 v 
 I am grateful to Emma Varley, Saiba Varma, Lynn Stephen, and Alejandro Agudo 
Sanchíz, whose discussant comments contributed to the development of these chapters. 
 Over the years at Johns Hopkins, I found spiritual and intellectual courage in the 
friendships of Aditi Saraf, Vaibhav Saria, Megha Sehdev, Citlalli Reyes-Kipp, Hester 
Betlem, Maya Ratnam, Andrew Brandel, Juan Felipe Moreno Garcia, Bican Polat, Túlio 
Zille, Ghazal Asif Farrukhi, Fouad Halbouni, Victor Kumar, Caroline Block, Sylvain 
Perdigon, Gregoire Hervoet-Zeiber, Sruti Changati, Nathan Gies, Christiane Kettler, 
Daniela Ginsburg, Tarek Dika, Mariam Banahi, Burge Abiral, and Elmira Alihosseini. 
Thank you especially Nandi Theunissen and Serra Hakyemez for conversations that spun 
work and life into something interesting and bearable, and Swayam Bagaria for the kind 
of friendship that withstands bitter extremes. 
 Jesse, Bernardo, Oscar, Emilia, Oriana, Mauricio, Sophia, Anna, Greg, Dante, 
Stefano and Isa, your friendships made a home for me in Mexico City.  Thank you Erica 
and John for the beautiful dinners and domestic comfort these last months in Baltimore. 
 I am indebted to Gay Wilentz for planting the seed of an idea of anthropology in 
my mind, the unwavering support of my grandfather and Aunt Jo, and to my mom, Lori 
































To Oriana and Sophia,  
and the many women in situations of abortion who shared their experiences with me.  
 I hope this work conveys the difficulties you face  
















Introduction          1 
 The juridical-clinical landscape      5 
Moral burden         10 
 ILE access: urgency and then, waiting     12 
 An awkward proximity: ethnographic encounters and feminist action 18 
 Chapter descriptions        24 
 
Chapter 1: Exceptional Legality        27 
 A different logic of exception       37 
 Competing rationalities of government     41 
 Jurisdiction as legal guerilla       47 
 
Chapter 2: Clinical Intervention and Collective Expressions of Pain  56 
 The political economy of care      58 
 Gendered discourses of poverty relief     63 
 The clinical intervention       68 
 Collective excess        81 
 Expressions of pain        85 
 
Chapter 3: Kinship and the Juridical Subject      91 
 Cotejos and the closure of the legal text     97 
 viii 
 Intimate knowledges        107 
 The feminist defense: psychosocial vulnerability    112 
 Forced recognition        114 
 The gender of kinship betrayal      119 
 
Chapter 4: The Ephemeral Politics of Feminist Networks    125 
 El tiempo me viene encima, time is running me over    128 
 The disappearance of the world      131 
 Accompaniment encounters and the vulnerability of action   134 
 Normative disjuncture       142 
 Feminist action, ethnography, and world-making    147 
 
Conclusion          153 
 Normative disjuncture       156 
 Temporality and political action      158 
 Ethnography and feminist advocacy      160 
            
Appendices          162 
Bibliography          173 
Curriculum Vitae         201 




Table of Figures 
 
 Figure 1 
  El Aborto en México 
 Figure 2 
  Aborto Anterior y Actual, CNDH 
 Figure 3 
‘INFORMATION about the LEGAL INTERUPTION OF 
PREGNANCY is only given inside the Clinic,’ official 
sign of the Secretaría de Salud 
 Figure 4 
  Orden de Aprehensión 
 Figure 5 
  Letter from the Head of Police to the Judge 
Figure 6 
  Handwritten list of pregnant women in a community 
 

















































 This dissertation draws on the “awkward proximity” of feminist advocacy and 
ethnographic research to track the normative disjunctures generated by competing 
abortion laws in Mexico.  In four chapters, I examine how a legal complex of abortion 
rights and criminality shape trajectories of access, the texture of clinical care, and the 
possibilities and constraints of feminist advocacy.  Rather than focus on the individual 
subject of the abortion “decision,” my research explores how women collectively 
negotiate multiple regulatory frameworks and moral demands through the brief affective 
encounters of feminist advocacy and the public clinic. Combining ethnographic and 
archival research, the chapters trace the following themes: 1) the exceptional legality of 
abortion in Mexico City, 2) how a particular legal complex of abortion rights and 
criminality shapes the conditions of access and practices of care in public and private 
clinics, and 3) temporalities of (feminist) political action within this juridical-clinical 
landscape.   
 I began research on these topics in the summers of 2009 and 2010 with a feminist 
organization based in Mexico City that provides “accompaniment” to women travelling 
to Mexico City from other states for legal abortion services.  I was drawn to the project 
when, in 2007, Mexico City decriminalized early abortion.  The Mexico City reforms 
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were followed by a severe backlash across the country, seemingly carving out the capital 
from the rest of Mexico as a kind of liberal exception to Mexico’s 31 otherwise 
conservative state governments.  Following the Federal District legislation nearly all 
other Mexican states made explicit that rights-bearing life begins at the moment of 
conception, amending their penal codes to re-iterate the criminality of abortion outside of 
state-authorized exceptions.  The Mexico City reforms thus had the dual effect of opening 
a new possibility to obtain legal procedures for women living in, or who could travel to, 
Mexico City, while instigating the criminal prosecution of abortion practices in other 
states in Mexico.   
 Throughout the dissertation, I draw on ethnographic research that I conducted 
through my participation with Red Paulina,1 or the Paulina Network, as an acompañante, 
or abortion access advocate. Acompañante translates to companion in English yet 
throughout the manuscript I refer to acompañamiento as “advocacy” and acompañantes 
as “advocates.” While advocacy is a broad category that usually implies speaking or 
acting on behalf of someone else, accompaniment to abortion clinics points to a particular 
set of activities and dispositions that differ from advocacy in the usual sense, as I will 
describe in detail throughout the chapters. For now, I highlight the imprecise translation, 
as a potential starting place for approaching the questions of feminist political action that 
I raise in chapter four.         
 The Paulina Network emerged out of an existing civil society organization for 
women living with HIV in Mexico City.  In 2007, the organization added an area of focus 
that aims to extend the accessibility of safe, legal abortion services to women who live in 
states where voluntary abortion is illegal, and in many cases, actively prosecuted.  In our 
                                                        
1 The name of the organization and all names are pseudonyms to protect confidentiality. 
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first conversations, the hesitance of the Paulina activists to declare that the legalization of 
abortion was an advancement of women’s reproductive and sexual rights in Mexico 
compelled my interest in their work and political vision.  The two founders of the group, 
sisters whose parents were involved in making national reproductive health policy since 
their childhood, characterized the backlash effects of the Mexico City reform as a serious 
limitation, leaving the question open as to whether the new law was a “win” for women’s 
reproductive rights when it seemed to re-draw long-standing boundaries between the 
privileges of the “city” and the “rest of Mexico.” Red Paulina is at once a state authorized 
civil society organization that facilitates access to state administered clinics and a radical 
feminist organization whose daily work confronts the limit of governmental programs of 
reproductive rights– a limit that constantly threw their very activities and organizing 
principles into question.  From the outset, I wondered, what kind of political commitment 
allowed for this kind of self-doubt and contradiction?  And how was it sustainable? 
 In 2012, I returned to Mexico City to extend my research over the course of 18 
months.  During this time, I was fully integrated into Red Paulina as an abortion access 
advocate.2 Advocates in the Red engage in a wide range of activities; providing 
information about safe and legal options for terminating pregnancy over the phone and by 
email; arranging bus and plane tickets to Mexico City, counseling women in their 
decision-making process, making referrals to other organizations (such as for religious 
counsel or legal advocacy) and physically accompanying women to public and private 
                                                        
2 Red Paulina is a project that operates without total publicity within a small private NGO in Mexico City.  
It relies on funding from larger national and regional NGOs, such as the Latin American and Caribbean 
Women’s Health Network, and the Observatory of Maternal Mortality. They also accept private donor 
funding that comes in equal parts from individuals in Mexico, Latin America, and the United States and 
periodically apply for grants from the U.S. Their grant applications require a great amount of energy 
towards systematizing results and the presentation of evidence.   
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clinics when they have no one else who can go with them. This final activity, referred to 
within the group, as “acomapañamiento presencial” (accompaniment in presence/in 
person), is what the feminist activists in Red Paulina consider most expressive of their 
first organizing principle: to respond to women’s immediate needs within the limited time 
frame of the abortion process. Participating in Red Paulina as an advocate in this latter 
capacity allowed me to make contact with more than 500 women from other states who 
sought access to safe abortion procedures.  Assuming the role of women’s legally 
required companion, I regularly accompanied them to public and private clinics and 
travelled with them across the city.  
 In addition to feminist advocacy, I conducted participant-observation in two of the 
four clinics that specialize in the Legal Interruption of Pregnancy (ILE), opened 
sequentially in 2008, 2010 and 2013 by the Mexico City Ministry of Health (SSA-DF).  I 
observed the documentary practices of receptionists, social workers, nurses and 
physicians in the creation of the clinical file as well as patient-provider interactions, 
collective orientation sessions provided by nurses and social workers to patients and their 
families, ultrasonography practices, the administration of misoprostol for medical 
abortions, and surgical abortion procedures.  While in the clinic, I also conducted 120 
surveys with patients about their knowledge of the legal frameworks of abortion in 
Mexico City and their home state, their perceptions of Mexico City clinic services, their 
previous experiences of reproductive healthcare and their feelings about terminating their 
pregnancy.3   
The third major component of my research was archival. I collected documents 
from the Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (National Supreme Court of Justice) in 
                                                        
3 See Appendix A for an example of the survey 
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Mexico City and from the archives of a Feminist NGO that provides legal defense for 
women incarcerated for abortion in the state of Guanajuato.  Among these documents are 
the case files and video recordings of the public hearings in the Supreme Court about the 
constitutionality of competing state abortion reforms and the case-files of women who 
were incarcerated for the charge of “Homicidio en Razon de Parentesco” or Homicide, 
qualified by a Relation of Kinship between 2007 and 2011.4  
 
The juridical-clinical landscape 
 Drawing together archival research with clinical ethnography and feminist 
advocacy, I approach law and the clinic as continuously interpenetrating fields of 
government, across which there are significant gaps and incommensurabilities (Harper, 
Kelly and Khanna 2015, Das and Han 2016).  As outlined above, my research takes place 
in the wake of the decriminalization of abortion in Mexico City in 2007. These reforms 
inaugurated a new public program for the Interrupción Legal del Embarazo/ILE (Legal 
Interruption of Pregnancy).  After unprecedented public debate in the Mexican Supreme 
Court, the reforms were upheld as constitutional in 2008.  The city government has since 
developed the program through the creation of four specialized “ILE clinics” that are 
administered by the Secretaria de Salud- Distrito Federal (Mexico City Ministry of 
Health).  The specialized clinics provide abortion procedures to women upon their 
request at no cost.           
 Latin American legal scholars have documented the intensification of legal 
                                                        
4 When charged with a crime in the Mexican criminal justice system, one is guilty until proven innocent.  
This entails the possibility of “preventative detainment,” which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3.  
Judicial reforms will limit the use of preventative detainment, in efforts to create a more “cost-effective” 
system. See Marquez- Carrasquillo and Shirk (2008) brief for summary of reforms. 
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debates surrounding abortion in the region over the last decade, pointing to the co-
occurrence of the expansion of reproductive rights discourses with a surge of legal 
restrictions and criminal prosecutions of “illegal” abortion practices (Roberts and Morgan 
2012, Ruibal 2014, Gloppen and Gianella 2014).  As scholars across disciplines have 
documented, the criminalization of abortion disproportionately affects women who do 
not have the resources to access private healthcare (Pruitt and Vanegas 2014, Schiavon et 
all. 2012, Cruz 2011, Lamas 2008, Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2000). In addition to the 
transnational languages of the “right to life,” the criminalization of abortion in Mexico 
relies heavily on articulations of Catholic morality with maternal responsibility, which 
becomes particularly striking in the cases of women who were incarcerated for the 
criminal charge of “Homicidio en Razon de Parentesco,” or Homicide, qualified by a 
Relation of Kinship.  
 The normative tension between the legalization and criminalization of abortion is 
also informed by the federalist organization of state-level criminal codes and health laws, 
allowing for extreme variation across jurisdictions.  On a federal level, the Mexican 
National Supreme Court of Justice upheld Mexico City's legalization of early abortion in 
2008, and, in following years, the Court also reaffirmed the constitutional reforms to 
protect life at the moment of conception on the grounds of jurisdiction. Since the early 
19th century, Mexican states have locally defined exceptional circumstances that mitigate 
the punishment of abortion (Ortiz-Ortega 2007).  Beginning in the 1970s, this form of 
attenuating the crime was expanded to include exceptions under which a woman should 
be able to procure a legal abortion, such as when pregnancy is the result of rape (Lamas 
2008b).  The legality of abortion has thus historically been negotiated as an attenuation or 
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exemption from criminal punishment. Mexican feminists and human rights advocates 
have extensively documented how women who petition states under these exceptional 
provisions are usually so delayed and morally attacked in the process of giving proof that 
they either do not attain the procedure in time or give up (GIRE 2013, IAHR 2016).5 
 The 2007 Mexico City reforms both extend what might be understood as a logic 
of exception that has framed Mexican abortion law historically.  In chapter one, I discuss 
in detail the “exceptional legality” of abortion in Mexico City as distinct from Giorgio 
Agamben’s concept of the “state of exception” that draws on a reconceptualization of 
Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty as the decision that “frees itself from all 
normative ties and becomes in the true sense absolute” (Schmitt 2006: 12).  In 
Agamben’s work, the state of exception refers not only to a paradigm of government in 
which crisis or emergency legitimates the suspension of the legal order (namely rights of 
citizenship), but also to the “strange relationship of law and lawlessness” (Agamben 
2004). Through the governmental paradigm of exception, human life can be made bare, 
stripped of juridical subjectivity and social belonging (Agamben 2005).  Following this 
line of thought, the paradigm of exception might configure women as sinister sovereigns 
competing with the state for the power over the life and death of the fetus as bare life 
(2007).   I explore an alternative way that exception is folded into contemporary forms of 
government.  Rather than presenting us with a transcendental form of juridical power, I 
argue that the regulation of abortion through exception reveals the tenuous and 
incomplete relays between conflicting, but entangled, domains of law and government 
(See Das and Poole 2004).  The corollary of this different concept of exception is a 
                                                        
5 See Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico, Case 161-02, Report No. 21/07, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130 Doc. 22, rev. 1 (2007) 
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different concept of the subject.  Rather than assume that situations of abortion place 
women in the position of sovereign decision-making, I explore how different forms of 
agency emerge across normative disjunctures brought into play by competing temporal 
and moral imaginaries of law, life, and state intervention (See Richland 2013).  
Combining archival research in constitutional and criminal law, I consider how abortion 
rights and criminality are interwoven as a “legal complex” (Rose and Valverde 1998). 
This approach builds on recent anthropological studies of law in postcolonial states that 
explore the “pluralism” within the formal structures and jurisdictions of the state itself 
(Leal 2006, Merry 2006, Sierra 2005, Poole 2006, Roitman 2006, Sieder et all 2005, 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, Huneeus et all. 2010, Biehl 2013a, Obarrio 2014).   
 While the Mexico City reforms were designed to improve access to safe abortion 
for poor women, my ethnography shows how the political economy of public and private 
clinical care unevenly distributes, if not mortality, then different affective and bodily 
registers of pain and moral stigma.  Mexico has a nationwide social healthcare policy 
called Seguro Popular, which since 2011 has been celebrated by World Bank global 
health experts as an exemplary achievement of universal health coverage (Klingen 2013). 
Developed in the era of the NAFTA negotiations and the privatization of Mexico’s 
national bank and telephone companies in the early 1990s, Seguro Popular targets poor 
and formally unemployed populations with a limited package of free-of-cost healthcare 
while encouraging the growth of private medical institutions for those who can afford it 
(Agudo 2015).  The decriminalization of abortion within this framework has thus 
involved the development of “special” ILE clinics and the discourse of “gratuidad” or 
free-of-charge care.  The efficacy of “free” abortion procedures provided by the state is 
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intensely contested among feminist activists, scholars, and policy makers.  While some 
feminists have demanded that the state guarantee safe abortion as a matter of 
governmental responsibility for women’s health and wellbeing, others are concerned 
about the kind of subjectivity produced when women, especially poor women, are 
recipients of “free” state benefits.        
 In their investigation of whether the Mexico City decriminalization of early 
abortion has effects on women’s subjective understandings of citizenship rights, 
sociologists, Ana Amuchástegui and Edith Flores outline three prevalent discursive 
positions among patients in public ILE clinics: the grateful subject, the irresponsible 
subject, and finally the “proper subject of rights” (2013: 915).  They suggest that the 
former two positions reflect histories of stratified reproduction and clientalist 
governmental relations. Within this history, they argue, the limitation of state-regulated 
ILE services to specialized clinics funded by Seguro Popular “transfers the 
underprivileged status of the poorest women without social security to all women seeking 
abortion” (2013: 916). What it might mean to inhabit the “underprivileged status of the 
poorest women” when receiving abortion care is a central concern of this dissertation.  In 
conversation with feminist scholars who have provided critical perspective on the 
mistreatment of poor and indigenous women in Mexican public healthcare settings, and 
specifically in the context of obstetric medicine, I explore how race, class, and gender 
violence is both routinized and amplified by the uncertain and volatile juridical landscape 
of abortion regulation (Erviti 2005, Erviti et all, 2006, Howes-Mischel 2012, Herrera 
2013, Dixon 2014, Smith-Oka 2013, Mills 2015).   
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Moral burden  
 My ethnography of the clinic examines how the criminality of abortion, both 
explicitly proclaimed in the laws outside Mexico City and by the Catholic Church, 
becomes part of the atmosphere of “special” ILE clinics as dispersed glances, everyday 
turns of phrase, and the organization of clinical space. For example, on one occasion, 
Marta, the head nurse at the first ILE clinic that opened in Mexico City, described how 
coworkers from other areas of the Health Center (Centro de Salud) used to avoid her 
eyes.  She said that slowly things were improving, particularly since many of those who 
at first looked down upon the ILE program had later shown up to the clinic asking for 
help for a family member or friend who needed to terminate a pregnancy.  She spoke 
about the stigma shouldered by ILE providers within the bounds of the community health 
center, for often among family members and friends, they kept the content of their work 
vague to avoid confronting moral judgment in their personal lives. The moral burden 
suffered by women in situations of abortion is much more intractable, and more so when 
travelling long distances from other states. Attending public clinics, they negotiate 
competing demands for public disclosure and secrecy, oftentimes struggling to keep the 
fact of their pregnancy unknown from their parents, children, friends, lovers, and 
employers, while at the same time searching for the financial resources to be able to 
travel, gathering the necessary forms of identification and supplies to be able to receive 
care, and finding temporary excuse for absence from their domestic, kinship, and work 
obligations.   
 Studies of neoliberal governmentality often account for the individualization of 
moral responsibility in conjunction with the withdrawal of state resources from public 
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institutions (Abadia-Barrero 2016). Along these lines, my ethnography explores how 
social workers, nurses and physicians adapt a neoliberal discourse of the individual 
subject of rights and responsibility to the public clinic environment shadowed by 
criminalization. At the same time, I suggest that the discourse of moral responsibility 
rehearsed throughout the clinical procedure has an uncertain duration and impact upon 
women’s experiences (See Mulla 2014).  I also move away from looking at the moral 
experience of abortion as an individual psychological process, as in Carol Gilligan’s 
classic study of women’s moral reasoning (1982) or Rayna Rapp’s ethnography of 
women’s experiences of grief in abortion decision-making (1999), and towards an 
exploration of the performative nature of clinical practices and how they potentially 
transform social relationships and bodies, however temporarily (Mol 2002, Gammeltoft 
2014, Cooper 2015).  Rather than focus on the individual subject of abortion “decision,” 
my research attends to how bodies in the proximity of the clinical space share and 
circulate moral affects and modes of expression.  I argue that while such affective scenes 
might not fit into individualized biographical narratives, they are, nevertheless, important 
aspects of subjective experience (Rechtman 2015).  
 Focusing on the feminist advocacy surrounding the regulation of abortion, the 
dissertation also attends to how women in situations of untenable pregnancy creatively 
navigate these competing normative demands.  Through my position as a feminist 
advocate, I not only made contact with women in various phases of their search for safe 
abortion, but also often encountered women and their friends and family members 
outside clinics when they were unable to receive care for any number of bureaucratic 
reasons.  Based on these encounters, I understand what I call “situations of abortion” or 
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“situations of untenable pregnancy” in relation to, but not determined by the clinical 
procedure. This implies alternative ways that an untenable pregnancy unfolds beyond or 
parallel to the institution, even if those unfoldings are just at the periphery of my 
ethnography (Leonard et all. 2007, Day 2007).       
 In the following section, I shift to ethnographic description in order to open up an 
adjacent set of questions about ethnography and feminist advocacy.  I describe a series of 
encounters initiated by a teenage couple who travelled to Mexico City from another state 
and waited outside a public clinic over night, and then waited again in the morning to be 
able to access a private clinic through the feminist accompaniment network.  Throughout 
the dissertation, I reflect on such encounters as a means to rethink the critical space 
between ethnographic and feminist modes of inquiry, and to examine the intensifying 
juridical, moral, and clinical uncertainty surrounding abortion in Mexico.   
 
 
ILE access: urgency and then, waiting 
  In the early morning hours, Luisa, a twenty-two year-old Mexico City student 
who is a feminist activist is waiting to accompany a 35 year-old woman from Jalisco, 
Ana, to an ILE clinic.  Ana is a bit late, and Luisa is not sure where to stand as she waits 
for her, in the main entrance to the Community Health Center, or around the side by the 
unmarked, and somewhat hidden entry way for the ILE clinic. Alma, the coordinator of a 
feminist network of acompañantes (abortion access advocates), has arranged for me to go 
along with Luisa as she accompanies Ana to answer any questions that might come up 
because it is Luisa’s first time.  I am also to meet with a woman attending the clinic from 
Veracruz, Arleth, just to sign some forms.  It is just past 7am and both the main entrance 
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to the Health Center and the gates to the ILE clinic are closed.  Luisa and I push 
ourselves to the front of a crowd of women and their family members waiting outside the 
gate when the guard arrives and asks loudly if anyone is from another state.  We are, we 
say, we’re from Red Paulina. At that point the woman from Jalisco, Ana, approaches us; 
she has travelled with her husband and child. The guard grimaces and says only one of us 
is allowed to enter with her, but then he recognizes me and lets all five of us in.  Once 
inside the gate we approach the clinic doors, which are closed.  Inside a large group of 
women is listening to the secretary as she gives them paperwork.  Ana stands pensively at 
the door, while Luisa and I wait behind her. She whispers back to us, we can’t go in. She 
is worried the sound of the door will interrupt the secretary.  I slide in past her, pulling 
both Ana and Luisa with me, it’s important that we alert the clinic to Ana’s arrival 
because if she isn’t checked-in in time they might deny her the procedure.  
 I find Arleth from Veracruz after receiving a text message from Alma who is just 
setting off for her commute to the office.  She writes: Arleth is wearing a white scarf. 
Arleth and I make eye contact and step outside the clinic to talk for a few moments. 
Arleth says she is studying French and wants to study Linguistic Anthropology; that she’s 
been feeling awful with nausea; she recently had salmonella.  The chavo (boy) came with 
me, she says, as though to make sure I understood he hadn’t left her to deal with this on 
her own. You’re not from here, verdad (right)? She asks. No, I’m an anthropologist from 
the U.S., I say.  Social anthropology? I nod. Que padre (how cool), she says half-
heartedly. We sign the consent form, and then get up to go back inside because the guard 
tells us sternly that patients are not allowed to be outside.  On the way in, the clinic’s 
street cat runs past us, I swoop her up and kiss her. Luisa and Arleth laugh.   
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 The guard waits by the door for Luisa and I to exit the clinic, leaving Ana and 
Arleth inside.  We tell them that we will stay until it’s certain they will both be attended, 
that the hard part, arriving on time and finding the entrance and being persistent enough 
to get in, is over.  Now as long as they have all the required documents they should be 
seen.  They have those documents handy only because they have been in contact with 
Red Paulina finding out what to bring in advance. There is still the ultrasound, if it shows 
more than 12 weeks of pregnancy, or the presence of uterine miomas (fibroid tumors), 
they won’t be able to receive services in the public clinic. It’s likely that they will go 
through (que van a pasar), but we wait anyways.  Luisa and I go into the tent where the 
guard has shepherded all the family and friends of the patients. He stands just outside the 
tent explaining that we are not allowed to hang around the patio because it’s a loading 
area and an evacuation route for the Community Health Center (a strange excuse 
considering I never saw any loading or evacuating over the many weeks I was there).  
 Earlier Luisa had noticed that Ana’s husband was talking to a young couple in the 
nearby park where he walked with his toddler, how strange she commented.  I shrugged, 
just people being friendly in the way they are when they’re waiting together, I thought.  
Just then the couple came up to us though, and asked if we were from Red Paulina. He 
had sent them over to speak to us after they approached him in the park asking what his 
last name was. The teenage pair had found the address of the clinic on the internet and 
decided to come in the middle of the night from Hidalgo, about five hours away to the 
North. When sixteen year-old Alondra had presented herself to the clinic secretary she 
was told she needed a copy of one her parents’ IDs. She stayed a moment in the clinic 
waiting room and watched other girls who, also menores de edad (legal minors), gave the 
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secretary copied photo identifications as evidence of parental consent.  She noticed that 
the copies were accepted without ever calling in the parent, who was supposedly waiting 
outside. So Alondra and her boyfriend, Tito, went out to look for someone who might 
stand in for a parent on paper, someone with the same last name, Morales Cruz.   
 Eyebrows raised, I showed my surprise. Es bastante comun (it’s pretty common), 
Tito informed me. Cuando mis padres se enteraron me corrían de la casa (when my 
parents found out they threw me out of the house), Alondra said. With nowhere to go if 
she continued the pregnancy, the couple had caught a bus to Mexico City and arrived the 
night before at 11pm. They had spent the night in the park beside the Health Center, 
sleeping on and off until 5am when other women began to arrive to the ILE clinic gate.  
 The guard recognized them as we spoke in the tent and told us we had to leave the 
clinic area. We walked outside to the street and called Alma, it was only 7:30 in the 
morning and she was still on a bus.  Alma called Graciela, one of the founders of Red 
Paulina, to see if the accompaniment network could do anything to help, such as give 
them directions to a safe private clinic that would provide an abortion to Alondra without 
requiring parental consent.  Alma called back to give me the number of one of the most 
trusted clinics, I wrote it down and handed it to Alondra, who handed it to Tito. Ya se va 
acabar el crédito (the credit’s about to run out), he said, as he dialed the number on his 
cellphone. He turned his back to Alondra and I as he spoke with the private clinic 
secretary.  After a few minutes he turned back and handed me the phone with a startled 
look in his eyes, they want to talk to Red Paulina to see if you will pay, he said.  I took 
the phone and told the secretary I didn’t know if that was possible, con gusto los 
atendemos (with pleasure we’ll see them), she said sweetly, but there will be cuota de 
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recuperación (recovery fee) of 2000 pesos (about 110 US dollars), just then the phone 
credit ran out. 
 I called Alma, again, a feeling of urgency rising.  Tito and Alondra stood facing 
each other, silently, glancing at me nervously. Alma said she would call back at 10am 
after she arrived to the office. Creo que ya nos vamos entonces (I think we’ll get going 
now then), Tito said. We will get the pills instead.  They had heard of Cytotec, the brand 
name of misoprostol, about a week ago from a friend and looked for it online. They found 
a site that sold two pills for 500 pesos and gave an unlikely protocol for how to use it. I 
told them the public clinic dispenses the same pills for free and that you can also buy 
them in a pharmacy since they are an over-the-counter medicine for ulcers.  But Alondra 
hadn’t had an ultrasound, so she didn’t know how many weeks she was pregnant.  They 
also had no space to practice the pharmaceutical abortion in, since both of their parents 
had kicked them out of the house.  I told them it was probably worth it to stay around and 
try to go to a legal clinic, where, if they were decided for sure on having an abortion, it 
would be much safer. Tito looked to Alondra, we can wait she said softly.  We walked 
back to the park they had slept in the night before and sat on the bench.  It was cold in the 
shade so we moved to the sun.   
 We sat there, me checking my phone obsessively, impatient.  Since their phone 
was out of credit, the only way they could receive the call from Alma was if I stayed with 
them until 10. Tito and Alondra alternated between nuzzling each other and staring 
straight ahead blankly. Ana’s husband, who was still there with his toddler in the park, 
came up and asked if he could leave the stroller with us as he went to change the kids 
diaper on another bench. When he came back he struck up a conversation.  Children are 
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great, he said. ...Well, planned ones I mean. Well I don’t know if planning works, he 
mused… life continues to be an accident, it’s not as though we can consciously plan these 
things... he paused... but we do know when it is impossible.  Alondra and Tito remained 
quiet, I nodded reluctantly. 
 What’s your last name again? Juan asked Alondra. Cruz Morales, she said with a 
half grin. Lets go look for someone... him? He joked as he gestured to another man in the 
park. We all laughed. He told us he had his first child when he was 29, after he had 
already done and undone many things (despues de hacer y deshacer muchas cosas).  He 
had one child from a previous relationship and then he and Ana had recently had Luc, the 
toddler, and they knew another child would be impossible; they were barely making ends 
meet. The state should guarantee this service, he said, not going to happen in any other 
states though, we only achieve this kind of thing in DF.6 DF might as well be France! He 
chortled.  
 We kept sitting there and sitting there. Alondra slumping against the bench and 
Tito tapping his foot. Finally Alma called and Alondra perked up, I handed her the phone. 
We all watched her carry out the conversation with Alma.  At one point she laughed, No, 
de hecho estoy mareando por no comer (No, actually I’m getting dizzy from not eating).  
To go through the manual aspiration abortion procedure Alondra would need to have an 
empty stomach, but without any money it just so happened that she hadn’t eaten anything 
anyways. What are you going to do after? I asked them as we stood up, they shrugged.  
Can Alondra go to your parents’ house? No creo (I don’t think so), Tito responded 
                                                        
6 DF stands for the Distrito Federal (Federal District), which was the official title of the jurisdiction that 
contains Mexico City (and portions of the Greater Mexico City Metropolitan Area) and the seat of the 
federal government, until 2016.  The name has now officially been discarded as Mexico City transitions 
even closer to full status as a federal entity or state within the 32 federated states of Mexico.  
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quietly. Do you have any siblings who could help? I asked Alondra, One, but she lives in 
the same house as my parents.  I asked them if they wanted me to go with them to the 
clinic, which was across the city. Again Tito deferred to Alondra.  She looked at me, if 
you have time, she whispered.  So we walked and walked towards the metro. On our walk 
Alondra’s mood changed. She shivered, is it really cold or is it my nerves? She asked 
awkwardly, blurting it out and then giggling. Neither Tito nor I answered.  From the 
metro window Tito pointed out places where family members of his had previously lived 
and Alondra followed his gestures with her eyes.  We got off, he asked a passerby where 
the clinic was, no sabría decirte (I couldn’t tell you), the person grumbled. We kept 
walking until we saw it across the street.  Well I’ll leave you here, I said. We hugged 
goodbye, que les vaya bien ([I wish, hope, god willing], that everything goes well for 
you). I felt that very familiar feeling -- so familiar that I could keep it from overwhelming 
me. Of letting go of a problem, before it was finished, before I got to know it.   
       
An awkward proximity: ethnographic encounters and feminist action 
 Fleeting and partial encounters like the one described above make up the 
affective, political, and ethical pull of my fieldwork on abortion law and the politics of 
clinical care and feminist advocacy in Mexico City. Importantly, the reciprocity of 
encounter entails that the anthropologist must observe and describe as part of the field of 
observation (Borneman and Hammoudi 2009).  She is seen and judged by her 
interlocutors, and to some extent constrained by the subject position made available to 
her in these processes (Favret-Saada 1981).  In this sense the ethnographic encounter 
resonates with strands of thought in feminist theory that articulate an ethics of reciprocity 
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not as mutual recognition, but as a site of unresolved tension and asymmetry (T Minh ha 
1982, Irigaray 1993, Young 1997).      
 As I conducted research as a feminist advocate, women in situations of abortion 
who relied on the Paulina network to gain access to clinics, perceived me in different 
ways.  In the scene above, for example, Arleth also studies anthropology, and our brief 
exchange suggests she can read me very quickly, and without great interest or surprise, 
my foreignness and similarity.  She also quickly preempts any moral judgments that I, as 
a slightly older, white, unmarried graduate student, and on top of that, a gringa (from the 
United States), might have had about her situation.  I’m not abandoned by my partner, 
she told me up front.  Other times my role in the feminist advocacy network was cause 
for suspicion.  There was one occasion in which I was to meet a woman, Ixchel, from a 
rural town in Puebla in a private clinic. When I arrived, there were only two women in 
the waiting room and one of them was with a man. I approached the other woman and 
asked if she was Ixchel.  No, excuse me, she responded, barely meeting my eyes and 
turning away.  Confused I sat down across the room and waited.  After many glances, she 
inched towards me and conceded that she was in fact Ixchel but that she hadn’t been sure 
why I was speaking to her.  She was frightened and confused about my intentions.  She 
had been sexually assaulted by someone at work, and subsequently had found it nearly 
impossible to leave work on a day that her close friend, who worked in the same factory, 
would be able to travel with her. They had figured it out though, and I was simply there 
to give them money for the bus ride back to Puebla.  A suspicious affect clung to our 
interaction and it unsettled my understanding of the genre of exchange within which 
feminist advocacy should unfold.          
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 On other occasions, my sense of the parameters and effects of feminist advocacy 
was unsettled by the passing quality of friendship that could emerge with the women I 
was accompanying. After the strange encounter with Ixchel, I accompanied a woman 
named Beatriz throughout her abortion process in the same clinic.  She had travelled 
alone to Mexico City from Chihuahua, a northern state that borders the United States. She 
was 29 years old and had been in a relationship with a younger man.  When she became 
pregnant she initially thought she would continue the pregnancy, but when her boyfriend 
disappeared from the scene, she rethought her decision.  She and her sister lived in a 
small apartment and Beatriz worked a lot in order to pay rent and was helping to care for 
her sister’s child. She did not want to extend what she perceived as a precarious form of 
life. Beatriz and I talked easily outside the clinic, laughing and smoking cigarettes 
together.  When her clinic procedure was over she had twelve hours before her three and 
half hour flight back to Chihuahua.  Then confusion crept into our relationship.  She had 
never been to Mexico City and had nowhere in particular to go. She thought of waiting in 
the bus terminal until it was time to return to the airport.  I felt too close to let her do that 
and ended up awkwardly staying with her all day, exhausting the tentative connection we 
had made in the margins of the institutional space of the clinic.  
 I recount these different affective modes of encounter in order to make the simple 
point that the distance and proximity between myself as an ethnographic researcher- 
feminist advocate and women in situations of abortion was highly variable and tenuous, 
coded in ways that were not completely transparent.  Although I could not know in 
advance how I would be read, I was aware of the power relations I brought in tow as an 
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“urban feminist,” my status alternating between a guera (fair skinned) chilanga (upper 
class Mexico City resident), and a gringa (foreigner from the United States).  
 I knew I might also be seen to embody the neoliberal ideals of autonomy and self-
mastery, ideals which in spite of their rhetorical links with “the right to choose,” mark the 
situation of abortion as a kind of failure that sticks to certain bodies and not others (See 
Cohen 2003, O’Neill 2010).  This mark of failure has its own peculiar moral force in 
Mexico. Within a history of family planning interventions and the uneven ways such 
interventions have been carried out between urban and rural regimes of government, the 
need for abortion is often attributed to poor and indigenous women vaguely located 
somewhere beyond the city.  This organizing discourse of need is only amplified by the 
discourse of Mexico City as a place of democratic citizenship whereas the rest of Mexico 
lags behind (in Juan’s words: DF might as well be France!) What does it mean to take 
the position of an able-bodied urban feminist as a starting point for ethnographic inquiry?  
 Elizabeth Povinelli has powerfully diagnosed the governmentality of late 
liberalism as based on differential distributions of “tense, eventfulness and ethical 
substance” (2011).  Within Povinelli’s vocabulary, neoliberal or late liberal governmental 
logics might divide the subject in the urban feminist network from women in situations of 
abortion who rely on the network for support, between discourses of the autological (free, 
self-making) subject and the genealogical (morally obligated and constrained) society.  
Povinelli’s critical interest is how these divisions “deflect moral sense and practical 
reason from the durative present to an absolute difference between presence and absence 
or the critical difference between the future anterior and the past perfect” (2011:13). In 
other words, the polarization of freedom and constraint is one way we deflect our 
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material entanglements with radically different forms of life in the present. In contrast, an 
ethical commitment to this cosubstantiality would lead the ethnographer to dwell within 
and enrich (even if only in retrospect) an uneasy connection with alterity.  If ethnography 
is a “dwelling science,” in what temporality or tense might we think the ethnographic 
encounter?  And how does it square with the tense and eventfulness of feminist action? 
 Although the long-term, durative engagement of anthropologists with their 
interlocutors is classically understood to be both a source of ethnographic insight and the 
bedrock of the ethical and political commitments of anthropological research, there are 
other strands of thought within this tradition, particularly in attempts to grapple with the 
material and historical conditions of globalization and capitalism (Tsing 2005).  Deborah 
Poole thinks the politics of ethnographic engagement in terms of the radical contingency 
of encounter and the unsettling of racial and cultural categories that such encounters 
might provoke (2005).  This attention to the flux of encounter requires hesitation to grow 
between the interpretative impulse of anthropology and the ongoing lives of others.  In 
Joao Biehl’s words, anthropological ethics might find footing in the struggle to “bring 
this unfinishedness into our storytelling” (Biehl 2013: 574).  For Veena Das the question 
“comes down to whether the ethnography is meant to illustrate a theoretical argument or 
whether theory might be built into the ethnography itself” (Das 2015: 15, See also Das et 
all 2014 and Han 2012).          
  Anthropologists who are simultaneously engaged in organized political struggles 
have reflected on the possibilities and constraints generated by their double role (Hale 
2006, Speed 2006a).  As both a human rights lawyer and anthropologist, Annelise Riles 
analyzes how ethnographic methods and insights are easily absorbed and 
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instrumentalized by transnational feminist and human rights networks (2001).  In her 
search for a point of differentiation between ethnography and the instrumentalizing 
knowledge practices of human rights, she suggests that in contrast to the forward looking 
projects of lawyers, writing ethnography commits one to “standing in two temporal 
places at once—past and present—and hence to the pull of the past in the present” (Riles 
2006: 63).             
 While long-term sustained engagement with the lives of individuals, and the webs 
of relationships in which such lives are embedded, is an indispensable source of 
ethnographic insight, as a feminist advocate, I was subject to certain possibilities and 
constraints that differ from these methodologies. I was not able to maintain long-term 
contact with individual women, but rather engaged in numerous encounters that were 
shaped by the critical juncture of seeking safe abortion in a context of legal and 
institutional uncertainty.  Unable to follow how the situation of abortion folded into 
women’s lives and relationships over time, this dissertation thus traces how women and 
feminist advocates move across the interstices of competing domains of law as well as 
spaces inside, and adjacent to the clinic.  In following these movements, I do not assume 
that ethnography and feminist advocacy always share commensurable goals and 
strategies.  Feminist activists engaged in a strategic struggle for reproductive rights are 
constrained in terms of what can be acknowledged as political action and suffering and 
what cannot.  Whereas feminist projects place suffering and political agency, autonomy 
and necessity, and freedom and constraint in opposition, I hope that my ethnography 
might reveal other, less absolute, axes of ethical and political life (Pinto 2014). Yet rather 
than pose the political potential of ethnography against the institutional structures of 
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feminism, this dissertation unfolds with the intuition that there is a productive, albeit 




 The first chapter examines how abortion has historically been regulated through 
what I call “exceptional legality.”  It traces recent abortion debates and legislations as 
part of a longer history of population policy and neoliberal government.  In the first 
section, I show how since the 19th century feminists have struggled to expand abortion 
rights through exceptions within criminal law.  I argue that this feminist struggle to 
expand exceptions aims to move abortion, as an object of governance, from the domain 
of crime and punishment to the domain of public health intervention.  In the second 
section, I examine the 2008 Mexican Supreme Court debates to argue that the Mexico 
City reforms and the Supreme Court jurisprudence that followed have re-constructed 
abortion as a legal object hinged between the rationalities of criminal punishment and 
clinical intervention. 
In chapter two, I examine how this specific form of legal regulation, i.e. 
exceptional legality, has particular effects in the clinical space.  Drawing on ethnographic 
observation of daily clinical interactions, I describe how physicians, nurses, secretaries, 
and social workers address patients as a collective body that is morally indebted to the 
state for the provision of abortion.  In doing so, I argue, they legitimate a register of 
brutality in their care.  By constructing the situation of abortion in the tense of a past 
action in relation to a future in which it cannot be repeated, I further argue that the 
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clinical intervention carries the dual force of moral punishment and redemption.  In 
response to this collective address and the future-oriented responsibility it aims to instill, 
I show how women collectively articulate their pain in a contracted present. I suggest that 
these expressions of pain might speak back to the specific form of intervention, not 
necessarily as resistance, but as an ephemeral affective intensity through which women 
endure the routine violence of the clinic.       
 The third chapter examines the criminal case files of women incarcerated for 
Homicidio en Razon de Parentesco in the state of Guanajuato.  Tracing the evidence 
mobilized in the cases, I explore how criminal responsibility is articulated as the 
“traición,” or betrayal, of kinship.  Drawing on anthropological studies of law and 
bureaucracy, I track how the legal text of the criminal case ensures a totalizing temporal 
horizon of action. In the second part of the chapter, I show how the scene of crime is 
rendered through public health surveillance and expert psychiatric knowledge that 
constructs the accused woman as a dangerous element in the social body. I argue that 
these processes of elucidating the crime through extra-legal knowledges produces a 
juridical subject defined by pathological kinship relations. Criminal responsibility is 
therefore not secured through the autonomous individual who is master of their acts, but 
against the backdrop of the normal family held together by intimate knowledge.  
  In the final chapter, I explore the politics of feminist advocacy for abortion 
access. I bring Hannah Arendt’s theory of action into conversation with political theories 
of care, medical anthropology, and reflections on ethnography. Rather than rehash 
debates about “the body” as a feminized biological fact pushed outside Arendt’s 
conception of political life, I consider how her notion of political action relies on a 
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temporal imaginary of the world as durable.  Following this re-reading of what is at stake 
in Arendt’s thought, I describe an accompaniment encounter in which I was haunted by 
the feeling that I could not know the effects of my action. In conclusion, I suggest that the 
contingency of accompaniment encounters, and in particular their articulation with the 
limits and possibilities of ethnographic inquiry, reflect an ephemeral temporality of 

























Exceptional Legality  
 
 Feminist scholars tend either to characterize contemporary reproductive rights 
politics in Latin America along trajectories of Liberal progress and Catholic backlash, or 
to locate them within a Foucauldian history of the emergence of population as an object 
of governmental intervention. While the first approach holds fast to liberal feminist ideals 
of maximizing women’s individual rights and freedoms by reclaiming the body from the 
control of men and the institutions of church and state (Ortiz-Ortega and Barquet 2010, 
Ruibal 2014), the second casts a critical eye on how (neo)liberal reproductive rights 
technologies shape the governance of racialized and economically marginalized 
populations (Roberts 1997, Briggs 2002, Erviti 2005).  Anthropologists Lynn Morgan 
and Elizabeth F.S. Roberts offer the concept of “reproductive governance” as a way to 
think through transformations in the political rationalities of reproduction and population 
in Latin America (2012). They argue that governmental policies aimed at controlling and 
normalizing reproductive practices have been polarized by rights-based discourses since 
the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development in 1994 and the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.  In their view, notions of 
population control and reproductive health in the cold war era have given way to a 
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neoliberal form of governance, which entails “a new – and newly juridical – 
understanding of individual rights” (2012: 245).  While this formulation of individual 
rights has served as the platform for legislations that provide greater access to abortion 
and contraception, it has also created an opening for a competition between the “right-to-
life” of the unborn and the “reproductive rights” of women (See Htun 2003).  Morgan 
and Roberts further suggest that “the right to health,” envisioned as a collective right in 
Latin American constitutions, is in tension with the individual rights invoked by 
reproductive rights, which in contrast to encouraging social health policies, “support 
neoliberal agendas... by producing citizens who have the ‘right to choose’ (that is, to 
consume) privatized medical services” (2012: 248).  In this sense Morgan and Roberts 
echo broader critiques of the “ngoization” of feminist social movements that has led to 
the selective appropriation of radical political demands by governmental institutions 
(Alvarez 1999; See also Schild 2014 and Speed 2006b). Yet the effects of neoliberal 
reforms pertaining to health, sexuality, and reproduction are not as easily discernable and 
transferable across settings as Morgan and Roberts’ analysis might imply (Reyes-Kipp 
2014, See also Howes-Mischel 2012).      
 The current landscape of abortion law in Mexico does not quite accommodate this 
picture of neoliberal government through individual rights and NGO-mediated consumer-
citizenship.  The 2007 Mexico City legislation obligates the city’s Ministry of Health to 
provide free abortion services to women upon their demand.  Although the legislation 
stipulates a cuota de recuperación, or recovery fee, that ranges between 1,415 (75 
dollars) and 7,000 pesos (375 dollars),7 for non-residents of Mexico City, it provides 
                                                        
7 The fee is supposed to be determined by clinic social workers using the Mexico City Ministry of Health 
standard “tabladora de cuotas de recuperación por servicios medicos” organized by 5 socioeconomic 
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free-of-cost service to any woman who makes use of one of the four “special” clinics. 
The specialized clinics are located within neighborhood health centers across the city and 
are solely committed to the provision of the Legal Interruption of Pregnancy (ILE).  In 
the chapters that follow, I focus in more detail on the juridical and medical subjectivities 
engendered through the provision of free abortion care in specialized clinics, as well as 
the particular role of feminist accompaniment networks that facilitate women’s access to 
these spaces.  In the current chapter, I describe the legal and political landscape in which 
these clinics and networks operate. 
 To begin to examine the assemblages of reproductive governance at work in 
competing state abortion policies, we have to consider the pluralism internal to Mexican 
state law, and more specifically, the particularity of Mexico City as a capital city with a 
unique degree of political autonomy from the federal government.  Studies of legal 
pluralism have often separated “state law” from non-state “norms and customs,” often 
unwittingly reinscribing the taken for granted legal concepts of the neoliberal state at the 
outset (Poole 2006).  My approach here explores the normative “pluralism” within the 
formal structures and jurisdictions of the state itself.  Extending critical anthropological 
studies of how indigenous struggles for collective rights and autonomy articulate with the 
normative plurality of state legal “customs” (Nader 1990, Collier 1973, Stephen 1997, 
Sierra 1995, Hernandez-Castillo 2002), my research tracks the normative pluralism of 
state legality across subnational domains of abortion regulation (Sieder et all 2013, 
Baitenmann et all. 2007). 





 Within the history of Mexican federalism, Mexico City, ordinarily called “el DF” 
(acronym for the Distrito Federal), has been the locus of efforts to centralize political 
power (Alonso 2012, Craib 2004).  Yet it is also a prominent site for leftwing intellectual 
dissent and resistance to the 71-year autocratic rule of the PRI (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional) (Poniatowska 2014, Monsivais 2008).  Since 1997, the Federal District has 
been governed by a locally elected mayor and Legislative Assembly (ALDF) that favor 
social-democratic policies and agendas put forth by the PRD (Partido de la Revolución 
Democrático)- a left-leaning political party that has an irregular personality in the federal 
states.  In January 2016, administrative reforms officially renamed the Federal District, 
the “Ciudad de Mexico,” and began a process of conferring statehood to the city, which 
involves further decentralizing the city government and writing a new city constitution. 
In light of its unique legal and political culture, Mexico City is simultaneously disparaged 
and celebrated as exemplary of Mexico’s liberal modernity.8 Often in a defensive tone, 
the legality of abortion in Mexico City is spoken of as a privileged form of rights-based 
citizenship that is only accessible within the city’s jurisdiction.  Dra. A, the administrator 
of one of the special ILE clinics put it like this: “those of us who live in DF have a lot of 
rights, and the women who live outside don’t have any... so it’s like what Marta Lamas, 
or one of them [feminists], said: discrimination against women.”  In response to the 
moral attacks on DF government abortion providers by numerous politicians and Catholic 
Church officials, she said: I call them mochos (uneducated Catholic fanatics), the ones 
who beat their chests while at the same time go around doing worse things than this 
[providing abortion] that they criticize us for.  They should realize that that women are 
                                                        
8 Hector Carillo analyzes how teenagers in Jalisco talk about Mexico City as a place of both sexual freedom 
and gender equality, and dangerous anonymity and promiscuity (2007). 
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going to come to DF; they can’t [keep] them- I mean, they can’t cover the sun with only a 
finger, the woman requires it, she requires it, she needs it...”9  
 Marta Lamas, a major figure in Mexican feminist politics and founder of the legal 
advocacy group GIRE (Grupo de Informacion sobre Reproduccion Elegida), begins the 
story of the feminist struggle for reproductive rights in Mexico in the 1930s following the 
publication of the Federal Penal Code of 1931 (Lamas 2008b, See also Cano 1990). 
Spearheaded by socialist-feminist medical doctors, arguments for the decriminalization of 
abortion were presented as derogaciones or exemptions/dispensations of the penal code 
under certain conditions.  The regulation of abortion under specified “social and 
economic causes,” should be, one of the doctors argued, “the responsibility or 
competency of public health and not criminal law” (as cited by Lamas 2008b: 13).  In the 
1970s legal and policy discussions about abortion surged again, now alongside the 
General Law of Population (Ley General de la Población) and the creation of the 
National Population Council (CONAPO)- re-centering the debates within a broader 
governmental science of administering the problem of population. CONAPO began to 
generate the demographic statistics and systems for indexing and mapping socioeconomic 
marginalization in relation to the coordinates of rurality, such as schools and health 
centers, that continue to provide the data for national health policy (Agudo 2015: 79).  In 
1973, modifications to the Federal Sanitary Code that prohibited the sale of 
contraceptives laid the groundwork for the General Population Law, which, the following 
year, established that the State was obligated to provide family planning services free-of-
                                                        
9 “Yo lo digo mochos, son los que sean golpes de pecho y por otro lado andan haciendo cosas peores que 
esto que nos critican, deberían de darles cuenta que las mujeres van a venir a df, no las pueden, o sea no 
puedan tapar el sol con un dedo, la mujer lo requiere, lo requiere, lo necesita...” 
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cost to women in public health institutions (Erviti 2005: 91; See also Bliss 1999). 
Following the Population Law, The Feminist Women’s Coalition (Coalición de Mujeres 
Feministas), along with CONAPO, published a report that recommended that the penal 
sanction of abortion be suspended under the banner of “Voluntary Motherhood” (Lamas 
2008b).10  This route of argumentation led to the expansion of the legal circumstances 
under which abortion would not be punished in direct relation to the emergent objectives 
of family planning policy directed at poor, rural, and indigenous families.    
 Adriana Ortiz-Ortega locates contemporary Mexican abortion laws in a longer 
colonial history (2007). Abortion was classified as a crime in the first systematic penal 
code written by Spanish colonial officials for Mexico in 1871. The exception of honoris 
causa – which still appears in Mexican state penal codes today- reflects the Catholic 
morality embedded in the legal reasoning about how to punish abortion, which is closely 
linked to defining what kind of crime it is.  The Honoris causa provision lessens the 
intensity of the criminal offense as well as its punishment if the woman is of “high 
reputation,” conceives out of wedlock, and attempts to conceal her pregnancy (Art. 573 
of the 1871 Penal Code). Ortiz-Ortega relates the honoris causa provision to a persistent 
“gentlemen’s agreement” between the Catholic Church and the post-revolutionary 
Mexican state that has resulted in the inaccessibility of legal abortion- that is, even in the 
exceptional circumstances in which punishment is supposedly suspended. From this 
standpoint, we see how the progressive liberalization of abortion law through exception 
                                                        
10 The language of Voluntary Motherhood is distinct from, though obviously related to the Global Health 
Initiative, Safe Motherhood, which calls for the legalization of abortion in light of maternal mortality in 
conditions of poverty, low access and criminalization (Starrs 2006). But voluntary motherhood campaigns 
are specifically responsive to the Latin American context of forced sterilization and Catholic values of 
maternity.  It continues to shape contemporary campaigns put forth by Catholics for the Right to Decide. 
One current CDD campaign reads: “Maria was consulted about being the mother of god” (Maria fue 
consultada para ser el madre de dios).   
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emerges from a colonial catholic context, in which codes of honor and kinship are tightly 
bound with race and class status (See Seed 1992 and Martinez 2009).  The current legal 
exceptions under which the punishment for abortion is set aside now include a range of 
“secular” state interests. Yet, as I explore in Chapter three, the prosecution of abortion as 
a crime of kinship reveals the persistent juridical and moral uncertainty about what kind 
of crime abortion is, how it should be punished, as well as who, or what kind of 
individual commits such a crime.        
 Because each state has its own criminal code and health law, abortion regulation 
varies widely across Mexico. Yet all states, including Mexico City, currently define 
abortion as a crime with exceptions that range from accidental behavior on the part of the 
pregnant woman, pregnancies that are the result of rape, grave danger posed to maternal 
health, risk of death, non-consensual artificial insemination, fetal malformation, and in 
Mexico City, up to the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. Mexican feminists generally organize 
the state laws along a continuum of least to most exceptions, considering the highest 
number of exceptions to correspond to the most liberal regulatory framework (GIRE 
2013, Ortiz-Ortega 2007). See table produced by GIRE on the next page: color-coded to 
highlight restrictive regimes in red that progress towards more liberal jurisdictions in 
shades of green.11 12 13 
                                                        
11 Figure Translations: causales- causes or reasons to allow legal abortion in los entidades: federal 
entities: violación- rape; imprudencial o culposo- imprudent or accidental conduct; peligro de muerte- 
risk of [maternal] death; grave dano a salud- grave injury to [maternal] health; alteraciones genéticas 
o congenitas graves en el proucto- genetic or grave congenital alterations in the product [fetus]; 
inseminación artificial no-consentida- nonconsensual artificial insemination; causas económicas 
graves siempre cuando la mujer tiene al menos 3 hijos- grave economic reasons only in cases in which 
the woman has at least 3 children; voluntad de la mujer hasta las 12 semanas de gestación- the 
woman’s will up until the 12th week of gestation 
 
12 Translation of first para of text beneath the figure: In this classification the risk of death and injury to 
health are distinguished in the way that they appear in each penal code. Although the risk of death should 
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be interpreted as subsumed within injury to health, the situation specified in Campeche, Chihuahua, 
Hidalgo and DF. This interpretation is what offers the most protection to women’s reproductive rights.   
13 Translation of second para beneath the figure: This figure demonstrates the heavy legal restrictions of 
abortion access in this country. The entities with the most restrictive abortion legislations are 
Guanajuato and Queretaro; where they only admit the causes of exception for sexual violation and 













The range of exceptions reflects the diverse strategies pursued by reproductive 
rights advocates within the parameters of its logic. The long-term and incremental project 
of expanding exceptions also suggests a vision of legal change particular to Mexico and 
other countries with civil law systems, as compared to the precedent-based common law 
systems of, for example, the U.S. and the UK (See Zamora et all. 2004). In civil law, the 
codification of exception is not primarily expected to reflect or respond to actual cases, 
but rather to create textual links within the law (Latour 2010). For instance, 
“nonconsensual artificial insemination” was one of the “exceptional causes for impunity” 
added to the Mexico City penal code in the passage of Ley Robles in 2000, often cited as 
the necessary precursor to the 2007 legislation.  The actual cases that might pertain to 
“nonconsensual artificial insemination” are not that important to the minds of law-
makers, but rather the insertion of a legal concept of consent.  The concept of consent 
creates a potential link between the provisions for legal (not-punishable) abortion to 
broader discussions about reproductive rights as constitutional rights.  That said, along 
with pushing for more expansive exceptions in state penal codes, feminists have also 
fought for the creation of protocols and standards of care in states’ response to women 
seeking procedures through such exceptions.  This is a minimal demand intended to make 
the existing openings in the law actually mean something in practice. As has been well 
documented over the last decade, a heavy burden of proof lies with women seeking 
abortion through exceptional provisions.  In the process of acquiring “expert 
authorization,” their petitions to the state for legal care are so delayed and morally 
attacked that they more often than not give up or do not attain the procedure in time 
(Lamas 2008a, Lerner and Guillame 2003).   
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A Different Logic of Exception 
 The 2007 Mexico City reforms both extend what might be understood as a logic 
of exception that has framed Mexican abortion law historically, and breaks it open in 
important ways. 14  Feminist theorist, Penelope Deutscher suggests that approaching 
abortion law through an analytic of exception might allow us to grasp how reproductive 
bodies figure as both targets of biopolitical control and sites for various re-constructions 
and exercises of sovereignty (2008).  In her view, “abortion has relentlessly and 
internationally- and in an uncannily duplicating formation of policy and law been its own 
state of exception” (2008: 60). Deutscher’s notion of the “state of exception” draws on 
Giorgio Agamben’s theorization of the sovereign’s capacity to suspend the law, and in 
that suspension create a zone of bare life, or social and political abandonment (Agamben 
2005: 4). She ultimately suggests that the regulation of abortion through exception is a 
biopolitical form of government in which the body of the woman is configured as a 
sinister sovereign competing with the state, and the fetus is made akin to bare life. 15 
Indeed, I would argue along with Deutscher that abortion is in many different contexts, 
regulated through a form of exceptional legality.  But the different ways in which 
exception works at particular historical and political junctures matters.  By attending to 
the specificities of Mexican abortion law, we see another way that exception has 
                                                        
14 This logic of exception has arguably characterized abortion policy internationally.  The pattern 
of progressive exemptions from criminality is found in manner civil law contexts. (See Le Deoff 
on France) 
15 In this chapter, I am less concerned with how current abortion debates construct the fetus as 
bare life (which indeed it does in global Pro-Life/Anti-abortion discourses) (See also Deutscher 
2016 and Cooper 2009), and more interested in how the legalization of abortion through 
exception suggests an historically and culturally specific form of government in which problems 
of population and issues of crime and punishment are intertwined in a particular way.   
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constituted the basis of juridical power, revealing the tenuous and incomplete relays 
between conflicting, but coexisting, rationalities of law and government.   
 For instance, the legalization of abortion in the United States, established by the 
Roe v. Wade precedent in 1973, deploys a language of exception in which the state’s 
interests might, at an unspecified moment, trump a woman’s right to decide. In the U.S. 
Supreme Court Roe v. Wade opinion, Justice Blackmun qualifies women’s right to 
decide as follows:  
“...appellant and some amici argue that the woman’s right is absolute and 
that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in 
whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do 
not agree. Appellant’s arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at 
all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to 
support any limitation upon the woman’s sole determination, is 
unpersuasive. The Court’s decisions recognizing a right of privacy also 
acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is 
appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important 
interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in 
protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective 
interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the 
factors that govern the abortion decision. (Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 
1973) 
The opinion first delimits abortion as a right within a private sphere supposedly free of 
state intervention, which, as many scholars have shown, takes for granted an abstract 
subject of “private choice” (Roberts 1997, Briggs 1998, Solinger 2008). Second, it 
reconfirms the state’s readiness to intervene upon its legitimate interest in health and 
“potential life” (See Greenhouse and Siegel 2012).  Here “potential life,” and in a parallel 
fashion, the state’s interest in safeguarding “health,” are exceptions under which 
women’s right to decide might be suspended. 16  This form of legality and exceptionality 
                                                        
16 In her analysis of the criteria for determining state intervention within global health discourse, 
Veena Das outlines three conditions: market failure, when a person’s actions could harm another, 
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not only gesture to the sovereignty of the state by holding in perpetual suspension the 
possibility of intervention, but also places the right to abortion in tension with a web of 
agitated interests, in which given the variable political leanings of each state in a federal 
system of law, women might not have access to that right.  While the Roe v. Wade 
jurisprudence explicitly links the growing interest in protecting life to the advancement of 
pregnancy, in recent years conservative legislators have reinterpreted the margins of 
when and how abortion should be disallowed or prevented in the name of “potential life” 
and “health”- effectively making even first trimester abortion inaccessible in some states 
(Borgmann 2014, Pruitt and Vanegas 2015).17 Whereas in the U.S. individual rights are 
the ongoing rule to which exceptions in the name of health potentially legitimate state 
intervention (a logic that has functioned to obstruct women’s abortion rights), in Mexico, 
feminists have mobilized a discourse of health as an exception to the ongoing rule of 
criminality in their attempts to expand women’s access to abortion.     
 In recent years, Mexican feminists’ struggle to re-code abortion in “secular” terms 
of population and public health has been coterminous with the public reorganization of 
the state in relation to the Catholic Church.  In 1991, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
amended the 1917 constitution to give juridical status to the church, revoking a central 
tenet of Mexico’s tradition of liberal anticlericism.  Recalling Adriana Ortiz-Ortega’s 
suggestion that colonial abortion law was built upon a private “gentleman’s agreement” 
                                                                                                                                                                     
or to redistribute resources to vulnerable populations (2015). Otherwise, global health policy 
withholds intervention in the name of the “rational unitary individual who evaluates all his 
choices and selects which one would maximize utility” (199).  Intervention here, like in U.S. 
abortion law, operates as as exception to the rational health choices of the individual. We see then 
that the logic of intervention underlying Mexican abortion law and policy also importantly differs 
from global health discourse.  
17 Recent legislations- known by reproductive rights advocates as- TRAP laws- “Targeted 
Regulation of Abortion Providers”- re-deploy “the state’s interest in safe-gaurding health” purely 
as guise for limiting access (Hendricks 2014).  
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between church and state, Salinas de Gortari claimed to “modernize” church- state 
relations by making them public and explicit.18  The overtness of the interdependence of 
the Catholic Church and the Mexican State has brought the prohibition of abortion, 
alongside moral imperatives of the family, to the fore of right-wing government 
campaigns and policies (Reyes-Kipp 2014).      
 Against this background, the Mexico City reforms, and the legal debates that have 
followed, have generated a new field of reproductive politics. Reforms to Mexico City’s 
Penal Code changed the definition of abortion as occurring only after the twelfth week 
pregnancy, before which it is no longer sanctioned as a crime.19 The Legislative 
Assembly also introduced a new article in the City Health Law that defines the “Legal 
Interruption of Pregnancy” (ILE) as an integral part of public services up to the 12th week 
of gestation. The Health Law obligates the Mexico City Ministry of Health to provide 
ILE procedures to women upon their request, regardless of her circumstances and without 
requiring any form of external authorization (Enriquez and Anda 2008).  To better 
comply with this obligation, the Ministry created the four specialized ILE clinics, 
mentioned earlier, which are funded by the national insurance program (Seguro Popular) 
and follow standardized protocols of care. Whereas earlier reforms expanded the range of 
exceptions through the addition of new circumstances, the Mexico City law provides a 
temporal opening, rather than a circumstantial one. This opening is in part achieved 
through the invention of the new terminology “Legal Interruption,” creating an awkward 
disjuncture between the “legal” definition of pregnancy termination and biomedical, as 
                                                        
18 After a special dinner for the Mexican Bishop’s Conference at Los Pinos (the presidential 
house), an Archbishop excitedly told journalists, “We entered through the front door” (El 




well as ordinary understandings of abortion.  In other words, the invention of the term- 
“Legal Interruption of Pregnancy”- which now refers to any termination before 12 weeks, 
attempts to sever the textual links between first trimester “interruptions” regulated in the 
Health Law and “abortion” as it is regulated in the penal code.  Just as the addition of the 
“nonconsensual artificial insemination” exception binds the texts of criminal to 
constitutional law, the renaming of first trimester abortion as the “Legal Interruption of 
Pregnancy” shows an “aptitude to unbind” (Latour 2004: 150).  Through this unbinding 
of “ILE,” from “abortion,” the elite academic lawyers who designed the reforms pride 
themselves with having found a way to experiment with a new form of legality (Personal 
communication, 2015).  Taking their strategies seriously, we might think of Mexico City 
as an intensified site of normative experimentation in which the regulation of early 
abortion has [almost] been shifted into a new domain of law.  
 
Competing Rationalities of Government 
 Since abortion debates in the 1930s, briefly mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
Mexican feminists have sought to move the regulation of abortion from the jurisdiction of 
criminal law into the domain of public health. As Marta Lamas highlights, early 
arguments for the decriminalization of abortion were presented as derogaciones or 
exemptions from the penal code under specified “social and economic causes.” Under 
these causes, it was argued, abortion should be defined within the competencia of public 
health instead of criminal law (Lamas 2007: 13).  “Competencia,” or competency, 
suggests not only spatial jurisdiction- where the application of law is questioned in 
relationship to a bounded physical territory, but also in regards to what domain of law the 
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object in question belongs (See Benton 1999, Ford 1999, Richland 2013).20  
 The Mexican Supreme Court jurisprudence written after the long public debate 
about the decriminalization of abortion in Mexico City has been criticized for avoiding a 
substantive interpretation of constitutional rights in favor of a politically neutral, 
technical, invocation of the “strict principles of legality” (Madrazo and Vela 2013). One 
month after the passage of the Mexico City reforms, the President of the Comisión 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH, National Human Rights Comission) brought an 
Acción de Inconstitucionalidad (Action of Unconstitutionality) against the Federal 
District Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal, ALDF) to the 
Mexican Supreme Court, arguing that the legalization of abortion violated fundamental 
human rights.21  In response, Marcelo Ebrard, the mayor of Mexico City at the time, 
argued that if the CNDH action was to be considered legitimate, it would have to be 
within the framework of a constitutional controversy (controversia constitucional) which 
deals with the competencies of the organs of government in Mexico’s federalist 
hierarchy, and not with the principles of fundamental rights as implied by an action of 
unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court admitted the action emphasizing the valued role 
of the CNDH in raising the question of fundamental rights in “abstract” terms, as 
opposed to technical terms of jurisdictional competency (Action 147/2007, 114).  
                                                        
20 In Security, Territory, and Population, Michel Foucault (2007) traces a shift from “disciplinary” power 
to what he characterizes with varying clusters of terms, such as “security,” “governmentality,” and 
“neoliberalism” (Dilts and Harcourt 2009, Fassin 2009).  Whereas Foucault’s reading of disciplinary 
formations allowed him to track how juridical power is dispersed across institutions and “transported to the 
entire social body” (Foucault 1975: 298), in the Security, Territory and Population lectures, he explores 
how objects of government are inserted within a series of probable events and invested with calculations of 
cost (2007: 6). The problem of security “refers to the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be inserted 
within a given space” (Foucault 2007: 20). We might consider how “jurisdiction” works as a technique of 
government in contemporary abortion debates in relation to probable events and uncertainty.   
 
21 The action was also put forth by the Procuradur General de la República (General Attorney’s Office) and 
the Supreme Court subsequently consolidated their arguments into one case 
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 The original demanda is organized around ten separate “conceptos de invalidez”- 
concepts of invalidity or inaccuracy- in which the CNDH argues that the Mexico City 
reforms violate the Mexican Constitution. Not all of the points were taken up by the 
Supreme Court as worthy of pursuing, and here I will only highlight those that the Court 
then reproduced in the presentation of the case to itself.  Of the ten points of contention, 
the Court discussed in great detail whether or not the Constitution of the United States of 
Mexico recognizes the right to life, and more specifically if the right to life is the 
fundamental principle and value that underlies all other rights (Demanda, 12). The Court 
also discussed the CNDH’s ironic, and by all accounts, “unreasonable” claim that by 
placing the decision-making power solely in the hands of women, the Mexico City 
reforms violate men’s right to paternity, equality and procreation.  Of most interest for 
this chapter though, are the seventh and eighth concepts of invalidity that are central to 
what critics consider as the out-of-date technicality of the Court’s final ruling.   
 The seventh concept of invalidity argues that the reforms made to the Federal 
District penal code contradict “the principle of the exact application of the law,” citing 
Article 14 of the Constitution, “en los juicios del orden criminal queda prohibido 
imponer, por simple analogía, y aún por mayoría de razón, pena alguna que no este 
decretada por una ley exactamente aplicable al delito que se trata” (81). Nullum crimen 
sine lege- no crime without law.  In other words, “one cannot consider an act a crime 
unless it is defined in the law as such.  So too, for all acts catalogued as a crime, the law 
must expressly prescribe the punishment that corresponds to it, in the case that it is 
consummated” (82).  The CNDH demanda continues that this “principle of exact 
application of the law” not only obligates legislators to establish that an act is of criminal 
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nature, but also that they describe “with clarity and precision” the act or conduct that is 
criminal and the corresponding type of punishment.  The principle lies at the core of 
traditional civil law limitations on the interpretative authority of judges in order to protect 
against corruption (Merryman 1969).  In this tradition, criminal law must be precise and 
explicit, “with no ambiguity” so that it is not “subject to the discretion of the judge who 
applies the law” (83). In this sense, legislators must “avoid using indeterminate concepts 
that generate a state of uncertainty” (84). The demanda lists four “inexactitudes” that the 
Mexico City reforms dangerously propagate within law.  The first is the impossibility of 
determining exactly when the temporality of “after twelve weeks” begins and ends, the 
second is the imprecise definition of consent (they give the example of digital finger print 
obtained from a woman who is sedated).  The third inaccuracy, they argue, is that the 
level of punishment given to a woman who aborts a pregnancy after 12 weeks of 
gestation is not severe enough. The fourth, and “most important of the inaccuracies,” 
refers to the ambiguously changing juridical status of life over the course of three phases 
of pregnancy. To illustrate the temporal uncertainties set into motion by the Mexico City 









 The eighth concept of invalidity refers to the “invasion of competencies,” arguing 
that the federal government has ultimate authority over laws pertaining to health and that 
the Mexico City reforms put into a place a definition of pregnancy that contradicts the 
Federal General Health Law. The last concept spatializes the conflicting temporal 
frameworks of juridical personhood, pregnancy, and intervention as a problem between 
the hierarchies of jurisdiction. After an unprecedented appeal to the participation of civil 
society with a special online forum and a series of public hearings (audencias públicas) 
from a range of “experts” on either side of the debate,22 eight of the eleven Supreme 
Court Justices agreed in August 2008, that the Mexico City reform was constitutional. In 
its plurality opinion, the court framed the central question before it as follows:  
This case confronts us with a peculiar problem, in which the question to be 
answered is the opposite of the one responded to by [constitutional courts 
in most abortion cases elsewhere]: we must ask if the state has the 
obligation to criminalize a specific type of conduct, and not if the 
criminalization of a particular type of conduct affects or violates 
constitutional rights.23 
Here the Court reiterates the “opposite” logic of exception that operates in the United 
States that I outlined earlier.  This manner of casting the question allowed the court to 
sidestep the question of reproductive rights versus the right to life, bringing to the fore 
arguments about the “principle of legality” and jurisdictional competency. The court held 
that Mexico City was not obligated to penalize an action even if it were considered a 
crime in penal codes. In this sense, the Legal Interruption of Pregnancy was reiterated as 
an exception to the ongoing rule of abortion criminality, while at the same time health 
                                                        
22 The public hearings were held between April 10th and June 27th in 2008.  The University Program for 
Gender Studies (PUEG) at UNAM published a book with a selection of the presentations made at the 
audiences. See Enríquez and de Anda 2008.  The Center for Documentation and Library of GIRE also 
produced a series of video recordings of the audiences that I will analyze in future publications. 
23 This statement also reflects the comparison drawn earlier between the way exception works in the 
context of U.S. abortion law vs. Mexico. 
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regulation and penal codes were asserted as separate domains of law that did not 
necessarily have to hold to the same temporal definitions of pregnancy and juridical 
personhood, as long as they complied with jurisdictional limits. Through technical 
arguments about the principles of legality and jurisdiction, the Court left in tact the 
double regulation of abortion as a crime and public health concern.  As an ambiguous 
object of government hinged between alternating domains of law, or competencias, I 
would argue that abortion regulation has been re-spatialized, as states attempt to fix 
competing temporal imaginaries of personhood, pregnancy, and intervention in terms of 
territorial jurisdiction.   
 
Jurisdiction as Legal Guerilla 
 Scholars have noted a process of the “judicialization of politics” in Latin America 
(Sieder et all 2005, Biehl 2013a). Rather than assume that political and social movements 
are colonized by law and legal language (Alvarez and Escobar 1992), these works attend 
to how law might be resignified beyond the (neo)liberal frame (See Merry 2006).  I read 
Mexican feminist legal debates about reproductive rights attuned to that possibility.  
Shortly following the Supreme Court decision on the Mexico City abortion law, the 
majority of Mexican states began initiatives to reform their local constitutions to protect 
life at the moment of conception (GIRE 2013).  Feminist legal advocacy organizations 
quickly began strategizing how to best challenge the “life begins at conception” reforms 
in the Supreme Court. They considered two options: the writ of amparo, which can be 
mobilized on behalf of an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated by 
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state authorities, or the action of unconstitutionality, (as was used in the case against the 
Mexico City government by the CNDH), which requires the backing of an institutional 
body like the State Attorney Office or a human rights commission.  The writ of amparo 
has been the main strategy for litigating abortion rights over the last few decades.  In 
Mexico’s civil law system, the only way for the judiciary to establish binding precedent 
is through the amparo procedure, which dates back to the 1857 Constitution. The amparo 
is literally a “protection” that can halt government actions that encroach on an 
individual’s constitutional rights.  But it is only binding for the individual case.  Only 
after five consecutive and identical rulings on the same topic can jurisprudencia (the 
closest thing to precedent in civil law) be produced from it retrospectively (Marquez-
Carrasquillo and Shirk 2008).  In the feminist struggle for abortion rights, amparos have 
involved making a public scandal of a particular instance of state violence against an 
individual woman, such as in the famous case of Paulina Ramírez versus Baja California.  
Paulina was 13 years old when she was raped in 1999 and subsequently denied a legally 
permitted abortion by health and law enforcement officials.  In 2002, an association of 
international reproductive rights NGOs and the Mexican legal advocacy group for 
voluntary reproduction (GIRE), filed a petition on her behalf with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, alleging violations of her legally guaranteed rights under 
Mexican law, as well as her rights to physical and psychological integrity and health.  
Paulina and her mother testified to being dissuaded from securing the abortion, from 
bureaucratic-administrative deferrals to moral coercion (Univ. of Minnesota Human 
Rights Library, 2007).24  The structures of dissuasion that prevented Paulina from 
                                                        
24 For instance, while waiting to meet a doctor at the public hospital, Paulina was shown videos 
about the violence of abortion and sent to speak with a Catholic Priest.  
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securing an abortion were especially influential in her home state of Baja California, 
where the ultra-conservative National Action Party (PAN), closely aligned with the 
Catholic Church,25 had been in power for 11 years and where the state’s PAN governor 
Vicente Fox was preparing his presidential campaign.  In the widely circulated NGO 
pamphlet “Paulina: In the Name of Law,” reproductive rights activists denounced public 
health officials for “prioritizing their own personal religious beliefs over the rule of law” 
and called for the neutrality of legal institutions necessary for a democratic secular state 
(GIRE 2000).  
 In 2013, feminist legal advocates adopted a new strategy, mobilizing cases of 
constitutional controversies on behalf of municipalities against their local state 
governments.  At the time I was approaching the end of my fieldwork in Mexico City.  It 
had taken me months to figure out how to request access to cases in the Supreme Court.  
The first few times I visited the court (after presenting numerous letters explaining my 
research), I was directed to a common room with desk-top computers where I could look 
up cases.  There was a man in charge of helping outsiders find what they were looking for 
on the court’s website. I told him I was interested in all of the discussions and 
jurisprudence surrounding abortion.  Of course! he said. If I could just bring an external 
hard drive he would transfer some of the files for me directly. Elated, I returned in the 
afternoon with a hard-drive, when I got home I opened the files to see that he had given 
me only what was already available through the online “transparency” website. Only 
                                                        
25 In the 1990s, under the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the juridical status of Catholic Church 
was revised through amendments to the constitution that had protected the tradition of liberal anticlericism 
that characterized the Mexican Revolutionary and Post-revolutionary state. Salinas de Gortari claimed to 
“modernize” church- state relations by making them public and explicit. After a Mexican Bishops 
Conference at Los Pinos (the presidential house), an Archbishop told news agencies with glee “We entered 
through the front door” (El Universal, LaTimes). 
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after hiring an UNAM law student as a research assistant did I learn how to properly 
request access to cases before they are prepared for the public domain. Of course by the 
time I received notification from the court that I could visit the archives for a limited 
amount of time to read the cases of interest, I had already returned to Baltimore. 
 In January of 2015, I returned to Mexico for follow-up fieldwork. On that 
occasion I made a trip outside of Mexico City to visit one of the top nationally funded 
centers for legal research to speak with Arturo,26 a central figure in the internally divided 
circle of Mexican feminist lawyers and activists.  He welcomed me to a brand new office 
with bright expansive windows overlooking the dry landscape.  Located thirty minutes 
outside the state’s capital city, his first question to me was how much did the taxi charge.  
Cincuenta pesos (fifty pesos), I said. Puta madre (son of a bitch), he muttered.  In fact, he 
had made a point to tell me in our brief correspondence how much it should cost, thirty 
pesos.  But the place was extremely difficult to find and after driving back and forth the 
driver had requested eighty, I had talked him down to fifty. So you’re a law student, he 
asked enthusiastically.  No anthropology, I said.  Arturo brought me to his office and he 
called out to his assistant, a young woman completing her Masters degree at UNAM and 
applying to law school in the U.S., to prepare us two coffees. We began a recorded 
conversation that went on into the evening, where I joined him in his drive to pick up his 
kids from school and then back to his house for dinner that had been prepared by his 
households’ domestic caretaker.   
 I began with a few questions about the recent constitutional controversy cases that 
I had not been able to access directly, which Arturo had litigated in the Supreme Court. I 
asked how they had come up and how they departed from earlier strategies, speaking in 
                                                        
26 I’m using a psuedonym to protect his confidentiality. 
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English because he was perfectly and keenly fluent. He said he would tell me the whole 
story but that he “was known to ramble and go into long side stories” and so I should 
interrupt and get him back on track as needed.  Arturo started by recounting a meeting of 
representatives from ANDAR, the national alliance of NGOs for the right to decide.  
During that meeting, “I gave a very strong opinion that... okay so here’s the thing” he 
interrupted himself.  “At the time the only strategies that they had thought of were 
acciones de inconstitucionalidad and amparos. And then I gave my opinion that amparos 
are not going anywhere... and it’s important to mention this: He spoke cautiously ...the... 
internal politics of the feminist movement made it so that... from the Allianza- which is 
the big NGOs- they could only send one representative per legal strategy meeting.  At this 
meeting the turn for being there I think was for, I don’t remember, but it wasn’t GIRE... 
so it was a meeting about the legal goals of the feminist movement and the protagonist 
wasn’t there.” It was in this context that Arturo proposed a new legal strategy. He argued 
that the amparo structure necessitated that a woman either be willing to go to prison for 
an illegal abortion (since she would already be known to the state by virtue of her 
petition), or carry an unwanted pregnancy to term because of the delayed legal process of 
petitioning the state.  Paulina Ramírez, for instance, gave birth in 2000.  In this sense, the 
writ of amparo used in the case of an untenable or unwanted pregnancy has the 
paradoxical effect of claiming reproductive justice in the name of an individual while 
virtually ensuring that that individual will not see justice- she will either carry her 
pregnancy to term or wait for an undetermined amount of time in prison.  The actions of 
unconstitutionality are not viable options because the majority of state government 
officials and human rights commissions are politically aligned with the reforms to protect 
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life at the moment of conception. “So basically through those two avenues you’re 
screwed,” Arturo concluded.  His team of elite law professors based in Mexico City, most 
of them with law degrees from UNAM and masters and doctorates from Yale and 
Harvard, pursued constitutional controversies instead, which would bring the debates 
about abortion regulation back into the “legal game of jurisdiction” that the Supreme 
Court had initiated in its 2008 decision. Arturo contrasted the relatively conservative 
approach of the feminist NGOs that spearheaded most of the litigation on abortion rights 
through the writ of amparo and his own, perhaps more creative, engagement with law, 
which he called “legal guerilla.”  
I was somewhat disappointed, and also quite amused, by a parallel he drew 
between the leftist politician Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s attempt to refuse the 
federally mandated switch to daylight savings time in Mexico City in 2001 and the 
municipal governments of Ansunción de Ixtaltepec and Uriangato attempts to refuse their 
states’ constitutional reforms to protect life at the moment of conception in 2013.  Both 
issues entered the Supreme Court as constitutional controversies, and in both cases a 
larger authority was challenged by a smaller body within its own jurisdiction – in the first 
case the federal government was opposed by Mexico City and in the second, the state 
governments of Guanajuato and Oaxaca were opposed by municipalities. With a tone of 
admiration, I asked him if the idea to mobilize the constitutional debate through an 
invocation of municipal jurisdiction came from the legal struggles for autonomy that 
indigenous communities in Oaxaca and elsewhere had waged against the state and he 
responded that the precedent for their strategy had actually been AMLO’s daylight 
savings case.          
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 In 2001, one year after the defeat of the PRI and the election of Vicente Fox of the 
conservative Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), previous governor of Baja California 
where the Paulina scandal took place, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) of the 
leftist Partido de la Revolución Democratico (Democratic Revolution Party, PRD) and 
mayor of Mexico City at the time, staged a political challenge against Fox and the federal 
government by refusing to adopt daylight savings time. In an interview with La Jornada, 
AMLO associated daylight savings time with United States imperialism,27 asserting “they 
cannot, from abroad, impose on us what time we must wake up, what time we must go to 
work, what time we must go to sleep" (March 3 2001, LA Times).  President Fox 
responded that all of the federal offices in the city, since it is the seat of the federal 
government, as well as all of the institutions under federal rule, such as schools, would 
indeed adopt the daylight savings clock whether the Federal District government agreed 
or not.  Commentators relished the thought of Mexico City divided internally by National 
and Federal District “jurisdictions” in such a way that time itself would be illegible. 
 As Arturo explained, AMLO’s argument was that “Fox was invading congress’s 
power and thus had made an illegal decision that affected the citizens of Mexico City. So 
the fundamental right to legality– basically that authorities act according to law- of the 
people he represented as mayor of Mexico City- was being violated because the wrong 
institution had made the decision.” For the constitutional controversies on the right to life 
reforms, Arturo and his team followed AMLO’s example, arguing both that states could 
not redefine the status of personhood, a category that could only be altered in the Federal 
Constitution and that the state reforms invaded the competencies of the municipalities to 
                                                        
27 The CNTE in Oaxaca called it “la hora neoliberal” (neoliberal time) or “la hora del tirano” (tyrannical 
time) (Debbie Poole). 
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provide adequate healthcare to women.  But the Supreme Court upheld the “right to life 
at the moment of conception” reforms, countering that they in no way contradicted the 
Federal Constitution or inhibited the powers of the municipalities. Where the court had 
invoked Mexico City’s jurisdiction as ground for the constitutionality of the 
decriminalization of abortion, they also upheld each state’s capacity to define the limits 
of legal personhood within their local constitutions—and hence criminalize abortion with 
even more severity. 
AMLO’s daylight savings case might seem like one of Arturo’s long winded side 
stories that I should have interrupted, but it actually raises some of the fundamental 
points about the shift in abortion regulation that I set out to highlight in this chapter.  
First, questions of jurisdiction within Mexican law are not solely spatial or technical, they 
are also particular enunciations of juridical power. Mariana Valverde suggests we 
understand jurisdiction less as the foundation of spatial sovereignty and more as an 
interpretative standpoint with concrete political effects.  In this sense, problems of 
jurisdiction lead us to ask questions not only about “who governs where,” but about “how 
we might govern and be governed” (2009: 145).  In this sense AMLO took the politics of 
jurisdiction to its literal conclusion, in which the question of who manages our time was 
an emphatic question about how to govern and be governed. Mexico City, in its unique 
position of rivaling authority to the federal government, was divided between two modes 
of government that explicitly entailed different orientations to time.  
Alongside the juridical power exercised through the exception, jurisdictional 
politics concern the separation and interpenetration, not only of territories, but of 
alternate competencies and rationalities of government, each with their own temporal 
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imaginaries.  In the Action of Unconstitutionality brought against the Mexico City 
reforms, we see that the “principle of legality,” a technical argument invoked by the 
CNDH, has as its object the temporal dimensions of life as defined by law.  In the debates 
about competencies we see how questions about whether abortion is an object of health to 
be regulated as a preventative measure in the management of the population, or as crime 
to be punished persist.  The shift from regulating abortion through exception to 
jurisdiction has thus not merely avoided an interpretation of abortion as a constitutional 
right, as some critics have pointed out, but also positively re-constructed it as a legal 
object hinged between rationalities of criminal punishment and clinical intervention.28  In 
the next chapter, I examine how the convergence of healthcare with criminal law shape 
the provision of abortion inside Mexico City clinics, and more specifically how 
conflicting legal and clinical temporalities are managed, inscribed, and to some extent, 
refused in a collective patient body.  
 












                                                        
28 For Mariana Valverde (2003 and 2014), “criminal law and other instruments for punishing wrongs try to 
ascertain past events and provide a symbolic return to the time before the injury was committed through 












Clinical Intervention and Collective Expressions of Pain 
 
Rosa, a literary scholar, feminist philosopher, and orientadora (counselor) in a 
private abortion clinic in Mexico City, consistently took the questions I posed to her and 
made them into something else.  She was often frustrated by my fascination with the 
2007 Mexico City law, and the legal language with which I approached reproductive 
politics more generally.  It took me awhile to begin to grasp what she was saying, that my 
approach was symptomatic of a broader problem in transnational feminism, which since 
the 1990s has fetishized the “legal” at the expense of other starting points and 
frameworks.  In the middle of a two and half hour recorded conversation, Rosa was 
frustrated again by my return to the question of legality. “Now look, one has to 
understand, she said, that abortion has been reduced to its legal concept as if there has 
been a decantation of the term and they have forgotten... I mean so many things that they 
are forgetting because of encapsulating everything in one concept- and the concept 
always refers back to the law of 2007.  So it seems to me, that in this sense, well it’s a law 
that has encouraged the access, search for and visibility of abortion, but that it has also 
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favored other ghosts...”29 Rosa’s comment not only suggests that feminist concepts of 
reproductive health have been narrowed by a discourse of legal rights, but that the 
legalization of abortion in Mexico City, while progressive in certain terms, has also 
brought to the fore old problems that we tend to forget.     
 A self-proclaimed radical feminist, Rosa has worked as a counselor in a private 
abortion clinic in a middle-class residential neighborhood in Mexico City for ten years. 
Opened in 1999 by an association of private doctors who trained themselves in the 
provision of abortion procedures long before the 2007 reforms, the clinic has an uneasy 
position vis-a-vis public models of care. For Rosa, the provision of free abortion 
procedures under the state’s rubric of the “Legal Interruption of Pregnancy” might have 
unintended consequences.  In one of our many conversations about the shortcomings of 
the government-funded ILE clinics, she made this point in so many words, saying to me: 
“as an anthropologist you must understand that the gift can be poisonous.”30 Her remark 
about “the gift” has pushed me to think about the kinds of relations that are established 
through public clinic care. What is given in the public abortion clinic, and how is it 
received? What is expected in return and what would constitute a failure to comply with, 
or fulfill this exchange?  
                                                        
29 Ahora mira, hay que entender que el aborto se ha reducido a su concepto legal como si se haya hecho una 
decantación del termino y han olvidando o sea muchas cosas que se están olvidando por el virtud de 
encajonar todo en un solo concepto- y el concepto es a partir de la ley del 2007 entonces me parece que en 
ese sentido, pues es una ley que ha favorecido el acceso, la búsqueda y la visibilidad del aborto, pero que 
también ha favorecido otros fantasmas y en esos otros fantasmas esta el hecho de olvidarnos de la parte de 
salud que incluye el proceso del aborto 
 
30 Rosa was probably citing Marcel Mauss’ well-known essay in which he explores the etymology of the 
word gift- meaning both present and poison in Germanic languages. “The drink-present can be a poison; 
with the exception of a dark drama, it isn’t; but it can always become one.  It is always a charm anyway 
(the word “gift” has kept this meaning in English) which permanently links those who partake and is 
always liable to turn against one of them if he would fail to honor the law” (reprinted in The Logic of the 
Gift, 1997: 30). 
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 In this chapter, I situate the provision of free abortion procedures in Mexico City 
within a broader political economy of healthcare in Mexico. In the first two sections, I 
examine how neoliberal market reforms and histories of poverty relief programs aimed at 
poor mothers frame Mexico City’s ILE policy.  I then consider how the exceptional 
legality of abortion, as discussed in the first chapter, lends the routine procedures and 
pedagogies of the public clinic a peculiar moral force.  Drawing on ethnographic research 
in public clinics as both a patient-advocate and “shadowing” providers, I explore how the 
clinical intervention is shaped by competing temporalities of punishment and prevention.  
In the final sections of the chapter, I explore how expressions of pain counter the moral 
narratives of the clinic.  I describe a scene in the public clinic in which women’s pain 
emerges as a collective affective intensity and then is left behind when they exit the clinic 
and return to their families. In conclusion, I suggest that such collective expressions of 
pain emerge as an ephemeral form of relationality, at once shaped by, and flowing against 
the logics of clinical intervention. 
 
The Political Economy of Care  
 While the Mexico City ILE policy, based on a broader social policy of the right to 
health, was designed to even out the distribution of risk to poor women, I saw in my 
ethnographic research how the political economy of public and private continues to 
unevenly distribute, if not mortality, than different affective and bodily registers of pain 
and moral stigma.  As an advocate for women travelling to Mexico City from other 
states, I attended public, private, and transnational ‘NGO’ clinics (such as MexFam and 
Marie Stopes), with women from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds and domestic 
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situations. Moving between multiple institutional spaces, I was struck by the different 
practices of care in public versus private clinics. Such differences were not only manifest 
in the way providers and patients spoke about rights and obligations, but also in the 
material and affective architectures of the clinics (Street 2012). Women with scarce 
resources from other states usually attend public clinics. Below are some points of 
reference from Red Paulina’s database that show how resources are assessed by feminist 
advocates. The data is based on information collected from women either over the phone, 
or from the solicitudes for support that they fill out themselves online.    
 In 2011, Red Paulina accompanied 466 women from other states to clinics in 
Mexico City.  Women came from every state in Mexico, with a majority coming from the 
neighboring states of Mexico, Puebla, and Morelos.  The next largest group comes from 
states with higher levels of abortion criminalization: Jalisco, Guanajuato, Guerrero, and 
Veracruz. There were also a small number of cases in which women contacted the Red 
from other countries in Latin America: Puerto Rico, Brazil, Colombia, and Chile.  The 
solicitudes for support that women fill out online, and the paper forms filled out by 
advocates over the phone in the office, ask if the woman belongs (pertenezca) to a 
particular ethnicity.  An overwhelming majority of women respond no to this question.  
In 2011, 13 women identified with the following ethnicities: Otomi, Mixe, Tseltal, 
Nahuatl, Amuzga, and Tzotzil. Material-economic precarity is measured by questions 
like the following: Is there running water in your household?  What kind of floors do you 
have? (earth, tile) Do you have a phone?  Do you have internet? But these questions are 
usually left blank.31  If they are filled out it is in the instance that the advocate hopes to be 
                                                        
31 See Appendix F for Red Paulina registration form filled out by advocate speaking to a woman on the 
telephone. 
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able to mobilize an agreement with one of the NGO clinics, like Marie Stopes, for a 
discounted abortion procedure.  The large majority of women also select Catholic under 
the religion heading, followed by none, and then Christian.  Over half of the women 
(259), accessed one of the public ILE clinics administered by the Mexico City 
government, 22 went to a private clinic, 18 went to Marie Stopes, 21 attended a MexFam 
clinic, and 146 self-administered misoprostol.  Among all of the women who travelled to 
Mexico City, two reported that the pregnancy was a result of rape, but that they did not 
seek legal services in their home states.32  
 Generally, unless a convenio, or agreement is in place (which in the case of NGO-
funded clinics come up for certain amounts of time according to shifting funding sources 
and motivations), women without financial resources are directed to public clinics for 
free-of-cost care.  In particularly sensitive cases, such as situations of domestic violence, 
sexual assault, and lack of parental consent for women who are under 18, Red Paulina 
will arrange appointments at private clinics and cover part or all of the costs with varying 
reimbursement plans with the women who receive the care. Most of the women who 
attend public clinics, with few exceptions, do so because they do not have the resources 
to attend a private clinic. As Dra A., the coordinator of one of the ILE clinics put it 
nonchalantly, “no one with money would come here, they’ll go to a private hospital, 
because it’s more comfortable to have your own little bed and all that, no?”   
 Mexico has a nationwide social healthcare policy called Seguro Popular, which 
since 2011 has been celebrated by the World Bank global health experts as an exemplary 
achievement of universal health coverage (Klingen 2013). Developed in the era of 
                                                        
32 I compiled this data from the NGO database, which is not in the public domain.  The NGO publishes tri-
monthly bulletins with similar kinds of information about the women they support and how they mobilize 
the network’s resources (donations) to increase abortion access.   
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privatization and structural-adjustment, the policy is based on two central tenets: 1) the 
“reinvestment” of public funding from the social security employment-based public 
health institutions (IMSS and ISSTEE) to Seguro Popular, and 2) the administrative 
decentralization of public healthcare funds. On a national scale, Seguro Popular provides 
health services to people living in conditions of poverty and those who are not employed 
in the formal sector (Agudo 2015).  Funding is allocated to each state towards an 
“essential package” of services that state governments then design and implement 
according to their local budgets and Health Laws (Frenk, Gomes-Dantes, Knaul 2009). In 
terms of reproductive healthcare, the essential package has varied tremendously from 
state to state (Mills 2015).          
 The World Bank, which has supported the growth of Seguro Popular over the past 
two decades, reports that 55.6 million people were enrolled in the program in 2013, 
accounting for almost half of the national population (2015). One of the strongest critics 
of the program has been Asa Cristina Laurell, who served as Mexico City’s Secretary of 
Health between 2000 and 2006.  She argued that the global health discourse promoting 
Seguro Popular as a universal health success story is a ruse for a dual policy of market 
commodities and poor relief (Laurell 2001: 299). At the same time as the program 
expands coverage, it draws boundaries within the population between those in need and 
those with capital, encouraging the growth of private medical institutions for those who 
can afford it while stripping down the basic services that are accessible to the poor.  
 In spite of initial resistance, the Mexico City government implemented Seguro 
Popular in 2003 and has since attempted to fold the program into its discourse of 
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inclusive liberal citizenship and public responsibility (Laurell 2008: 152).33 The 
decriminalization of abortion within this framework has thus involved the progressive 
development of special clinics that are strategically placed in different areas across the 
city.  The first ILE clinic opened in 2008 after the Supreme Court upheld the 
decriminalization of early abortion in 2007.  Other specialized clinics opened in 2011, 
2012, and 2014.  The first, which I will call the Victoria Abasolo clinic, is located on the 
edge of a residential neighborhood near a chaotic transportation hub in the northern most 
part of the city.  It’s a neighborhood where taxi drivers refuse to idle for fear of rateros 
(thieves) and where streets are lined with fast food restaurants and generic pharmacies 
advertising the sale of viagra and cytotec (misoprostol).  Exiting the metro on the side of 
the neighborhood (on the other side the metro connects to a major bus station through an 
underground tunnel), one encounters groups of men sitting listlessly on the ground with 
hand-drawn signs offering manual labors, such as car mechanics and plumbing. To arrive 
at the Victoria Abasolo clinic, you take a pesero (a small bus with rides that cost four 
pesos) whose destination is marked Puente Negro (Black Bridge).  You have to tell the 
driver that you want to get off at El Pollo Rico, a fast food chain that is visible from the 
highway.  Waiting in a line of people for the bus, your back is to a makeshift market of 
the kind that surround all metros in the city, although a bit on the grittier side, with 
gorditas, pambazos, and cocteles de camarón, socks, aprons, posters of jesus and the 
human body, and pornographic magazine stands.  
 All of the ILE clinics were installed in existing Community Health Centers 
(Centros de Salud) that operate with Seguro Popular, re-inhabiting spaces that were 
                                                        
33 See the Mexico City Secretary of Health website description of the principles of free healthcare 
(gratuidad) http://www.salud.df.gob.mx/portal/index.php/programas-y-accionesc/grat 
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originally designed for something else.  One of spaces now used for an ILE clinic 
previously specialized in services for mothers and infants (Materno-Infantil), as one of 
the clinic coordinators lamented to me, as though the community had taken a dark turn 
when the space was re-utilized for ILE. The Victoria Abasolo clinic, has, since opening, 
attended between 35 and 50 patients per day, the largest number of all the clinics, in part 
due to its convenient location and that it is well-known.  It also receives the greatest 
amount of resources, (staff and supplies) from the Mexico City Ministry of Health. The 
first clinic to implement the ILE program, it is where all of the ILE doctors, nurses, and 
social workers receive their training.  The Mexico City government also measures the 
successes and shortcomings of the policy based on yearly observations of the Victoria 
Abasolo clinical reports on daily operations. While I accompanied women to all of the 
different kinds of legal abortion clinics in the city, I conducted extensive fieldwork inside 
the Victoria Abasolo clinic, shadowing the clinical staff on a daily basis over a period of 
six months.   
 
Gendered discourses of poverty relief 
 The efficacy of the free abortion procedures provided by the state is intensely 
contested among feminist activists, scholars, and policy makers.  While some feminists 
have demanded that the state guarantee safe abortion as a matter of governmental 
responsibility for women’s health and wellbeing, others, Rosa for instance, are concerned 
about the kind of subjectivity produced when women, especially poor women, are 
recipients of state benefits. In their investigation of whether the Mexico City 
decriminalization of early abortion has effects on women’s subjective understandings of 
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citizenship rights, sociologists, Ana Amuchástegui and Edith Flores outline three 
prevalent discursive positions among patients in public ILE clinics: the grateful subject, 
the irresponsible subject, and finally the “proper subject of rights” (2013: 915).  They 
suggest that the former two positions are obstacles to the realization of “rights 
consciousness,” reflecting histories of stratified reproduction and clientalist governmental 
relations. Within this history, they argue, social services have generally been understood 
as “a decision of, and gift from, the state rather than as a citizenship claim” 
(Amuchástegui and Flores 2013).  They further suggest that the limitation of state-
regulated ILE services to specialized clinics funded by Seguro Popular “transfers the 
underprivileged status of the poorest women without social security to all women seeking 
abortion” (2013: 916).        
Their concerns resonate with critiques of the gendered implications of social 
development projects in Mexico. Maxine Molyneaux traces the links between current 
neoliberal policies aimed at “empowering the poor,” and the normative prescriptions of 
“good motherhood” that sustain Mexican paternalism (2006).  To illustrate her point, she 
focuses on the nationwide conditional cash transfer program, Oportunidades, which 
targets women, as poor mothers, as recipients of monthly installments of cash that must 
be invested in their children’s health and education. Social workers monitor women’s 
compliance with certain conditions set by the state, using a set of criteria such as school 
enrollments and the maintenance of regular healthcare appointments. Molyneaux argues 
that it is primarily through the construction of children’s needs, and in a parallel fashion, 
the heteronormative family, that women are able to access benefits from the state (See 
Reyes-Kipp 2016).          
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 Drawing on ethnographic research as a consultant for Oportunidades, Alejandro 
Agudo Sanchiz tracks the distinct models and historical moments of social development 
that undergird contemporary policies of poverty relief in Mexico (2015). During the 
presidency of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) structural adjustment required the reduction of 
public spending as a condition of Mexico’s negotiation of debt.  Within the rhetoric of 
cost-effective public spending, the federal government transferred the control of 
resources to municipalities and reoriented social welfare programs from national citizenry 
to specific target groups within the population.  These neoliberal reforms reignited strong 
critiques of clientalism and the corrupt spending of public funds (Agudo 2015).  In 
concert with increasing public pressure, governmental languages of transparency and 
“co-responsibility” and the allocation of funds directly to madres de familia (mothers of 
the family/household) aim to prove that resource distribution empowers marginalized 
individuals (rather than arbitrarily shifting the organization of patron-client relations) 
(Agudo 2015: 76). The new contractual language of “coresponsibility” positions poor 
mothers- as (vulnerable) actors in the household- “as citizen-benefactors who are capable 
of making decisions in their own interest.”  Importantly, poor mothers’ entitlements to 
state resources are envisioned as temporary- aimed at “making the citizen active in their 
own fate” rather than dependent over a long period of time (See Greenhouse 2014).   
 Building on 19th century theories of the “intergenerational transmission of 
poverty,” such government programs targeting poor women claim to interrupt the “cycle 
of poverty” by “facilitating access to the goods and services that allow [families] to grow 
the necessary habits and aptitudes so that, with their personal force, [they can] reach a 
full, self- sufficient life” (SEDESOL, cited in Sanchiz 2014; See Stepan 1991). Within 
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this rationale, poverty relief policies are designed to get women “to invest in their own 
human capital” by having less children and providing more health, educational, and 
nutritional resources for “smaller families.” Indeed a campaign urging the moral value of 
smaller families is painted all over the cement walls that line highways and urban and 
rural streets of Mexico: La familia pequeña vive mejor/ The small family lives better. 
Furthermore, according to Agudo, much of what occurs under the rubric of “active 
citizenship” and “personal force,” in practice, seems to obey “a logic of donation and 
indebtedness” (2015: 97).  In her study of the mistreatment of poor women in public 
hospitals in Morelos, a state that borders Mexico City to the south, Joaquina Erviti echoes 
Agudo’s observations about the entanglement of discourses of citizenship rights with 
policies aimed at the management of population. She argues that Article No. 4 of the 
Mexican Constitution, which recognizes the “right to decide, in a voluntary manner, the 
number and spacing of one’s children,” is conjoined with objectives of population 
government.  In a context in which family planning policy is based on an ideology of 
modernization in which women “are converted into objects of intervention instead of 
subjects,” hospital physicians and nurses deploy discourses of “reproductive rights” 
unevenly depending on racial and class-based assessments (Erviti 2005: 96).  The result 
of this selective deployment of “rights” is that women who are deemed morally 
suspicious or inadequate mothers do not receive good care (See Reyes-Kipp 2014). Erviti 
documents, for instance, how hospital staff members accuse poor women going through 
miscarriages of having provoked abortions, punishing them through the denial of pain 
medication (Erviti 2005).   
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 In spite of the fact that state services are known to be coercive, and unpredictably 
punishing of poor women, many feminist activists are committed to the public provision 
of abortion care. After decades of the NGOization of feminist movements in Latin 
America, they are wary of the conditionality and insecurity of relying on international 
funding and private donors (Alvarez 2009).  For women in situations of untenable 
pregnancy, government ILE clinics might still be more legible than private clinics- which 
given the general criminalization of abortion are thought to be either totally unregulated 
or completely driven by the market.  In a similar way, Red Paulina advocacy is often met 
with suspicion by women receiving their support.  Numerous women said jokingly, only 
after meeting advocates in person, that they had worried about their organs being stolen, 
or more generally, what could be asked of them in return for the accompaniment and 
financial support. We might therefore shift the question from how to enter fully into the 
domain of rights, as most feminist critics ask (Amuchástegui and Flores 2013), to how to 
harness and control the potentialities, as well as unintended consequences of the gift.  
 Along these lines some public health officials argue that the integration of ILE 
services into more comprehensive reproductive health clinics that offer HIV and cervical 
cancer screening in addition to pregnancy termination, would both expand the scope of 
the intervention on women’s health and buffer the stigma attached to the specialized ILE 
clinics, currently seen as “places of death,” as one of the clinic coordinators told me in an 
interview.  On the other hand, Graciela, one of the founders of Red Paulina, worries that 
expanding ILE care to include obligatory STD screenings might also entail women’s 
further subjection to “punishment” from healthcare providers.  Her fear is that given the 
transgressive character of abortion, women’s bodies in the public clinic are made 
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available to unpredictable forms of moral inscription.  Graciela’s concern reminds me of 
Veena Das’s reading of Nietsche’s legal subject who loses the rights over his body 
“because of an injury he has caused the creditor” (1995: 185).  Asking how women’s 
bodies become the sites where the violence of the nation-state can be inscribed and then 
justified, Das writes: “woman falls into the position of becoming a debtor whenever the 
normal order of society and family is disrupted” (1995: 185).  
 
The clinical intervention  
 Working with Red Paulina, which holds good favor with the Mexico City 
Ministry of Health by providing basic resources such as toilet paper, juice boxes, and 
needles that are required for drawing blood when clinic stocks run low, I built a rapport 
with public clinic guards and staff over time. With the permission of the director of the 
Mexico City ILE program, I was eventually allowed to rotate among staff, doing small 
tasks alongside receptionists, social workers, nurses, and physicians, and observing daily 
routines beyond the waiting room.34 Every day I attempted to arrive to the clinic before 
6:45 am, travelling an hour and a half on metro and bus from the southern-most borough 
of the city to the far north, and I frequently failed.  Often arriving just past 7am, I would 
find the mauve iron gate closed with a huge chain lock, the women who had been lined 
up outside since the early morning would already be in the clinic presenting their 
documents. Outside the gate a small group recited Rosarios Santos on behalf of the 
                                                        
34 While observing clinic routines, I sometimes slipped into an unofficial role as “patient-advocate.” The 
clinic originally knew me in this capacity through the NGO, and it was sometimes ethically impossible to 
adopt the distance that clinic providers did with patients.  The slippage between ethnographic observation 
through “shadowing” and advocacy in the clinical setting was extremely problematic and uncomfortable.  
After particular events, such as the one described at the end of this chapter, I stopped attending the clinic in 
this way.  
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women inside, pleading for forgiveness and praying that not a single other abortion take 
place. They solemnly held a framed image of the Virgen of Guadalupe in her appearance 
to Juan Diego on the Cerro de Tepeyac, lighting two altar candles in front of her portrait. 
Family members and friends of the women inside huddled together outside the gate with 
sleeping children in their arms.    
 The ILE clinic is located around the side of the Centro de Salud, and can only be 
accessed through the separate gated entrance.  In front there is an “ILE information” 
stand where prolife groups pretend to be part of the Health Center.  They often coax 
women into entering a long bus with official lettering on the side that advertises 
“Women’s Health Services.”  Upon entering the bus they are promised a free ultrasound, 
but only if they first watch the US made anti-abortion film, The Silent Scream.  They are 
then given an “ultrasound” that always produces an image of a fetus of an advanced 
pregnancy and then made to listen to its heartbeat (Joyce 2013).  On the wire fence that 
separates the street sidewalk from the busy road are posters titled in official lettering 
“ILE in DF.” The posters display graphic images in the style of a medical textbook, 
purportedly showing how an abortion is done, but using pictures of a Dilation and 
Cutterage procedure.  Dilation and Cutterage, referred to in Spanish as legrado, is an 
older, more invasive procedure that is no longer used for early abortion.  It is still the 
most common word used to refer to a clinical abortion procedure and the risks it entails 
continue to haunt the collective imagination.  Inside the gate to the ILE clinic, two 
posters announce that the information about the Legal Interruption of Pregnancy is only 
given inside the Clinic.  These competing signs, all appearing in nearly exactly the same 
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format, are a disorienting, as well as completely mundane instance of the illegibility of 
the state (Poole 2004). 
  
 
Fig. 3. The sign inside the gate reads: INFORMATION about the LEGAL 
INTERUPTION OF PREGNANCY is only given inside the Clinic.  Outside signs give 
contradictory information with graphic images of fetal bodies and inaccurate depictions 
of ILE procedures. 
 
 The gate was locked at 7am sharp in order to limit the number of women who 
entered to request services.  The guard would return at 10am to open it again, allowing 
those to enter who were returning for their obligatory ultrasound, scheduled for one week 
after the procedure. At that point family members and companions were allowed to enter 
the small courtyard outside the clinic doors.  They were asked to sit inside a small tent 
and if they roamed around or approached the glass doors they would be sternly directed 
to return to the tent or leave the area.  Throughout the morning the women inside would 
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come to the doors and gesture to their waiting companions who would run up and quickly 
exchange a few words through a crack in the door before being scolded by the guard. The 
mangy and affectionate little street cat would often appear at these opportune moments, 
run in, and usually find a place to curl up among the bustle in the waiting room, for a 
moment at least, before being scurried out.        
 Even if I arrived a bit late, they’d open the gate and let me squeeze into the clinic 
waiting room full of women, who strangers to one another, shared seats, whispered 
fragments of their situation, and filled out forms using each other’s backs as surfaces.  
While the majority of women with pregnancies of less than 10 weeks receive a dose of 
mifepristone in the clinic and take home a dose of misoprostol to effect a “pharmaceutical 
abortion,” women from other states, and anyone with pregnancies between 10 and 12 
weeks, are required to undergo an electrical aspiration procedure (AMEU). Because the 
voluntary termination of pregnancy is criminalized outside the jurisdiction of Mexico 
City, the procedure must be completed in the clinic to ensure its legality.  Patients first go 
through a quick ultrasound and consultation with the coordinator of the clinic, Dra. A.  
Based on the number of weeks, they are split into two groups, of those who will have an 
AMEU and those who will take home the pills.  
 Inevitably some women would be determined “fuera del programa” or “outside 
the program.” This status was announced and written across their thin clinical files, when 
their pregnancy exceeded 12 weeks, or if they were under the age of 18 and could not 
present a photocopy of one of their parent’s IDs- which served as proof of parental 
consent.  As I described in the introduction, young women searched for ways around the 
requirement of parental consent.  Alondra and her boyfriend looked for someone with the 
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same last name around the clinic to provide a copy of their identification to present to the 
clinic secretary who, presumably, would never check to see if parents were actually 
waiting for the young woman outside.  Encompassing both limitations is a margin of 
acceptability, whereby one may or may not just be “passed through.” Once designated 
“outside the program” it was not unusual for the doctors to offer hushed alternatives that 
would take place outside the legal sphere, for a cost. It was also not unusual that women 
under the age of 18 would invent alternative ways of documenting their parents’ consent. 
Secretaries sometimes even accepted handwritten letters to be placed in patient files in 
lieu of the photocopied ID. Though flexible, the collection of required documents 
demands an unpredictable amount of time, which when compounded with other 
exigencies, such as the time it takes to travel to and across the city, time taken off from 
work, and the pressure to maintain domestic rhythms in order to keep the abortion a 
secret, can create both a sense of implacable urgency and resignation.  
 Many women who attended public clinics had already attempted to terminate their 
pregnancies through other methods.35  According to the clinic physicians, the widespread 
use of misoprostol, which can be bought in almost any pharmacy, seriously threatened 
the integrity of the clinical intervention. Dra. A would often chastise patients for 
“automedicating,” her accusatory phrases punctuated by the steps of conducting the 
ultrasound. In these dialogues with patients Dra A. constructed the proper time-line of 
clinical intervention in which the action of taking the pills in the recent past was 
projected onto a hypothetical, but almost certain future “disaster.” Here I recount one 
                                                        
35 In the 120 surveys with patients who were going to use miso in the waiting room, 40 of whom said they 
tried other methods before going to the clinic 
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such dialogue that I recorded in my fieldnotes as I helped Dra. A fill out the forms that 
documented the ultrasound results for the patients’ files. 
 
Dra. A: Don’t do stupid things, eh? It’s your life, not mine. 36  
 
The young woman was lying on the gurney, her pants already unzipped, Dra. A pulls 
them aside and squirts cold blue gel on her belly. 
 
Dra. A.: Why did you self-medicate? What did you take?37  
 
Patient: I don’t know 
 
Dra. A: What do you mean you don’t know? What did you do?  
 
Patient: I put two under my tongue and one in my vagina.  
 
Dra. A already knew the story through the social worker, but was trying to get the woman 
to confess it to her directly. A friend had apparently given her misoprostol, the same pills 
that the clinic administers legally.  
 
Dra. A: That friend doesn’t care about you much if she pretends she’s a doctor.38 She 
turns to make eye contact with me and rolls her eyes, turns back to the patient and 
spreads the gel with the end of the ultrasound wand. 
  
Dra. A: This is our work 
 
Patient: I didn’t know... my friend told me, the patient responded quietly 
 
Dra. A: Well then stick with her because the other one isn’t your real friend, she put you 
in risk. Dra. A looks at the ultrasound image on the screen and announces: You have 7 
weeks, and what would have happened if you had fallen outside the program?  And we 
would of had to respond to the disaster?  
 
                                                        
36 No hagas tonterías, eh? Es tu vida, no es mía 
37 ¿Por qué automedicaste? ¿Que tomaste? No sé. ¿Como no sabes? Que hiciste? Puse 2 bajo de la lengua 
y 1 en la vagina. No te quiere mucho si se siente médico. Nosotros trabajamos en este. No sabía, me dijo 
una amiga… pues júntate con ella porque la otra no es tu amiga, te puso en riesgo. Tienes 7 semanas, y 









The doctor announces the number of weeks the woman is pregnant while at the same 
time implying that she could have just as easily been pregnant longer.  If that had been 
the case she would not have been able to access the legal procedure as she would have 
“fallen outside the program.”  Importantly though, even if she had to be excluded from 
the program, the doctors would still potentially be in a position to respond to her 
situation, only in this case it would require an ambiguous act of generosity that would 
exceed what they are legally obligated to do. The conjuring of a scenario in which the 
woman might not have been able to access legal care is central to Dra. A’s moral 
narrative (See Mattingly 1998).  Through this conjuring, it is as if the woman will receive 
the abortion procedure against all odds and just in the nick of time. The reiteration and 
assumption of control over the boundaries between legality and illegality funnel a strange 
power into Dra. A’s hands.  Her authority is both dependent on, and made insecure by, 
the exceptional legality of the clinic. It is precisely because Dra. A acts as a 
“representative of the state that she is able to move across—and thus muddy—the 
seemingly clear divide separating legal and extralegal forms of punishment and 
enforcement” (Das and Poole 2004: 14).  Yet Dra. A is not only exacting punishment; she 
also provides sought after care. In a sense, her relationship to the patient becomes a 
modality of police power that straddles domains of law enforcement and future 
prevention—treating the woman’s abortion simultaneously as a crime and health 
objective of the state. The moral narrative thus hinges competing temporalities, “allowing 
the governance of the past to be articulated with the governance of the future” (Valverde 
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and Dubber 2006: 4).39         
 While Dra. A. spoke within both temporal frames, social workers strove to 
consolidate the situation of unplanned pregnancy as a past error and to bring patients 
fully into a future orientation of improved self-care. On the occasions that I was allowed 
to observe clinical operations beyond the waiting and ultrasound room, I was never alone 
with an individual patient, but rather immersed in a group of 12-20 women as they moved 
through the clinic together.  In preparation for the AMEU procedure, a group of women 
would begin receiving intravenous fluids together at 10am in a small area just outside the 
operating room.  There is a plaque on the wall dedicated to a woman, Charlotte Ellerson, 
a “feminist entrepreneur and advocate.” Inscribed there, uncannily, is the Emily 
Dickenson poem, in its original english, The heart asks pleasure first.  It reads:  
The heart asks pleasure first 
And then, excuse from pain- 
And then, those little anodynes 
That deaden suffering; 
 
And then, to go to sleep; 
And then, if it should be 
The will of its Inquisitor, 
The liberty to die. 
 
On the other walls are posters urging the use of condoms. Adjacent to the poem, there is a 
handmade drawing of a penis with a condom on it and the words Metodos 
Anticonceptivos spelled with letters made from differently colored pieces of construction 
paper.  Another poster, perhaps the most memorable, shows a lively cartoon penis 
exclaiming, Sin gorrito no hay fiesta! (Without a hat there’s no party!). Another one 
                                                        
39 In interviews clinic doctors spoke of themselves as “technicians of law”- legality was referenced 
whenever uncomfortable questions of personal morality came up. Working in way similar to Sameena 
Mulla’s analysis of criterial thinking as a technique for managing moral disgust (2014).  
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reads: Usa condón, no seas egoísta, no solo eres tú (Use a condom, don’t be egotistical, 
it’s not just about you).  
 While the patients began receiving fluids, a social worker wearing the navy blue 
uniform of SSA-DF would draw up a chair to sit among them.  One day I timidly took 
notes as the social worker dio su plática (gave her speech) about the finality of the 
decision to terminate pregnancy and justification of the Legal Interruption of Pregnancy 
as a last resort family planning intervention. The grammar of her speech was quite 
instructive, “We often think in the form of ‘if only I had’... well now we can’t think ‘if I 
had,’ now it must be left behind us.”40 Moving from a subjunctive past tense that is used 
to describe an action that happened in the past but that continues or repeats into the 
present, to the past preterite that describes an action absolutely completed, the social 
worker builds a temporal orientation in which the abortion is both the logical resolution 
of an error, and a new beginning for a reproductive future in which it should not occur 
again. Shifting tenses in this way had moral force, resonating oddly as the IVs dripped, 
which treated everyone for potential malnutrition, but were often interpreted by women 
as a medication that started the abortion. For instance, after the social worker concluded 
her remarks, one of the women told the group about another woman she had been talking 
to outside the clinic in the early morning hours. The Provida people who set up the 
“information booth” outside the Centro de Salud had grabbed her arm and she had been 
dissuaded and left.  It really scared me (me dio mucho miedo), she paused and continued, 
it makes me feel ashamed/it pains me (me da pena)... But now that I’m already here, she 
lifted her arm with the IV, what can I do?        
                                                        




 The social worker rips out a piece of paper from her notebook and begins asking 
the women a set of questions, jotting down their answers somewhat haphazardly. She 
asks their names, how old they are and why they decided to interrupt their pregnancy, 
every now and then intercepting with pedagogical remarks that address the women as a 
collective, reformulating each I and you into We and shifting the weight of responsibility 
and the locus of agency from external events to the actions of the women.41  For instance, 
a 22 year-old woman admitted that she had an ILE last year, after which the physician 
inserted an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD). “Me falló” (it failed me), she said 
and the social worker corrects her, “The IUD doesn’t fail, no, an infection that we have 
causes the cervix to open and the device moves, that’s why we need to have it checked 
every 6 months.” She asks the women who accompanied them that day, my sister, my 
partner, my boyfriend, my dad, they respond in turns.  No one, one of the women says. 
And why didn’t you tell the father? The social worker asks.  He’s married, she replies.  
As the social worker establishes a linear timeline of error and resolution, she also 
communicates what is morally acceptable.  By asserting linear time over other possible 
temporalities, the intervention is made to fit a narrative of redemption (Mulla 2014, 
Greenhouse 1989).         
 The two most potent threats to this narrative of redemption, and thus the integrity 
of clinical intervention, are the widespread use of “non-legal” modes of pregnancy 
termination, such as the self-administration of misoprostol mentioned in the ultrasound 
scene described above, and the possibility of repetition, or the slippage of ILE from last 
resort to routinized form of contraception.  Doctors, nurses, and patients expressed horror 
                                                        
41 Speaking in the collective we is quite a common form of address in Mexico, especially in an institutional 
setting. It mediates between the personal form of address tú, and the deferential form usted. Everyday Dra. 
A greeted me by saying, Como estamos? How are we? 
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at the idea that abortion could become a contraceptive method.  The specter of repetition 
also dovetails with the general feeling that the provision of legal abortion procedures 
could be taken away if used inappropriately.  In Ana Amuchástegui and Edith Flores’ 
interviews with women about their perception of ILE services, one woman is quoted 
saying: 
“It is not a game. Women must avoid thinking: ‘so what? there’s always 
this solution’, because precisely by thinking that way they can take these 
things away from us, and then we won’t have them anymore because 
women abused the opportunity” (Amuchástegui and Flores 2013: 22) 
 
Accompanying women through the feminist network I heard many women voice similar 
sentiments.  Without any official stipulations against the number of times one may access 
an ILE procedure, secretaries and social workers have also begun to take it upon 
themselves to try to track women who return to the clinic for a second or third time.  One 
day I sat with Guadalupe, the secretary at the Victoria Abasolo clinic, as she compiled 
patient files. In stiletto heeled boots and a long flowing shirt, she handed me a styrofoam 
cup of coffee. “Es medio cabrón, yo así ando”(It’s pretty ass-kicking, this is how I roll), 
she boasted. Beside the section heading “Motives for ILE” where women were supposed 
to write in the reason for the desire to terminate pregnancy, Guadalupe had written in a 
new section for “Delegación” or city borough, to track the women who came from the 
surrounding neighborhood.  “I handle this jurisdiction separately,”42 she said.  There was 
someone who came in for the sixth time, she said with utter disgust written across her 
face, and then paused to see if it also makes me apalled. “Since we don’t work with 
                                                        
42 Yo manejo esta jurisdicción a parte 
 79 
advanced technologies, there’s no way to enter her name somewhere and know that she’s 
already been here- we have to trust them,”43 she says incredulously.   
 At the time of my research, the ILE clinics did not operate with computers but 
with handwritten files and log books. The receptionists have thus developed an 
impromptu system to track repetitions.  If they think they remember someone they look 
for her file and sometimes find it.  Then they write in big permanent marker across the 
front of the file, 2do vez (2nd time) and highlight it.  They told me that this way they 
might catch women who try to pretend it’s their first time.  
 Maribel, the head nurse at the clinic, with perhaps the kindest countenance of 
anyone there, explained why she pushes women to have the IUD inserted after the 
AMEU procedure. “Son muy olvidezas y tienen miedo de las inyecciones/ They’re very 
forgetful and they’re afraid of injections,” so it’s best they accept IUD, whenever we 
have it.  It’s not a coincidence that the clinic generally runs out of all other contraceptive 
methods, such as hormonal contraceptive pills and patches, by March each year, after the 
initial distributions from the yearly health budget in January. Every morning while social 
workers “give the speech” to patients, Maribel goes outside to the tent to speak to the 
families and friends of the patients about contraception.  An improvisation she has made 
because she thinks they should be involved.  As she talks, kindly in her way, people in 
the tent interrupt her delivery with tidbits of their own experience.  Most people have 
something to say about the iud, the most widely used contraceptive method in Mexico.  
Mi sobrina used it, got pregnant and had a baby and wouldn’t you know it was plastered 
to his arm! …I used the IUD and my blood was more abundant and then I guess my 
                                                        
43 Como no manejamos tecnología avanzada, no hay manera de poner su nombre y saber 
que ya había estado aquí- tenemos que confiar en ellas 
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organism adapted to it- Yes, Maribel confirms, It is a foreign body and the organism has 
to respond how it will. But the patch is only for “a very careful woman,” insinuating how 
unlikely it is that anyone here would fit that description. ILE is not a method of 
contraception, she reiterates, We have women who come back three or four times. A 
woman in the tent shudders dramatically.   
 The anxiety about repetition is entangled with the slippery boundary between the 
legality and illegality of abortion. The right to ILE, legitimated as a public health 
objective, operates through a logic of intervention in which the interruption of pregnancy 
must produce health-maximizing outcomes that justify the moral transgression.  Within 
this logic, repetition threatens to outweigh the tenuous balance between rationalities of 
prevention and punishment.  Dra S., coordinator at one of the other ILE clinics, who was 
in certain moments blatantly cruel to patients, told me that some kind of fee should be 
imposed to discourage women from taking the procedure too lightly. The law “is good, 
it’s excellent,” she said, but “there should have been a certain number at which point you 
say, okay, intervene one time, interrupt once, I mean, you have to think really hard 
because there’s not going to be a second, or a third, or a fourth, or a fifth, like the ones 
we’ve had here.  That’s what I tell you, its the same thing, same ones.  So they should... I 
think that they should apply a recovery fee.  I think its one of the factors why the people 
(la gente) can be so repetitive, because it doesn’t cost anything, it costs them absolutely 
nothing.”44  
                                                        
44 “Debería de haber un cierto número de decir bueno, intervienes una vez, interrumpes un vez, este, tienes 
que pensar muy bien porque no hay una segunda, no una tercera o una cuarta o una quinta, como las que 
hemos tenido aquí.  Lo que te digo, son lo mismo y las mismas. Entonces deberían, yo creo que deberían 
tener una cuota de recuperación. Yo creo que uno de los factores porque la gente puede asi tan repetitivas 





As I moved alongside women through different phases of the clinical procedure, I 
often heard the phrase, “Tengo miedo” (I’m afraid). “De qué?” (of what), I would 
sometimes ask, or someone else would ask.  The response would most often be, “Que me 
va a doler mucho” (that its going to hurt me a lot). I once asked the coordinator of the 
Victoria Abasolo clinic if there was anything that could be done, aside from 
administering general anesthesia, which was not possible in this environment, to decrease 
a particular woman’s pain during the abortion procedure.  She responded unequivocally, 
“Pain, in general, is the same for all women, and the Mexican woman endures a lot, a lot, 
a lot.”  
While the public clinic coordinator envisioned pain as distributed equally in a 
collective body of “the Mexican woman,” Rosa, the private clinic abortion counselor with 
whose words I began this chapter, created an individualized diagnostic rubric for 
assessing and managing each woman’s experience. In contrast to liberal feminist 
languages of choice and control that tend to occlude the reality of pain that accompanies 
a surgical procedure, Rosa emphasized the transformative potential of the pain associated 
with abortion.  Do you think the manual aspiration procedure is painful? I asked her in 
one of our conversations.  “Is it painful? Yes it’s painful,” she answered adamantly. “A 
woman who is in pain changes odor, her breathing is different, the tone of her skin is 
different, the gestures of her face are different, therefore, yes, there is pain.”45 In 
                                                        
45 una mujer que esta durante un procedimiento de aspiración manual endouterina y tiene dolor 
cambia de olor, su respiración es diferente, el tono de su piel es diferente, los gestos de su rostro 
son diferentes, entonces sí hay dolor. 
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response, she created a diagnostic rubric for predicting the amount of bodily pain each 
woman was likely to experience based on her emotional and affective state in the 
counseling session before the procedure.  She called this potential pain experience the 
“umbral.”  From Latin umbra refers literally to shade or shadow, and in clinical terms 
refers to “pain threshold.” She thus saw herself in a position to diminish women’s pain 
experience through providing the right kind of attention in her talk and bodily posture 
before and during the procedure.46  Rosa aimed to respond not only to the woman’s 
reactions to the doctor’s actual touch, but by anticipating her “imagination of touch,” as 
she put it (See Cornell 1995).  To her mind, pain was most likely amplified rather 
diminished in the public clinic. “In the public clinic someone who has an umbral of six 
might experience the procedure at 10 or 15 because of the poor treatment,” she said. 
Whereas Rosa sought to address each woman individually, women in the public 
clinic setting were addressed as a collective body and shuttled through all phases of clinic 
procedures as a group.  There was a day that stands out in my mind in which the pain of 
the group of women going through the aspiration procedure in the public clinic was 
particularly intense.  The operating rooms are next door to one another and open to a 
small hallway that leads to the recovery room where the women spend most of the 
morning.  At about 11:30am the two male gynecologists begin doing the aspiration 
procedures.  Two female nurses line up the patients in twos outside the rooms, and a male 
nurse wheels a noisy electric aspirator back and forth between the rooms, as there is only 
one.  Beneath the metal gynecological exam table with stirrups, is a bucket where the 
blood and other materials of the terminated pregnancies are allowed to fall together.  As 
the first women enter the procedures, the affect noticeably changes among the waiting 
                                                        
46 See Kleinman and Kleinman (1985) on damping vs. amplifying pain through therapeutic talk 
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women. Sounds of breath and voice expressing pain call out from the rooms and the 
women waiting express the sounds on their faces and in whispers to one another.  The 
doctors, whose actions are by all accounts hurried and harsh, use familiar modes of 
address with the patients, such as reinita (little queen), hija (daughter), mamacita (little 
mama), telling them to relax, while asking them impertinent questions, such as, How 
many children do you have? Did you birth your children from below? What method (of 
contraception) are you going to take home with you today?  The nurses, young women 
themselves, keep a consistent distance from the patients, avoiding their gaze and directing 
their attention to keeping pace with the speed of the doctors’ actions.     
 Just before one of the women was summoned by a nurse to wait outside the 
operating room she grabbed my hand, all of a sudden frightened by the prospect of going 
in there alone.  Please hold my hand she said, looking me fiercely in the eyes, it helps to 
have someone hold your hand.  I stood by her as she moaned and her eyes rolled back in 
her head, she never looked me in the eye but grasped my hand with all her force for the 
five- minute duration of the procedure. When it was over she seemed shocked, the nurse 
and I helped her move around to the side of the table and walk back to the recovery room. 
She could barely walk and she softly sobbed as the nurse let go of her arm and let her 
drop down to the stretcher.  She hunched over herself.  The other women stared at her 
with surprise.  I helped her lie down and found her jacket to cover her legs because she 
was shivering and covered in goose bumps. One of the women sitting beside her said, “I 
felt exactly where he scraped me, I felt so much.  Where you feel the physical pain inside, 
you realize what you’re doing.”47        
                                                        
47 Me sentí exactamente donde me raspaba… tuve muchos sentimientos 
En donde te sientes el dolor físico a dentro te das cuenta de lo que estas haciendo 
 84 
 After half an hour many of the women began eating sandwiches and drinking 
juice boxes, which they are told to do before leaving the clinic, and many are anxious to 
do so in order to rejoin their family and friends waiting outside.  Just as half of them 
began to eat, another woman become enraged during the procedure, yelling at the doctor 
that he was hurting her. Afterwards she flew out of the operating room, tears streaming 
down her flushed face.  Several women at that point became desperately nauseous and 
threw up several times in the recuperation area. They had perhaps eaten too quickly, but 
the vomiting seemed to give expression to something, though without a specific 
emotional referent.  It was not just grief, shame, rage, fear, or relief, which were feelings 
many women had expressed at other points.  It seemed as though their pain had built up a 
kind of momentum that circulated through sounds and materialities coursing through and 
between their bodies. I kept going for more and more wet paper towels to clean the floor 
and the nurses kept busy moving more women through the AMEU procedure. At a 
certain point, the rush of vomit stopped and each woman began gathering her things to 
leave undisturbed by messy clinic floor.  
 I stayed beside the woman who had grabbed my hand as she gathered her things.  
Her younger sister was waiting for her outside. She had not told her that she was having 
an abortion but that she was having uterine cysts removed. “The knowledge would 
contaminate her,” she had said. When we walked out of the clinic she walked quickly 
toward her her sister and they hugged tightly.  I stood to the side, struck by their intimacy 
and how distinct it was from the one she and I had briefly shared. She did not speak to me 
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again.  The other women joined their families without maintaining any contact with one 
another; casually they streamed out of the clinic gate.  
 
Bodily pain, and endurance        
 How do such articulations of pain bear the marks of a particular form of law and 
clinical intervention? 48 The Legal Interruption of Pregnancy, as a set of legal and clinical 
discourses and practices, gains legibility, as well as ambivalent moral force, in relation to 
postcolonial histories of social development and family planning policies and logics.  One 
might think the difference between ILE and programs like Oportunidades is obvious 
because policies that construct women’s citizenship through maternal identity reinscribe 
ideals of the heteronormative family and gender, whereas the state provision of abortion 
liberates women from such constraints.  But this is too facile a reading of how abortion is 
folded into broader state narratives of appropriate reproductive futures.  As I described in 
the beginning of this chapter, public clinics construct the event of unplanned pregnancy 
as an error that can be resolved by the clinic (and only the clinic) on the condition that it 
never happens again.  In this sense, the form of conditionality that operates in the 
exchange between poor women and the state makes ILE services contiguous with other 
social programs based on temporary, cost-effective interventions that aim to improve the 
reproductive subject. Yet, as I examined in the first the chapter, abortion is uniquely and 
awkwardly regulated across competing domains of government. In spite of global heath 
                                                        
48 I borrow this formulation from Sarah Pinto who takes up a parallel problem in her discussion of how 
poor rural women speak about infant death in North India (2008).  Pinto asks how women’s ways of 
accounting for and recounting infant death stand in relation to “transnational structures of health 
intervention in the postcolonial world of the “developing country”” (2008: 360).  She argues that languages 
of grief are truncated by fatalist concepts of causality that are inextricable from the histories of intervention 
that have “rendered the lack of [parental] affect or resignation a characteristic pathology of the subaltern 
woman” (363). And yet “talk among women about past losses flows within and against a legacy of 
interventions” (360).   
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expertise and local feminist movements that have documented the starkly unequal 
mortality rates related to unsafe abortion, which many hope would settle its status as a 
public health need, in Mexico it continues to be defined, and arguably felt, as a crime.  Its 
provision is therefore always under the rubric of exceptionality. Legal and medical 
rationalities and motivations are thus interwoven in Mexico City ILE clinics in peculiar 
ways.  In an effort to think further about how the public abortion clinic emerges at a 
particular crux of juridical and medical power, we might ask in Michel Foucault’s words: 
“What is it in this disciplinary place that is supposed to cure?  What medical practice 
inhabits this space?” (2006: 129).       
 As a disciplinary institution, the clinic is one site among others where a more 
general mediation between juridical and biopolitical power takes place, transforming the 
spectacle of sovereignty into something useful, and productive.  In Foucault’s words: 
“out of discipline a medically useful space was born” (1975: 144). In The Birth of the 
Clinic (1973), Foucault analizes how the clinical display of pain figures into this 
usefulness. “Can pain be a spectacle?” he asks (1973: 84).  It must be, he argues, for the 
clinical structure of exchange requires it. In order for the poor, and “morally disarmed,” 
to receive treatment, pain must be offered as an object of knowledge that can in turn be 
applied to the general population, and more specifically analyzed to improve medical 
interventions on the bodies of the rich (Foucault 1973: 85; See also Cohen 2004 and 
Goodfellow 2015).  Yet is there some sense in which the body in pain refuses to be 
useful?           
 It is perhaps in the lectures gathered in Psychiatric Power (1973-1974), where 
Foucault speaks most clearly to this question.  In distinction to the “classical cure” for 
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madness in which the doctor-psychiatrist manipulates the content of delirium in order to 
“satisfy it,” modern psychiatry forcefully imposes reality in order to make madness 
disappear (2006).49 Foucault’s description of the classical cure resonates with Levi 
Strauss’ account of the ritual actions of the shaman who eases the pains of childbirth by 
singing a song about a mythical struggle between helpful and malevolent spirits taking 
place inside the woman’s body (1963).  It also elucidates Rosa’s understanding of pain 
management in which her ability to anticipate and respond to the patients “imagination of 
touch” is integral to her capacity to diminish the actual experience of pain.  “Reality,” in 
these otherwise distinct forms of cure, is secondary to the collaborative making of truth 
between doctor and patient.  There is a tacit form of violence that inheres in medical 
power, above all when the doctor’s authority denies the meaning of pain in the patients’ 
world, “giving itself the truth” - rather than engaging a struggle for truth over the course 
of a curing relationship (Foucault 1973, Kleinman 1988, Rapp 1999, Biehl 2005, Biehl 
and Moran-Thomas 2009, Han 2011, Mulla 2014, Das 2015). 
 For Foucault, the problem or limit to power posed in psychiatric medicine, was 
never how to establish the truth of the cure, but how to establish the truth of symptoms. 
At the core of psychiatric medicine, there is a nagging problem in which “a true symptom 
is a certain way of lying and the way in which a false symptom is a way of being truly ill” 
(2006: 135).  Simulation, Foucault argues, “was a response of madness to the closure of 
psychiatric truth... the anti-power of the mad confronted with psychiatric power” (2006: 
136).  Hysteria, in particular, reveals this phenomenon of struggle. “The only way not to 
                                                        
49 “Introducing reality into the delirium behind the mask of delirious figures, so that the delirium 
is satisfied by reality... through a game of transformations, of masks, one surreptitiously introduces reality 




be demented in a nineteenth century hospital was to be a hysteric, that is to say, to 
counter the pressure that annihilated symptoms, that obliterated them, by building up the 
visible, plastic edifice of a whole panoply of symptoms, and by means of simulation, 
resisting madness being fixed in reality” (2006: 254).  Might we think about collective 
expressions of pain in the public clinic as resistant to “being fixed in reality”? 
 For feminist anthropologists concerned with the medicalization of reproduction, 
pain has been one of the central figures through which women’s reproductive experiences 
are analyzed as “sources of power as well as subordination” (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991: 
312; See also Martin 1987).  Cecilia Van Hollen discusses the uneven effects of modern 
reproductive technologies in Tamil Nadu, India where many women seek the intensified 
pain of Oxytocin-induced labor (2003). She shows how the deliberate use of oxytocin and 
the rejection of anesthesia reworks what in other contexts has been understood as the 
violence of biomedicalized birth into a kind of regenerative female power.  Many 
scholars have analyzed the infliction of pain on low-income women in public healthcare 
settings in Mexico as an instrument of gender and class subordination (Erviti 2005, 
Castro and Erviti 2003, Howes-Mischel 2012, Herrera 2013, Smith-Oka 2014 and 2015, 
Mills 2015). In these works, poor women are often discussed as victims of explicit abuse 
by hospital staff and broader health care infrastructures.50 Rather than analyze pain along 
such fixed axes of power and subordination, I have tried to become attuned to the 
agentive way it is expressed and the affective relations and historical and embodied forms 
                                                        
50 Lydia Zacher Dixon draws on ethnographic research with activist midwives who are re- framing obstetric 
practices as violent—as opposed to medicalized—in order to situate the “humanized birth” movement 
within broader discussions about drug cartel violence, gender, and inequality (2014).  Dixon’s work stands 
a part from the others, in that she locates her analysis of women’s experience of pain within a struggle to 
define what constitutes violence in a social context in which extraordinary violence has become part of 
everyday life (See also Angela Garcia 2015). 
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of being that make particular expressions of pain possible while foreclosing others (Das 
1996; Asad 2003). Women in the public clinics were intensely, however fleetingly, 
involved in a collective body-in-pain, and then returned back to themselves as they 
calmly walked away from the clinic.  Based on the limited conversations I did have with 
women after they had clinical abortions, many did not speak of it with their friends and 
families.           
 Julie Livingston gives an ethnographic account of the economy of pain expression 
in Botswana cancer wards that, while attesting to the profoundly social nature of pain, 
encourages a cultivated disposition of silence (2015). In a culture of silent expression, 
“laughter offers the prospect of reestablishing an embodied sociality” (2015: 198).  I do 
not claim to interpret how the experience of abortion in the public clinic might fit into a 
culture of pain expression in Mexico, as I did not observe how women folded their 
clinical experience into their ongoing lives, nor did I have much opportunity to speak 
with them afterwards.  It is clear though that there is an economy expression in public 
clinics that differs significantly from an abstract biomedical picture of the individuated 
patient-body,51 as well as how pain was imagined in other kinds of clinical settings in 
Mexico City, such as Rosa’s private clinic.  This economy of expression was far from 
silent. Women expressed their pain through a collective excess of sound and bodily 
secretion.52           
 Does the collective outpouring of pain discharge the moral burden of the clinical 
intervention, allowing women to return their normal everyday without carrying the shame 
                                                        
51 See Annmarie Mol (2006) 
52 Begoña Aretxaga discusses the trangressive potential of bodily excretions in the context of the Dirty 
Protests in Northern Ireland prisons in the 1970s (1995). She argues that the excess of the female body 
garners affective political force that resists interpretative meaning, and thus the total subjectivization of the 
disciplinary institution. See Douglas 1966, Kristeva 1982, and Grosz 1994 on bodily excess and gender. 
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or pain (pena) that clinical pedagogies seemed to reiterate?  By attending to the way pain 
emerges and dissipates, temporarily constituting an embodied sociality among patients, 
perhaps we have a picture of neither total subjectivization, nor resistance, but an 
ephemeral affective intensity through which women are able to endure the routinized 




















Kinship and the Juridical Subject  
 
“If law cannot adequately define the boundaries between life and death, guilty killing and 
innocent execution, then what is left of law?”  (Sarat 1999: 7) 
 
 Following the decriminalization of abortion in Mexico City in 2007, 17 of the 32 
Mexican states made reforms to their local constitutions “to protect life at the moment of 
conception.”  The wave of reforms is part of conservative state efforts to limit women’s 
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access to abortion under the legal exceptions in which it should be provided, as well as to 
prevent the expansion of such exceptions in the future (GIRE 2015b). In spite of 
jurisprudence by the Mexican Supreme Court and the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights that have said that “fetal rights” and the “protection of prenatal life” must 
be interpreted interdependently with the protection of women’s reproductive health and 
rights, the constitutional reforms have exacerbated uncertainty about the legality of 
abortion.53  The attribution of juridical personhood to what in Mexican legal language is 
often called “the product of conception,” conjoins contemporary Catholic understandings 
of the essence of life in the materiality of DNA with Roman Law concepts of nacsiturus, 
or the treatment of the unborn as legal persons in matters of their future interests (i.e. 
inheritance) (Lemaitre 2014, Madrazo 2014). The Mexico City reforms were widely 
understood as a denial of prenatal personhood along these terms and the legislation 
triggered intense lobbying by pro-life advocates and Catholic Church officials. Mexican 
Catholic bishops threatened excommunication to Mexico City politicians and Pope 
Benedict XVI sent a letter to the Federal District Legislative Assembly urging them to 
reconsider the ILE reform, writing pointedly “a crime, even under a different name, is 
still a crime”54 (Balboa 2007). 
 The confluence of catholic, scientific, juridical, and governmental frameworks of 
life as a constitutional right is parsed out and experimented with in the domain of 
criminal law.  As I outlined in chapter one, each Mexican state differently defines 
exceptions under which abortion should be legally provided within their local penal code.  
In a similar fashion, state penal codes vary in the location or typification of the crime of 
                                                        
53 From the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, see Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica an from the Mexican 
Supreme Court, Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad 11/2009 and 62/2009 
54 ''Un delito, aunque se le cambie el nombre, sigue siendo delito'' 
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abortion in relation to other kinds of crimes.  In all states except Mexico City, abortion is 
defined as “the death of the product of conception in whatever moment of pregnancy,” 
yet the severity of punishment that it incurs varies significantly. According to Mexican 
reproductive rights legal advocacy NGOs, between 2012 and 2013, a total of 682 
denuncias (or legal accusations) against women for abortion were registered across 
Mexico (GIRE 2015b).  The states with the highest number of reported accusations are 
the following, in this order: the Federal District (Mexico City), Quintana Roo, Baja 
California, Vera Cruz, and Guanajuato. Of the 682 filed accusations, 75 proceeded to 
judicial processing, and 29 were sentenced.55       
 Between 2008 and 2011, a small feminist NGO in the state of Guanajuato brought 
international attention to seven cases of women incarcerated for the crime “Homicidio en 
Razon de Parentesco,” or Homicide Qualified by a Relation of Kinship.  Reproductive 
rights advocates have since equated the crime with infanticide for simplicity as they 
address international audiences (GIRE 2015). In 1994, infanticide, along with parricide 
and filicide, was replaced by Homicidio en Razon de Parentesco in both the federal penal 
code and most of state penal codes.  In states with articles defining this crime, the 
“relation of kinship” is specified to varying degrees, but it always includes ascendant, 
descendent, collateral, adoptive, by marriage and “concubine.” They also specify that the 
offender must have knowledge of this relation. The new crime thus collapses what was 
previously delineated as different kinds of crimes into one, and adds marriage, adoptive 
                                                        
55 In 2006, Human Rights Watch published a report on abortion access after rape in Mexico.  At that time 
statistics about the criminal prosecution of abortion were unavailable.  Increased pressure on state 
authorities over the last decade have perhaps led to more open reporting on criminalization practices, but 
this is difficult, if not impossible, to measure.  It is therefore impossible to say if the number of criminal 
abortion cases has increased following the constitutional reforms that protect life at the moment of 
conception, or not.   
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and concubine to relations otherwise imagined to be based on blood or 
“consanguinidad.” The majority of states consider the knowledge of a “relation of 
kinship” to be an aggravating factor that increases the prison term of a regular homicide 
from 10-20 years to 20-60 years. Across the variations of state penal codes, the 
aggravating quality of “razón de parentesco” is described as “traición,”or betrayal of the 
“security and trust that are tacitly expected within familial relations.” 56  
 In states that still define infanticide separately, the definition refers to “the mother 
who deprives life from her child within 72 hours of its birth.”  Infanticide often includes 
the clause: “to hide her dishonor,” as the necessary motivation for the crime and the 
prison term ranges between one and six years.57 Most states now list abortion, homicide, 
and either infanticide or homicide qualified by a relation of kinship within a cluster of 
crimes “against life and personal health” or “corporeal integrity,” or some variation 
thereof.  As discussed briefly in chapter one, the state of Guanajuato includes only two 
exceptions under which abortion is not punishable, in the case of rape and accidental 
pregnancy loss (aborto culposo). This places the state in the category of most severe 
abortion criminalization along a wide spectrum that places Mexico City in the category of 
most liberal and progressive.58  Perhaps evidence of this, Guanajuato defines “Homicidio 
en Razón de Parentesco” as a crime in itself (rather than a qualification of homicide) in 
Articles 156 and 157, directly preceding the article that defines abortion (Código Penal 
                                                        
56 “Traición” is generally listed among other aggravating considerations, such as premeditation in a section 
before the crimes are specified. Some states consider homicide of an ascendant relative to be more severe 
than homicide across other directions of kinship.    
 
58 This categorization becomes more complicated when you look at actual practices.  The most denuncias 
for abortion are reported by Mexico City. 
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del Estado de Guanajuato, Periódico Oficial, 03 June 2013).59  
The recent incarceration of women for Homicidio en Razón de Parentesco incited 
a feminist outcry that condensed around a well-known story of the state’s victimization of 
poor and indigenous women.  Mexican feminist scholars, activists and non-governmental 
organizations connected the cases to broader patterns of the violation of women’s rights 
in order to advance an anti-abortion political agenda around the country (Woldenberg 
2009, Cruz 2011, Las Libres 2013).  Articles in El Universal, La Jornada, and the New 
York Times characterized the cases as an attack, orchestrated between public health 
providers and the police, on defenseless women: poor single mothers, uneducated and 
stigmatized within their own communities (Garcia 2009, Malkin 2010, Pérez-Stadelmann 
2010). For the seven women imprisoned for homicide qualified by a relation of kinship, 
the NGO engaged a team of reproductive rights lawyers and legal scholars in a highly 
public defense strategy. The mobilization of local and international media and human 
rights networks eventually led to a reform to the Guanajuato state penal code that added a 
subcategory beneath Article 156 to specify that “to the mother who deprives the life of 
her child within the twenty-four hours immediately following its birth, and furthermore, 
that this deprivation is a consequence of psychosocial motivations, there will be imposed 
six to ten years of prison.” 60          
The reform allowed the release of the seven women from prison, all having been 
charged with homicide qualified by kinship committed against their newborn (recién 
nacido) under the original sentence of 25 to 30 years.  At the same time, it reflected a 
                                                        
 
60 “A la madre que prive la vida a su hijo dentro de las veinticuatro horas, inmediatamente posteriores al 
nacimiento de éste, y además dicha privación sea consecuencia de motivaciones de carácter psicosocial, se 
le impondrá de seis a diez años de prisión” (Guanajuato Gaceta Oficial, June 2011) 
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typical, disappointing outcome of the pressure mounted on state authorities by feminist 
and human rights networks.  Instead of acknowledging a harm done, by either conceding 
the innocence of the women imprisoned, or admitting the mistaken conflation of 
homicide with abortion, state authorities deflected accusations by resignifying women’s 
vulnerability (a mainstay of feminist arguments) as an attenuating, albeit pathological, 
circumstance. The episode suggests how public acts of benevolence on the part of the 
state towards “dishonored” women can exercise violence covertly – and furthermore, 
how this double gesture reflects the narrative struggles between local and transnational 
feminist and human rights networks, medical and psychiatric experts, and legal, political, 
religious officials.  Mexican feminist NGOs continue to support women in the public 
telling of their story in language distinct from the state.  Along this line of breaking 
silence and raising consciousness, the groups GIRE and Las Libres have made new 
documentaries featuring women charged with abortion and homicide qualified by a 
relation of kinship (Las Libres 2012 and GIRE 2013).   
In the remainder of this chapter, I closely examine one of the cases of the seven 
women incarcerated for Homicidio en Razon de Parentesco.61 Tracing the evidence 
mobilized in the case, I explore how criminal responsibility is constituted as “traición,” or 
betrayal, of the intimacy of kinship.  What is at stake in the state’s recourse to kinship 
betrayal in the criminalization of abortion?  How do competing normative claims to life 
and death thread through this intense moral charge?  What picture of the juridical subject 
undergirds the construction of this crime? 
                                                        
61 Focusing on the case files instead of looking for women’s voices or collecting narratives, I suspend the 
question of the repression or expression of truth and instead explore how a particular kind of legal truth is 
made in the legal case file (for a critique of “compulsive feminist discursivity,” see Brown 1996 and 
Mookherjee 2015). 
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  I first recount how I encountered the case files in an NGO setting and their 
trajectory in the Mexican judicial system. Drawing on anthropological studies of law and 
bureaucracy, I track how the case is constituted as a sealed legal text that ensures a 
totalizing temporal horizon of action. In the second part of the chapter, I show how the 
scene of crime is rendered through public health surveillance and expert psychiatric 
knowledge that constructs the accused woman as a dangerous element in the social body. 
I argue that these processes of elucidating the crime through extra-legal knowledges 
produces a gendered juridical subject defined by pathological kinship relations. The 
absent, potential, or destroyed maternal-child relation becomes an analogy for other 
relations. Criminal responsibility is therefore not secured through the autonomous 
individual who is master of their acts, but against the backdrop of the normal 
“campesina,” rural working class family held together by intimate knowledge.  
 
Cotejos and the Closure of the Legal Text 
I began reading the criminal cases in a house in Guanajuato used as an office by 
the feminist NGO that spearheaded the defense strategy.62  I sat alone in an upstairs room 
that was usually occupied as a counseling space for women living with domestic and 
sexual violence and who were deciding what to do about an untenable pregnancy.  A 
loveseat and a chair faced one another.  A coffee table filled the small space in between, 
topped with a digital clock and a box of tissues.  In the corner, there was a brightly 
painted miniature wooden table and chairs for children.  Hidden in the sliding door closet 
                                                        
62 Reading the case files in the house of the NGO suggests their status as a contested archive, already 
dislodged from the place of law, worked over by teams of lawyers and then archived again, and perhaps out 
of their original order.  See Rachel Sieder (2010) on the circulation of legal discourses outside the original 
frame of the state- deterritorializations and reterritorializations of law. 
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were overflowing cardboard boxes of the criminal case files of the women who had been 
charged with “Homicidio en Razon de Parentesco” between 2007 and 2011. The boxes 
were ripping at the corners under the sheer weight of the documents after having been 
mailed back and forth between affiliated lawyers in the United States and Mexico. No 
one had re-opened the boxes and they had, for the time being, been haphazardly shoved 
back into the closet. Talia, the director of the NGO, had agreed to let me read them, but 
only in the house in Guanajuato.  Grateful for the chance, I spent a month reading them in 
that dimly lit room.  Although sometimes I would cart a case downstairs to sit outside in 
the beautiful sun, I usually didn’t for fear of disorganizing the documents.  
In the morning I would walk up the steep hill from the center of the city to the 
office.  On my way I passed tiny stores (tienditas) in dark cement rooms whose open 
doorways marked a stark line between shade and sun.  Middle-aged women sat inside 
behind cash registers, watching telenovelas on small televisions mounted on the wall and 
eating good food from one of the street stands nearby.  I’d arrive out of breath from the 
climb. Ringing the bell at the gate outside the house, I’d take in the impressive view: the 
striking contrast of colonial Guanajuato city against the expansive hill covered by dry 
grass and yellow flowering bushes.  I soon built enough trust with the NGO so that some 
days Talia or her sister would leave me their keys to work in the house on my own.  
Eventually they allowed me to make copies of the cases and bring them back to Mexico 
City.  Once I had them in my possession there, the files became a burden more than an 
interest. No longer the secret that I sought access to, they just unsettled my sense of 
composure.  I mostly left them collecting dust under my bed because every time I opened 
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them I’d lose hours trying to figure out what was going on, papers sprawled all over the 
floor.  
 Struggling to understand them, I finally asked a law student, Benjamin, for help. I 
began to meet him periodically either at the cafe below my apartment or in the garden of 
the Biblioteca Central of UNAM.  One day I carried one of the cases with me.  I handed 
him the 570-page file, and he looked at me with a smirk.  I told him I just needed a 
general sense of how a penal case file like this one moved through the judicial system.  
He opened it and began giving me an introduction to an endlessly confusing legal world.  
“Hay que encontrar el hilo” (you have to find the thread), he chuckled, “para saber 
donde dirigir tu atención, porque sí, los casos se vuelven en un mundo” (to know where 
to put your attention, because, yes, the cases become their own world).  We began by 




 Fig. 4 
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 The “Orden de Aprehensión” pictured above, is the first of a 157-page decree 
(auto) that initiates the judicial process for a woman I will call Valentina. Before this 
decree, the file contains the documents of the Averigación Previa (AP), which contains 
all of the evidence compiled by the Ministerio Público (MP), or the public prosecutor. An 
Averigación Previa, or preliminary investigation, is initiated either through a denuncia 
(accusation) or a querella (complaint). Whereas an individual person can make a 
“complaint” about a personal injury, denuncias assert from the outset that a law has been 
broken and requires the public prosecutor to represent the case throughout the judicial 
process.  A complaint, in contrast, is pursued by a private lawyer and might be settled 
outside of court.  Following the denuncia, the public prosecutor decides whether or not to 
conduct a preliminary investigation that will, upon completion, be presented to the 
Juzgado, the local tribunal/court of the state.  Each state has various Tribunales and one 
Superior Court located in the capital.  At this phase of investigation, the case is in the 
hands of the executive branch of government and is solely focused on compiling 
evidence.  Only after the point when the public prosecutor’s case has been approved and 
taken on by a Judge at a local level court, does the file officially become “judicial.”  
 To mark its new status as judicial, each page of the file must be authorized by the 
Secretaria de Acuerdos, the Judge’s personal secretary.  After typing each page of text, or 
receiving a document from another office, he or she signs it by marking the entire text 
with a slash. “It’s a “cotejo,” or signature, that gives validity, and it has to cover the 
whole thing in order to say that you can’t write anything else, I mean, to show that it’s 
complete and official,” Benjamin explained to my surprise.  To me the crossing out of the 
text didn’t look like a signature, but rather nullification. Later Benjamin took me to the 
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juzgados in La Neza, a jurisdiction on the outskirts of Mexico City, just to show me how 
a file was made.  Without permission to be there, we lingered gingerly by a counter that 
divided “the court” from a small waiting area for witnesses and family members. At the 
counter stood the cotejadora, (judge’s secretary) in a professional suit with high heels 
and a scarf tied tightly around her neck. On one end of the counter she was putting 
together a manila envelope that would encompass the documents of a new file.  She 
punched holes into two pieces of beige cardstock and then covered them with adhesive 
plastic reinforcement in preparation for the tight binding of a simple white string. Then 
she moved to the light stack of papers, presumably to be the contents of this brand new 
file, and began to sign them with the verifying slash – crossing out the text in a swoop 
with a thick black magic marker.  In his ethnography of the French Council of State, 
Bruno Latour suggests that the writing practices of law aim to domesticate the threat that 
words can be separated from intentions, that identity might be impersonated, or that the 
text might be grafted onto an unintended chain of signification.  In this sense the cotejo, 
or signature, aims to “tie up” loose ends and fend off all potential non-legal iterations and 
effects (Latour 2004).  It also reflects a particular ethos of juridical truth-making 
characteristic of civil law systems, which I will discuss in more detail after considering 
the following document that marks the judicial process and Valentina’s first statement to 
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 The letter above is from the Head of Police to the Judge that communicates that 
Valentina has been apprehended in her home and taken to the municipal prison for 
“preventative detainment.”  In all seven of the cases, when submitting the preliminary 
investigation to the judge for review, the prosecutor also requests and secures the prisión 
preventativa (preventative detainment) of the accused woman when the case is submitted 
to judicial processing. According to a 2016 report by the InterAmerican Comission on 
Human Rights, 52.94% of women prisoners are subject to this procedure, which based on 
Article 19 of the Constitution should only be used when other measures cannot assure the 
appearance of the accused at trial (IACHR 2016: 142-143).  The reason given in 
Valentina’s case is that she might flee to the United States to join her partner, whose 
absence figures strongly in the story of why she committed the crime.63  
 Valentina was detained the 28th of April 2008, after an investigation that began 
the 10th of October 2007.  After her apprehension and detainment she is brought from the 
prison to the Court to give a “preparatory declaration” on April 30th.  At this point she 
can validate or deny the declaration she has already given to the public prosecutor in his 
preliminary investigation. Benjamin assured me that no one denies the original 
declaration because to do so would immediately concede that one is a liar.  The 
declaration thus follows a narrative already set out previously by the prosecutor.  The 
Judge’s secretary poses questions to Valentina while another lower secretary types the 
dialogue at the same time. Afterwards each page of the declaration is signed by Valentina 
and marked by the secretary’s cotejo.  They begin with a series of initial questions and 
                                                        
63 Preventative detainment can last as long as the judicial process, which in these cases lasted 3-5 years. In 
theory, time already served should be subtracted from the final sentence, and if the accused is exonerated of 
her crime, the state is supposed to pay damages for the time spent in prison, but never does (See Hernandez 
and Smith 2008). 
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observations that every preparatory declaration begins with, such as; name, address, age, 
nationality, religion, occupation, income, identifying marks (senos particulares), name of 
her mother, under the influence of alcohol, etc. The text then indicates that “she is made 
to know (se le hace saber) that the Agent of the Ministerio Publico formulated an 
accusation against her for the crime of Homicidio en Razón de Parentesco con Ventaja 
(Homicide, Qualified by a Relation of Kinship and Advantage) against “the minor that in 
life would have responded to the names...” (la menor que en vida respondiera a los 
appelledos...).” The first thing we should note is that the typist records the posing of the 
questions in a third person passive voice, casting impersonality over the questioner as the 
speaker of the law.  In contrast, the formulation of the victim’s status through giving the 
family name repeats the formulation of the “Orden de Aprehensión,” which similarly 
refers to the victim of the crime as “who in life would have corresponded to the name...”  
The particular victim must be named in the same gesture that the speaker of the law has 
no name. “In this moment,” continues the text, “she was read her rights and knowing 
them she stated: “Yes, it is my desire to declare in this procedure...”     
 The text then continues in the first person voice of Valentina who describes the 
scene in which she gave birth by herself outside where the animals were kept, by the 
nopales, on the ground.  She describes her labor pains and attempts to be quiet, and then 
passing out to awake to a stillborn baby. This declaration constitutes the first “audencia,” 
or hearing, in which Valentina, as the “inculpada” or accused, the judge, the secretaries, 
the police agent of the Ministerio Publico and her public defender supposedly come 
together to put forth their side of the case.  There will be three hearings total before she is 
sentenced in which the public defender can make appeals for the addition of more 
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evidence.  Yet this brief excerpt shows how the scene of declaration is primarily 
concerned with reaffirming the existing evidence in the case file.  Indeed it seems as 
though Valentina speaks into a vacuum of law, her voice subsumed within a totalizing 
temporality of the file (See Greenhouse 2014).  The text covers all directions of time, 
first, and most strikingly, through the use of the past subjunctive tense to refer to the 
victim of the crime: “the minor who would have responded to the last names.” The law 
attributes the names to the victim only in retrospect, and then ties this reconstructed ghost 
to the present: “In this moment” in which Valentina appears to declare her crime.  It 
moves authoritatively from a passive third person account of the ongoing procedures of 
law, “she is made to know what she is accused of,” to the first person statements of 
Valentina, punctuated by legal reiterations and rewordings of her statements that at times 
leave no trace of her original speech.       
 All of this takes place very undramatically, Benjamin assured me.  “If you’re 
lucky the judge shows up, but usually they stay in their little cubicle.  It’s the secretary 
that has the public faith.” The secretary’s cotejo that marks the text suggests the peculiar 
temporality of criminal law (Ewick 2014).  If it were open to an uncertain future the 
verification of the text might be suspended until a “final” text is rendered.  Rather, the 
material practices of making and commensurating the text- marked again and again by 
the signature-slash, strive in each instant to fulfill the continuous promise of “being 
legal.” In this sense the file is not crafted in relation to events that have already happened, 
but rather creates a new domain of speech and time into which events are fed, and 
selectively reassembled and authorized. As the case accrues force through the process of 
assembly, the secretaries act as the guardians of “public faith” by marking the 
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authoritative legal speech off from ordinary language and non-legal effects. “Doy fe” is a 
constant refrain in the text, signifying both the power invested in the legal secretary by 
the people to act in the name of law and the vulnerability of the text to the threat of 
iterability.64 In this sense, the impermeability of the text is supposed to ensure the purity 
and certainty of juridical truth (Merryman 1969; Hale 2000; Pizzi and Marafiotti 1992; 
Couso 2010). Yet Mexico’s criminal justice system secures the preventative detainment 
of vulnerable citizens while maintaining impunity for military violence and state 
terrorism across the country (Stephen 1999, de Marinis 2011).65     
 In her feminist critique of the state, Catherine Mackinnon analyzes law as an 
instrument of patriarchal violence, describing it as a “cloak of force” (1989). 
Anthropologists have explored the limits of this critique, pointing out that the notion of 
law as violent imposition, more or less explicitly imagines the human (or the woman) in a 
natural state without laws (Pateman 1980, Strathern 1985, Das and Poole 2004, Valverde 
2003).  Bruno Latour’s study of the material practices of law-making suggests another 
possibility for thinking about law and gender violence. In contrast to Mackinnon, he 
argues that “the relation of law to force is not that of a clothing of naked violence,” 
something else is at work - “it’s not that [of the relation] between truth and its disguises, 
or between the contents and their wrapping, but rather between the transfer of force and 
the peculiar movement of law” (2010: 82).  The primary condition of law, both it’s 
                                                        
64 See Veena Das on perlocutionary force and excuses- what in ordinary language philosophy refers to a 
region of vulnerability of human action, in law becomes a site for the circulation of power (magical and 
rational). 
65 The criminal justice system is currently being converted from “inquisitorial,” in the civil law tradition, to 
“oral accusatory,” which incorporates aspects from jury trials like in the United States. Proponents of the 
judicial reforms generally oppose the written from the spoken, aligning text with absence and voice with 
presence.  In Benjamin’s words, in the new “oral system” “no se hace tanto papeleo... exige al MP que lo 
hace y se lo entregue a los juezes en muy pocas hojas... la ventaja es que tendrán que tener contacto 
directo con el inculpado.” 
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potential violence and justness, is its ability to stay relatively “light” in relation to the 
moral and political complexity of the events with which it deals.  Given any number of 
situations or conflicts, the law is made by selecting “the elements which will allow the 
file to progress according to a particular thought process that we can only call ‘legal’” 
(Latour 2010: 150). He suggests that judges might speak not only legally, but also justly 
when they hesitate before reframing an issue within legal parameters (See Constable 
2005).  Latour analyzes expressions such as  “it is delicate” or “it is complicated” as 
empirical signs of hesitation in the movement of law.66  Given Latour’s description of the 
“just” movement of legal reason, we could say that the potential to speak justly is absent 
in the case files of women charged with homicide qualified by a kinship relation.  To the 
contrary, the cases return to the original ground of the public prosecutor’s argument with 
astounding repetition. In what follows, I outline three prominent forms of evidence in the 
cases to show the arch of this repetition and how it accrues the moral force of kinship 
betrayal. 
 
Intimate Knowledges  
          In Valentina’s case, a nurse in the community health center accuses her of hiding a 
pregnancy in a testimony to the Public Prosecutor. What follows is an excerpt of the 
nurse’s testimony. 
 “…I am a nurse in the Community Health Center, since 1979, it has been approximately 
29 years, because of which I know the majority of the people who live in the community, 
                                                        
66 Latour’s argument is as much methodological is it is theoretical.  By sitting in on review meetings in the 
higher court he was able to observe all manners of presentation and voice between the different actors 
discussing a case. He borrows from semiotic analysis to identify several “value objects” and their shifting 
weight and transformations over the course of a ‘live’ argument. This method and kind of analysis frees 
him, or so he hopes, from falling into a definition of law as an elaborate disguise of arbitrary power or what 
he conceives as its opposite, the mere application of rules.  
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and even some people in the 29 communities that are around because they regularly visit 
the health center for consultations, and also, as I mentioned in my general information I 
live in the aforementioned community, and that is how I realized that Valentina was 
pregnant, whom I have known for all her life since she was born in the community and is 
approximately around 22 years old, and also that Valentina has lived her entire life there 
in the community where I live, and also that Valentina has a 4 year old daughter, and 
even though Valentina is a single mother, I have understood from what I hear around the 
community that Valentina had a boyfriend, whose name I don’t know, meaning I never 
saw her with anyone, and it is the case that I saw her wearing tight clothes, and that was 
the date of October last year 2007, in which there was vaccination campaign in the 
community to which Valentina brought her daughter to be vaccinated, but in this 
occasion I saw that her belly was swollen and also that she wore a large sweater and I 
asked her if she was pregnant, but Valentina, bothered, told me no and I asked her again 
if she was pregnant to which she said no and I insisted and I asked her when had been 
her last menstruation, because it would have been necessary to vaccinate her if she was 
pregnant, and that’s when Valentina annoyed answered that the 8th of february she had 
had her period, a thing I didn’t believe due to the fact of, as I already said, her swollen 
belly, and I said to her “well yes or no, I’ll give you the vaccinations.”67 
 
The testimony is written as continuous speech with barely any punctuation.  The 
reiteration of Valentina’s name and moments of awkward detail suggest points at which 
the legal secretary inserts a question to direct the testimony. The nurse relies on both her 
visual perception of Valentina and hearsay talk around town to conjecture that she was 
pregnant.  Importantly, the occasion in which Valentina attends a public health program 
to get a vaccination for her daughter also becomes a scene of accusation.   
         The next testimony is given by Valentina’s Aunt, the wife of her father’s brother. 
 “… I saw that Vale was wearing clothes that were somewhat fitted (ajustada), not skin 
tight (pegada), but she wore stretchy denim pants (mezclilla) and blouses a little fitted 
and I knew that Vale had a boyfriend in the community called JUAN PABLO, and that 
they were a couple (novios) but at the end of the month of december 2007, this JUAN 
PABLO didn’t go to see Vale at the house, which made me guess that that they had 
broken up, without knowing the motive for why they broke up... and it was the month of 
december without knowing the exact the date that I started to see Vale a little more 
chubby...” 
 
                                                        
67 See Appendix E for testimonies in original spanish 
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Valentina’s aunt then explains how she looked in her first pregnancy that resulted in the 
life of her 4-year old daughter and the familial circumstances surrounding it: 
“… the first pregnancy that Vale had, I didn’t realize until she was something like five 
months along in the pregnancy, since she looked normally chubby like most recently, and 
also the people in the community were saying that Vale was pregnant, and it wasn’t until 
then that Vale’s mama found out that she was pregnant, and I knew that she chastised 
Vale a lot, to the point that the Vale’s mama cried, but since Vale’s papa wasn’t there 
because he was in the United States I didn’t know how he would react, except that when 
he arrived to the ranch Vale’s papa had been supporting her and she [the child] had 
taken the last names... [of Vale’s father]... since the father of [the child] didn’t 
acknowledge her (no la reconoció)”  
 
 
A final testimony is given by the father of Valentina’s 4-year-old daughter: 
 
“...I realized that Vale went around with some guys from there in the community... and 
without remembering the exact date but it was approximately about one year that 
Valentina and I began having sexual relations in my car and I realized that during this 
time Valentina went around with a guy from there in the ranch named GERARDO, and I 
know this because like I said I live close to Valentina’s house and I always saw her with 
this guy outside her house like at 12:00 o’clock at night, including on some occasions my 
daughter was outside with her and I told Valentina that it wasn’t okay that she was 
outside the house so late at night...” 
 
 
He continues to detail his observations of Valentina with other men outside her house and 
his knowledge of the fact that she did not use contraception. Then he describes how he 
knew that she had been pregnant: 
 
“... I did notice that Valentina was pregnant, since Valentina is slender one could note 
that her womb was growing, and the face became blotchy a little (la cara se le empezó a 
manchar de paño un poquito), but I never asked Valentina if she was pregnant, nor did 
she tell me anything, and for what people were saying around the community, without 
being able to be more precise about who exactly, I heard the rumor that Valentina was 
pregnant...” 
 
Following the collection of these testimonies, the judge requests records of all of the 
women who are, or were, pregnant in the community to be added to the criminal file.  
The records turned into the legal authorities by community health centers and hospital 
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administrators generally note the name, address, number of weeks of pregnancy, expected 
due date and number of visits to the hospital or health center of each pregnant woman 
with whom they have had contact. While some of the records look “official” with all of 
the categories listed above and titled “Informe de Embarazadas,” some seem to have been 
originally designed for something else and only later occupied to list pregnant women.  
One form is from a vaccination program and another is a “censo nominal de mujeres en 
edad fértil/escolares” (nominal census of women of fertile/school age). Others are 
entirely hand-written. Below is one of the handwritten lists of pregnant women in the 







It seems this list of pregnant women has been made after the request from the judge, 
either copied from some other document or changed in relation to the request.  I chose to 
include it here because of the way the names are spatialized on the page.  The asterisks 
next to some of the names on the vertical list indicate women whose pregnancies would 
match the time-line of the crime. The names are then re-written at the bottom of the page 
horizontally, facing perpendicular the general list.  
 
The Feminist Defense: Mitigating Circumstance of Psychosocial Vulnerability 
          Part of the feminist NGO intervention was to request the addition of evidence 
based on psychological examinations of the accused women.  In each case the judge 
agrees and orders evaluations by a psychologist from the side of the state and the side of 
the defense.  The judge issues a document asking both psychological examiners, referred 
to as peritos (police investigators) to describe any “conditions that might have mediated 
the criminal actions” (See Leal 2006).  In response the state appointed psychologist 
produces the following report about Valentina:  
 “It’s important to recognize that whatever motivation, decision or action of a human 
being implies a psychological foundation, and in the case of the woman under evaluation 
one observes that there exists a structure of personality with primitive characteristics, 
which is to say they present immaturity, poor network of emotional support, poor defense 
mechanisms through which she does not make herself responsible for her decisions and 
holds responsible others for her actions and their results, without concerning her own 
self (sin compremeterse en ella misma).  Even when the woman under evaluation shows 
these individual characteristics, she is a person with the capacity, to make her own 
decisions, well one doesn’t find her trained (capacitada) to do so, and in the occasions 
that she does make decisions she does it in an impulsive manner and too passively (poca 
asertiva), without considering the results and risks that this decision implies.  The 
conjugal violence that was part of her relation with RODRIGO [the father of her 
daughter] is another element that intervenes in her emotional state, since being a 
dependent person, she doesn’t find in the relation the support and security that she looks 
for in a partner, choosing in an impulsive manner to involve herself with another person, 
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since she feels that what she doesn’t have in her house she has to look for outside, like 
she did when being unfaithful with GERARDO.” 68 
 
 After Valentina broke it off with Rodrigo she moved from her parents’ house to 
Gerardo’s house, where his parents also lived.  Gerardo subsequently went to the United 
States to work, and it is in this period of time that Valentina is accused of becoming 
pregnant (perhaps with Juan Pablo) and hiding the pregnancy.  Rather than retell the 
history of Valentina’s sexual relationships, the report given by the defense psychologist 
centers on an explanation of why she labored alone in the cactus garden behind the house. 
He begins with the fact that she lived with her in-laws to suggest that her secrecy was 
logical and necessary, and then explains her lack of maternal instinct as simultaneously a 
normal attribute of modern women.  The death of the fetus is therefore the result of her 
marginalization from public health services.   
“Since the woman under judicial processing was living with her in-laws, she decided to 
keep her pregnancy a secret, for the same reason she didn’t visit “control” [obligatory 
community services for pregnant women], nor at the moment of the premature labor did 
she receive medical attention, for this same reason she let the labor progress and she 
expelled the product of conception alone and with the consequences implied in this kind 
of labor, which is to say, in other words, at the mercy of God (a la buena de Dios)... it is 
important to mention that the process of labor, in normal conditions requires attention or 
assistance and that women do not possess the instinct to preserve the species like the rest 
of the mammals do... a woman does not possess these characteristics, even less so now in 
our actual times, due to which it is necessary to rely on adequate attention and more and 





                                                        
68 Examine further how the prosecution and defense alternatively portray the pathological personality in the 
“Junta de Peritos en materia psicológica” en L.M’s case and in the defense petition to the judge in AdR’s 
case.   
69 Examine further how the same peritos give a detailed dictamen answering questions from the judge about 
the nature of pregnancy.    
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Forced Recognition   
          Two weeks after collecting testimonies and public health records, the public 
prosecutor orders a “Gynecological Inspection of a person named Valentina” in which the 
goal is “to determine whether she currently presents physical or clinical signs of having 
been in a gestational state or of having recently given birth.” During the same 
examination the “medico-legista,” or medical-legal examiner, in the company of two 
agents from the public prosecutor’s office, take samples of Valentina’s blood, saliva and 
hair for genetic testing to compare with genetic materials of the fetal cadaver that was 
found outside her house.  In addition to DNA evidence, the forensics team conducts a 
dosimacia, in which the lungs of the fetal cadaver are submerged in water.  If the lungs 
float it signifies that a breath was taken which supports the Public Prosecutor’s narrative 
that Valentina smothered the cries of her premature infant. Valentina’s testimony since 
the preliminary investigation maintains that she passed out and awoke to find the stillborn 
baby.  The state gages the age of the fetus to be 29 weeks, a point at which if born within 
an advanced medical setting of a hospital it could have survived (Christoffersen-Deb 
2012; Williams 2005).   
          As in all of the cases there is ambiguity about what constitutes legal and scientific 
evidence of the cause of death of a fetus whose “independent” life must also be proven.  
In all of the cases the form of death and form of life of the fetus and/or newborn are 
elaborately debated between medical experts, forensic examiners, and legal authorities.  
One way the ambiguity of fetal life and personhood manifests is in the frenzy of naming 
its body.  Over the course of the case the entity who is legally defined as the victim of the 
crime takes many names; a fetus (un feto), a new born fetus (un feto-recién nacido), a 
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born (un nacido), a new born (un recién nacido), a human fetus (un feto ser humano), a 
child (un niño), a little body (un cuerpecito), the minor (la menor), the product of 
conception (el producto de concepción).  The criminal narrative strives to fix this 
ambiguous entity to a proper name within a particular set of relations.  At the moments 
when the state summarizes the crime as Homicidio en Razón de Parentesco, “the product 
of conception” becomes “her own new born daughter” (su propia hija recién nacida), her 
baby, or as I mentioned earlier in this chapter, “a new born who in life would have 
responded to the last names...”  In this attempt to name properly there exists an essential 
ambiguity as to how, when, and with what criteria the body will be seen as the body of a 
human being, which is in turn all tied up with the law’s labor to provide evidence of 
kinship (“razón de parentesco”). The law’s movement between naming the body as 
human and connecting it to its “progenitors” is full of moral ambivalence that relies on 
partial knowledge that can be accumulated through different kinds of evidence but never 
complete.  For instance, in many of the testimonies by the people, often neighbors, who 
find the body, refer to it at first as a “cuerpecito” or “little body,” without explicit human 
features.  It is not until the police agent taking the report asks what the gender of the body 
is that the witnesses name it as a girl or boy-child, una niña o un niño.                                                                      
         While DNA evidence establishes kinship ties between mother and fetus, more 
extended forms of kin recognition are required to carry the full moral force of “razón de 
parentesco.” In addition to forensic reports, all of the cases document what I call “scenes 
of forced recognition” in which state officials elicit verbal acknowledgment from the 
parents of the accused woman of their own relation as grandparents toward the fetal 
remains, requiring them to sign death certificates and official requests for burial rights. It 
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is perhaps here that we can begin to examine what is at stake for the state in using the 
crime Homicidio en Razón de Parentesco as opposed to the lesser crime of abortion. In 
order to have the fetal remains associated with Valentina’s case cremated, the judge 
orders the following birth certificate, which simultaneously serves as the registration of 











           The only categories on the form that that are filled out are the date and location of 
birth, the sex and the name of the new born, the nationality and age of the mother 
(Valentina), and the name of the “distinct person” who officially appears (compareció) on 
behalf of the fetal person.  The name of the fetus is listed as Valentina’s maternal and 
paternal last names.  The “distinct person” who appears is a state official, his age is listed 
and his kinship to the born and deceased is listed as none.  The production of birth and/or 
death certificates is necessary for the case to be able to go forward with the charge of 
Homicide. It is a documentary practice that substantiates the legal personhood of the 
victim and when the parents of the accused do not appear to request the documents, state 
agents fill in on their behalf.                   
 In two cases, the juridical uncertainty surrounding fetal personhood turns into 
cruelty on the part of the agents of public prosecutor’s office.  Such cruelty is evident in 
their own documentation of the exchanges they have with the families of accused women. 
In the case of a woman who was held in the hospital for questioning after aborting a fetus 
of 22 weeks, the fetal body was placed in a plastic jar and shown to her parents twice. 
The first time was to demand that they acknowledge that the stomach pains that their 
daughter had complained of were actually symptoms of an abortion.  In the second 
instance the state agents bring out the jar so that the parents would officially identify the 
body as their “grandchild” for the production of a legal birth/death certificate.  In another 
case, the judge argues in his final rendition of the crime narrative, that the tie of kinship 
between “mother and daughter” is beyond doubt due to the fact that the accused woman’s 
father had requested the fetal remains for cremation.  
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The Gender of Kinship Betrayal 
 
          In chapter one I discussed how various articulations of exception in state penal 
codes regulate the legality of abortion across Mexico.  Such exceptions can also be 
understood to mitigate the “voluntariness” of an action that would otherwise deserve 
punishment.  While feminists have struggled to expand exceptions to shift the rationality 
of abortion regulation from criminality to public health, we see in the criminalization of 
abortion how health, in its obverse form of illness or pathology, is introduced into legal 
reasoning in order to account for the etiology of crime.  In Mexican state penal codes it is 
clear that the application of proportional punishment requires that the voluntariness of an 
action is scrutinized and ascertained according to a complex rubric for judging moral 
action.  Analyzing the 1987 United States Supreme Court ruling in the Tison v. Arizona 
case, Jennifer Culbert shows how the court bases the allocation of criminal responsibility 
on tacit normative assumptions about the autonomous individual who is master of his or 
her acts (1999).  The fragility of these assumptions surface when confronted with 
“monstrous” crimes that offend a tacitly shared moral sensibility.  In an effort to contain 
this fragility, Culbert suggests the court reinscribes its jurisdiction by refusing to consider 
psychological explanations of the defendants’ criminal acts or the social context in which 
they occurred.  Here the fictive abstract individual who is master of his or her acts is 
necessary for the court to be able to apply punishment to the degree that they feel, or 
tacitly agree, is appropriate.   
Culbert’s analysis of how moral norms enter Supreme Court Jurisprudence is 
particularly relevant for the U.S. common law system based on precendent and wide 
judicial interpretation.  In Mexico, where cases are structured by a continental European 
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(“civil law” or “napoleonic”) tradition, crimes and the way they should be judged are 
meticulously codified.  Still there is a margin of interpretation when the public prosecutor 
chooses to pursue these cases as a crime of homicide rather than abortion. The code 
defines abortion as the death of the fetus at any moment of pregnancy, which all of these 
cases could have been prosecuted under.  It seems the presence of a fetal body conjures a 
liminal moral threshold and a particular kind of juridical uncertainty, to which the state, 
in these cases, responds with severe and cruel punishment (See Tsing 1990; Briggs and 
Mantini-Briggs 2000).  Indeed the allocation of criminal responsibility becomes a 
moment for the reinscription of jurisdiction. 
 Michel Foucault discusses precisely how the moment when law loses the 
capacity to define a crime, psychiatric knowledge emerges with new explanatory power 
(2003).  Confronted with crimes (many of which center on the murder or violation of 
children) that seem to have no cause, reason or interest on the part of the aggressor, the 
legal imaginary of the human subject enters a certain crisis.  At this point of unsteadiness 
within law, the “dangerous individual” emerges at the frontier between medicine and law.  
Formed in a peculiar conjunction of legal and medical rationalities, the dangerous 
individual affects its own field of normalization, “creating a continuum between 
delinquency and monstrosity, pathology and crime” (Foucault 1999: 16).  The interplay 
between expert medical opinion and criminal law gives what is otherwise ambiguous 
moral suspicion a place in law by linking the monstrous figure of heinous crime with the 
everyday figure of the neighbor. Through a distribution of risks and probabilities that can, 
in retrospect, be attributed to the “dangerous individual,” the crisis in law of how to 
allocate criminal responsibility is solved. 
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In the Homicidio en Razón de Parentesco cases, the psychological examinations 
requested by the defense team enter into the final legal judgment as both a mitigating 
factor and an explanatory model that resediments the prosecutor’s narrative of the crime. 
Importantly, (maternal) responsibility emerges against an abstraction of the normal 
family, rather than the normal individual. Throughout the crime narrative and the 
collection of evidence there is a tension between intimacy and detachment. First it 
appears in the intimate relations of “the community.” The testimonies gathered provide 
the criminal narrative a form of personal knowledge that paradoxically only knows 
through hearsay and rumor (See Valverde 2003). Valentina’s aunt in-law and ex-
boyfriend say that she appeared to be pregnant, but still they didn’t know for sure or ask 
her. Rather they heard what people in the community were saying.  Second, each of the 
psychological evaluations provides an account of Valentina’s lack of maternal instinct.  
The state psychologist traces an “immature structure of personality” and links it to 
Valentina’s incapacity to make good decisions (See Reyes-Kipp 2014).  When she makes 
decisions they are impulsive and wrong-headed.  He cites her infidelity to her absent 
husband as the perfect sign of her over-dependency on others and misguided attempts to 
fulfill her own needs.        
On the defense side, the psychologist explains the bodily event of stillbirth as a 
product of Valentina’s socioeconomic situation.  His comments bear traces of the logic of 
honor that attenuated infanticide in colonial law, which explicitly persists in some 
contemporary state penal codes.70 Because Valentina lives with her in-laws, she had to 
keep the pregnancy with a man who is not their son a secret. The colonial code of honor 
is overlaid with a contemporary biopolitical claim upon the state that argues that 
                                                        
70 For an analysis of gender, sexuality and honor in colonial law see Seed 1992 and Alonso 1995.   
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Valentina’s marginalization thrust her into a zone of abandonment in which she was at 
“the mercy of God.”  As evidence of the accused woman’s pathological detachment from 
her family accrues, the law then struggles to establish her connection to her hypothetical 
child.  In a cruel movement of law, which narrates the disintegration of the normal 
family, while at the same time documenting a maternal-child relation that has not yet 
existed, a unique form of criminal responsibility emerges.                                                 
In her ethnography of adoption bureaucracy in Morelos, Citlalli Reyes-Kipp 
explores how the daily state practices of forging new families while severing the ties of 
others, neither fits a welfare model–as a government through society– or so called 
“neoliberal” forms of rule–as governing through individuals and regulated choices 
(2014). On the one hand, she argues, adoption policies and practices in Mexico 
‘resurrect’ the family as the fundamental unit for social policy intervention and self-
responsibility in the wake of the state’s withdrawal of public services. The figure of 
family is “used rhetorically as exemplar –as a means to stigmatize those who have no 
family or whose family falls outside the norm of respect” (Reyes-Kipp 2014: 23). On the 
other hand, neoliberal rationalities come into play through “the figure of an adoptable 
child as an ‘autonomous subject,’ who is free from genealogical ties and therefore 
capable of improvement” (2014: 23). The future is imagined in the figure of the child and 
the failure of natal kinship is embedded in the female body, and more specifically the 
figure of the bad mother (See Edelman 2004).  
 As Foucault outlined in his lectures on the dangerous individual, the constitution 
of the “nuclear family” opened up a new field for particular forms and techniques of 
power centered on the care for the child’s body (2003: 255). While the bourgeois family 
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became a site for intense scrutiny around intimacy with non-kin, such as servants, that 
threatened to infiltrate the purer bonds of parents to children, the working class family 
was scrutinized on the basis of too much proximity.  Whereas the first kind of family was 
restricted to a compact nuclear unit, the other was encouraged to build a cautious space 
between family members (2003: 263-291).  The ties of kinship are thus thought in more 
than one way according to class- yet in both scenarios danger is related to the dual poles 
of attachment and detachment, intimacy and strangeness.  Particularly in the scenes of 
forced kinship recognition, these criminal cases suggest that the threat to moral order 
posed by abortion, is not only the death of innocent life, but also the moral ambiguity of 
the intimacy between families in relation to a broader community. In this sense eliciting 
acknowledgment of grandparentage attempts to repair (as punishment) the gaps in 
“constitutive knowledge” between kin members, criminalizing not only the death of the 
fetus, but also the secret within the family (Carsten 2007).   
 Across her work, Marilyn Strathern has explored how “culture consists in the way 
analogies are drawn between things, in the way certain thoughts are used to think others” 
(1992: 33). In this vein feminist scholars have examined how the emergence of fetal 
personhood as a legal and medical category is an intense site for cultural fantasy and 
ambivalence (Tsing 1990, Ginsburg and Rapp 1991, Berlant 1991, Carsten 2007, 
Gammeltoft 2014). Other scholars have investigated how tropes of gender, sexuality and 
reproduction are mobilized in the conflictive and fragile construction of the state and the 
national community (Mayer 2000, Aretxaga 2003, Das 2007, Mookherjee 2015).  In 
Mexican scholarship specifically, a great deal of work has focused on the symbolic 
effects of prenatal personhood in the historical struggle for a secular democratic state in 
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relation to the Catholic Church and the corporatist rule of the PRI (Htun 2003, Carillo 
2007, Amuchástegui and Rivas 2008, Lamas 2008, Ortiz-Ortega and Barquet 2010).  The 
criminalization of abortion as kinship betrayal reveals further how the fetus, as a kind of 
“speculative matter,” becomes an analogy for a host of other disorders of the social 
(Farman 2013). Threading through the crime narratives is the threat of contamination that 
comes with women’s secrets, the dissolution of kinship marked by economic hardship 
and the absence of the male partner and/or father, the ambiguous boundaries between the 




































The Ephemeral Politics of Feminist Accompaniment Networks 
 
 Between 9am and 6pm Monday through Friday, two staff members, Graciela and 
Alma, and one part-time volunteer, “work the line” at Red Paulina.  Graciela, co-director 
of the organization, devotes most of her energies to developing campaigns to decrease 
abortion stigma, and writing grant proposals. She also conducts regular meetings with 
sexual rights activists and policy-makers located across multiple local and transnational 
networks.  Alma, coordinator of acompañamiento (accompaniment), oversees all of the 
activities related to Red Paulina’s contact with women from other Mexican states where 
abortion is criminalized, who are in search of safe and/or legal options for terminating 
their pregnancy. At least half of the women who contact the organization, decide to use 
misoprostol, a pharmaceutical pill, to have an abortion at home.  In addition to giving a 
protocol for how to use it safely, as outlined by the World Health Organization and in 
light of international feminist advocacy guidelines, the Red explains that the symptoms of 
pharmaceutically induced abortion are indistinguishable from miscarriage, and so in the 
case of an emergency in which a woman might need to access a hospital, she does not 
need to tell the healthcare staff that she has used the pills.  
 The availability of misoprostol, either through international channels, or local 
pharmacies, is a safe way to terminate early pregnancy, and yet it involves a significant 
legal threat given the intensifying police-like role taken up by Mexican public healthcare 
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providers vis-a-vis abortion. Between 2007 and 2013, the feminist legal advocacy group 
GIRE documented a surge in criminal abortion cases, most of which begin with a public 
healthcare provider reporting a woman who comes into the hospital mid course of an 
abortion to the state prosecutor, often accusing her of having used misoprostol (GIRE 
2013). The kind of danger that surrounds misoprostol is thus importantly different than 
the “botched,” “back alley” procedures that are commonly associated with clandestine 
abortion in Mexico and globally.  Misoprostol is an abortion technology that poses 
minimal risk to women’s health if used within the first trimester of pregnancy,71 whose 
bodily application is, to a large extent, in the hands of the woman herself.  Yet in an 
atmosphere of secrecy, fear and suspicion, in which the basic medical care that might be 
needed as a result of its use could at any point be punitive, many women prefer to travel 
to Mexico City to access legal clinics where they can obtain an aspiration abortion.   
 In the Red Paulina office, there is a white board on the wall where Alma writes 
down all of the clinical accompaniment cases for the week.  Within a wobbly grid drawn 
with dry erase markers, she writes the woman’s first name in the left-most column, her 
registration number in the organizations’ online database, the number of weeks she is 
pregnant, the state she is travelling from, the clinic she will attend, and the volunteer who 
will accompany her. When an accompaniment case is finished, the woman’s name is 
erased from the board, signaling that the critical juncture of procuring the abortion 
procedure is over.  Leading up to that point, whoever is working the line explores options 
                                                        
71 See the 2012 WHO guidelines: “Safe abortion: technical and policy guidelines for health 
systems” 
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through back and forth emails and phone conversations with the woman and the people 
supporting her.72  
 “What we do is shine a little light to open the tunnel vision- in which you can’t 
see any alternatives / Lo que hacemos es dar luzecitos para abrir la visión de túnel- en 
que no veas opciones,” Graciela explained. Through phone conversations and emails that 
sometimes span up to three weeks, advocates try to shed light on the resources that are 
available in spite of overwhelming constraints, such as the legal rights and private and 
public abortion services in Mexico City, and the financial, emotional and logistical 
support offered through Red Paulina. Through the exploration of possibilities, 
acompañantes try to help women imagine paths of action. Aside from the day-to-day 
juggling of cases, Red Paulina activists envision building a long-term feminist project in 
which the brief encounter of facilitating access to legal abortion could enhance women’s 
sense of themselves as rights-bearing citizens who are capable of making decisions about 
their reproductive and sexual lives. But accompaniment work, as a feminist political 
imaginary and set of practical actions, is constrained to a very limited temporal horizon, 
marked by the normative tensions generated by the concurrence of legal abortion rights in 
Mexico City with its severe criminalization across Mexico. The contracted temporality of 
accompaniment reflects the duress under which women search for ways to resolve their 
predicaments.    
 
                                                        
72 In many cases, someone else wrote or called on behalf of the woman who was searching for a way to end 
the pregnancy, mothers, friends, male partners, or regional NGO workers who sometimes translated 
between Spanish and indigenous languages.  Women from other countries, including the border regions of 
the United States and Mexico, and other countries in Latin America, also regularly contacted Red Paulina 
for information about safe abortion options, and support for travel to Mexico City.  
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El tiempo me viene encima, time is running me over 
 For women in situations of untenable pregnancy, the passage of time can be 
excruciating.73 Often by the time they contact Red Paulina they have already tried other 
avenues for terminating their pregnancy and concrete obstacles loom larger than moral 
and political questions about whether it is right or wrong to make the decision.  It is not 
that such questions are not relevant in the face of more pressing practical concerns, but 
rather that moral and political conflicts are embedded within particular material 
conditions.  Phone calls are often whispered and rushed, as women use the phone at a 
neighbor’s house, or run out of cell phone minutes without money to buy more, or fear 
that their parents or in-laws will overhear the conversation and throw them out of the 
house. Email is often the preferred mode of correspondence, if internet is accessible. 
More than half of the requests for help that Red Paulina receives on a daily basis arrive 
via email and through the registration of a “solicitud de apoyo” on the organization’s 
website.  Each day Alma sorts through between 10 and 25 new registros, grouping them 
according to levels of urgency and the different actions that will need to be taken in order 
to respond. The following is an example email of the kind Red Paulina often receives. 
I just filled out a form on your webpage- my registration number is 2723. Please, I can 
pay you back after whatever help you give me now, please. 
 
I’ve been looking for help for an abortion for awhile. Let me explain my situation, I live 
in Aguascalientes, I’m 30 years old with 5 and half weeks of pregnancy that I would have 
liked to interrupt since before; I’ve looked for help, some of the emails haven’t been 
answered, others it seems like they just want the deposit or they say the pills can be 
altered with pesticides, that I can die, etc., the only page that seems trustworthy is the one 
Women on web, but the time of arrival (entrega) of their doses after making the donation 
is 3 to 4 weeks and the cost, even though not too much, is not possible for me right now.  I 
would like to talk with you since I’m totally alone in this. 
 
                                                        
73 Not unlike the aging body, untenable pregnancy might be felt as a conflict of perception in which one’s 
sense of self is out of joint with one’s bodily reality (Hallisey 2010, de Beauvoir 1970, Behar 1990). 
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Women on web gave me your information as an alternative option to travel to Mexico 
City, I could do it this Friday or Saturday but I urgently need information since my 
parents who I live with don’t know and I can’t take off from work since I’m not in a 
comfortable economic situation. That’s why I need to know if I have enough or if I need 
to find a little more. 
 
Please help me because time is running me over (el tiempo me viene encima) and I don’t 
want to resort to desperate measures that put my fertility at risk or my life because I 
would like to have a family afterwards. 
 
Thank you.  I wait for your quick response, please.74 
 
El tiempo me viene encima, time is running me over.  After accompanying hundreds of 
women as they figured out what to do against accumulating obstacles, the phrase is 
piercing. Time is an external force that threatens to overwhelm her, leading her to 
desperate measures that could place her life and reproductive future at risk.  She is 
constrained not only by the illegality of abortion in Aguascalientes, but by the different 
temporal exigencies produced by overlapping and ambiguous jurisdictions, the binds of 
familial secrecy, and economic precarity.  
In this chapter, I draw from my fieldwork as an abortion access advocate and 
conversations with long-term Red Paulina activists to examine the contracted and 
                                                        
74 Acabo de llenar una solicitud en su página mi registro es el 2857. Por favor, puedo cubrir después la 
ayuda que me puedan brindar ahora, por favor. Llevo algún tiempo buscando ayuda para un aborto.   
Les platico de mi, vivo en Aguascalientes, tengo 30 años con 5 semanas y media de embarazo que quisiera 
interrumpir cuanto antes; he buscado ayuda, algunos correos no me son respondidos, otros parece que solo 
quieren el depósito o dicen que las píldoras podrían estar alteradas con pesticidas, que puedo morir, etc, la 
única página que parece confiable es la de Women on web, pero el tiempo de entrega de sus dosis después 
de hacer la donación son de 3 a 4 semanas y el costo aunque no es demasiado no me es posible cubrirlo 
ahora. Me gustaría platicar con ustedes ya que en esto estoy totalmente sola. 
En women on web me dieron los datos de usted(es) como opción alternativa para viajar a la ciudad de 
México, yo podría hacerlo este mismo viernes o sábado pero necesito urgentemente información, ya que 
mis padres, con quienes vivo no están enterados y no puedo dejar mi empleo ya que no tengo situación 
económicamente holgada. Por eso necesito saber si con lo que tengo me alcanza o necesito conseguir un 
poco más.  
Por favor ayúdenme porque el tiempo me viene encima y no quiero recurrir a métodos desesperados que 
pongan en riesgo mi fertilidad o mi vida ya que posteriormente me gustaría tener una familia. 
Gracias. Espero por favor su pronta respuesta. 
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[ephemeral temporality of accompaniment practices given this juridical-institutional 
landscape.  In her ethnography of queer activism in India, Naisargi Dave explores the 
tension between activism as “ethical practice” and the “the moral and political 
hegemonies in the postcolonial democratic nation-state” that activists must engage (2010: 
371).  I take Dave’s attunement to the possibility that there might be an ethical livelihood 
within activist forms of relationality to be important here.  She argues that queer, and 
especially lesbian activism, is “much more an activism of invention rather than 
resistance” and in the same sense, less a “social movement” and more a process of 
making a “radical world,” in Elizabeth Povinelli’s words (Dave 2012: 14; Povinelli 
2002). Alongside a critical reading of feminist networks, and the ways they are linked to 
governmental discourses and institutionalized protocols, we might also ask: What is it to 
make a world?  What distinguishes a “radical world” from the reproduction of normative, 
(and oftentimes unlivable) moral prescriptions?  
Hannah Arendt’s theory of political action provides a compelling entry point into 
these questions. Arendt is often cited as a theorist of freedom and natality who envisions 
ethical action as our capacity to interrupt the automaticity of moral norms (Lambek 2010, 
Day 2010). Feminist political theorists have long debated the implicit hierarchy of 
masculine and feminine values in Arendt’s thinking, for in her conception of action, she 
cordons off bodily life from politics (Rich 1979, O’Brien 1981, Hartsock 2003, Zerilli 
1995, Pitkin 1998, Dietz 1995, Benhabib 1993, Honig 1995 and 2013).  Rather than 
rehash debates about “the body” as a feminized biological fact pushed outside Arendt’s 
conception of political life, I consider how her notion of the political relies on a particular 
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temporal imaginary of the world as durable. 75  Following this re-reading of what is at 
stake in Arendt’s thought, I describe an accompaniment encounter in which I was 
haunted by its contracted temporality and the feeling that I could not know the effects of 
my action.  In the third section, I recount how Alma describes accompaniment as a kind 
of affective labor caught between a feminist vision of an ever-expanding network and the 
actual limitations of transient and partial connections. In conclusion, I suggest that the 
contingency and ephemerality of accompaniment encounters, and in particular their 
articulation with the limits and possibilities of ethnographic inquiry, invite us to re-
imagine the temporality of political action and what it is to inhabit a world.  
 
The disappearance of the world 
Various essays in Bonnie Honig’s edited volume, Feminist Interpretations of 
Hannah Arendt (1995), work with Arendt’s thought for contemporary feminist concerns.  
In that volume, Linda Zerilli argues that the Arendtian concept of the laboring body 
symbolizes the “loss of symbolic mastery” that is essential to Arendt’s nonsovereign 
subject of politics (1995: 174).  Seyla Benhabib emphasizes the “associationism” inherent 
to Arendt’s thought, reconceiving the public sphere not as a bounded arena of individual 
rational speech, but as appearing wherever there is action in concert (1993; See also 
Hartsock 2003). Instead of reading feminine values of community (Benhabib) and the 
excess of materiality (Zerilli) into Arendtian politics, Bonnie Honig explores how the 
oppositional pairings of private and public, active and passive, freedom and necessity, 
interruption and automaticity, proliferate in an “effort to resist the erosion of a distinction 
                                                        
75 Bonnie Honig critiques the recent turn to ethics in political theory as a form of “mortalist humanism”- in 
which the vulnerability of the biological body is claimed as the basis of a (feminine) shared humanity 
(2013). 
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that is tenuous” (1995: 144).  Honig’s attunement to the shifting centers of Arendt’s 
thought, and based on this attunement- her refusal to reinscribe a gender dualism onto 
Arendt’s concepts, leads her to argue that the tripartite of vita activa: labor, work, and 
action, might be best understood as rivaling sensibilities or dispositions that could 
potentially pluralize our understanding of the body and the unified normativity of the self 
(1995). Honig has since developed her sense of Arendtian agonism as an alternative to 
what she calls the “mortalist ethical turn” in political theory (2013).  In contrast to an 
ethics based on corporeal vulnerability and finitude (see Butler 2004)- Honig draws on 
Arendt’s thought to argue for a politics of natality that would counterbalance grievability 
with immortality, pain with pleasure. My interest in Arendt’s thought is not so much to 
displace finitude and suffering with positive affective orientations, but to rethink the 
relationship between the body and the world, taking seriously Arendt’s concern for the 
world as a durable construct that might mitigate our mortality. Rather than position the 
vulnerable body, as biological fact of life at the center of feminist politics, I suggest we 
need different ways of understanding the relation between bodily and social life. I 
therefore shift from a sense of finitude and fragility as necessary to the biological body to 
the concrete ways bodies and social worlds are knitted together in time (Das and Han 
2016).    
In the opening pages of her critique of labor society in The Human Condition, 
Arendt writes of the nightmare of “painless and effortless consumption” in which 
“eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation 
through consumption” (1958: 132). Positioning herself critically towards Marxist theory, 
she argues that having conceived of labor as the highest and most natural of human 
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capacities, Marx leaves us “with the rather distressing alternative between productive 
slavery and unproductive freedom” (1958: 125).  Her argument in The Human Condition 
begins by reconfiguring labor as a property of being animal, or having a living body, 
rather than unique to the capacities of being human.   
“Of all human activities, only labor, and neither action nor work is 
unending, progressing automatically in accordance with life itself and 




Labor is “automatic,” and inseparable from the natural cycles of life and death.  But 
perhaps equally important for Arendt is the sense that labor does not produce durable 
objects and therefore cannot protect us from our own mortality.  In this sense, the body 
points to the aspect of the human condition “governed by the time of mortality and [the] 
risk [of our] eradication” (Honig 2013: 43). Whereas some critics have read this aspect of 
the human condition “governed by the time of mortality” as “mere” biological life, I 
argue that the mortality Arendt fears is the disappearance of the world (See Honig 2013 
and Fassin 2009).  In other words, what is interesting about Arendt’s conceptualization of 
the laboring body, is not that she separates “bare life” from the political sphere of ‘men,’ 
but rather that it alerts us to the reciprocal relationship between the transience of 
individual life and the impetus to make a social world.    
 While animal laborans is tied to the transient cycles of life, homo faber erects a 
world of objects that mediates our relationship with nature and with one another.  For 
Arendt the world of things protects us from eternal movement; objectivity saves us from 
our impermanence (1958: 157).76  But superior even to the concrete objects of homo 
                                                        
76 There are many forms of homo faber, from the utilitarian producer of use-objects who is incapable of 
meaning beyond instrumentalism to the artist who transcends himself.  
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faber, are the world-making capacities of action. The products of action are the “webs of 
human relationships, ...no less real than the world of things that we visibly have in 
common” (1958: 216).77  In distinction to homo faber who is “master of himself and his 
doings,” the woman of action is not sovereign-- she must act even though she cannot 
control or even foretell the consequences.  Action is therefore not collapsable into 
decision-making or choosing between rivaling paths or options (1977: 169).  Rather, it 
erupts when our care for the world presents no other alternative.78 As Bonnie Honig 
points out, “Arendtian action exposes us to vulnerability (if action goes awry, we may be 
hurt or misunderstood and, since it is collective, we are dependent on others and the good 
will of their “constant mutual release” (Honig 2013: 43).  Importantly, the vulnerability 
of action is not that of the biological body, but the uncertain way our life is implicated 
with others.79  
 
Accompaniment Encounters and the Vulnerability of Action  
 The fleeting temporality of feminist accompaniment practices conditioned both 
how my fieldwork unfolded and the way I have come to think about the limits and 
possibilities of feminist action given the juridical and institutional uncertainty 
surrounding abortion regulation in Mexico. In an article on the role of photography, and 
more broadly, artifacts of authentic presence in anthropological claims to knowledge, 
                                                        
77 Arendt goes on to distinguish her conception of the intangible web as distinct from a Marxist 
materialist notion of superstructure that supplements the basic material structure of the world. In 
other words, material structures are not more fundamental than the intangible and immaterial web 
of human relationships.   
78 To illustrate this point Arendt cites Shakespeare’s Brutus who makes a pact with fellow men to 
assassinate Julius Caesar on the grounds "That this shall be or we will fall for it" (Arendt 1961: 151; 
Shakespeare, Act 2, Scene 1). 
79 Arendt challenges the humanitarian impulse to sanctify “life” as an abstract figure that inherently calls 
for ethical response (See Tickten and Feldman 2010).  Contemporary abortion politics shore up the limits 
of this Christian-Humanitarian approach to the body. 
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Deborah Poole suggests that there is a subversive potential of the fleeting and contingent 
temporality of the ethnographic encounter (2005). By approaching accompaniment as 
kind of “encounter,” I aim to open up a particular set of questions about the limits and 
possibilities of both feminist political action and the conditions of my ethnographic 
inquiry, as the two were knitted together in my fieldwork. I suggest that one aspect of the 
political potential of accompaniment, much like ethnography, lies within the ambiguous 
incipience of encounter. 
 Accompaniment straddles distinct and sometimes incommensurable horizons of 
action.  One set of activities are oriented to a longer duration of building a feminist 
network, in which individual cases are interchangeable with one another and future 
outcomes are understood through global discourses of individual reproductive rights, 
freedom, and autonomy.  Along these lines, Alma sends out questionnaires to women 
after they have received support so that they can evaluate their accompaniment 
experience.  She then scans these questionnaires for possible sources for testimonies of 
the positive experience of abortion to use in de-stigmatization campaigns.  She also 
attempts to reincorporate women into “the network” by asking those who previously 
received support to help facilitate another woman’s access to abortion in their state.  
Once a year, Red Paulina publicizes a call for volunteers who are chosen based on an 
extensive application. After the selection process, Alma and Graciela lead a 4-day 
accompaniment training.  The training includes sessions with feminist lawyers who 
explain the legitimacy and specific limitations of Red Paulina’s work in terms of 
competing state jurisdictions, psychotherapists and progressive Catholic priests who do 
post-abortion skype sessions with women when needed, physicians who explain the 
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different procedures for terminating pregnancy, and previous volunteers who have 
continued their careers in sexual and reproductive rights advocacy.  It also involves 
ongoing “contención” or support workshops where advocates critically reflect on their 
own presumptions about the experience of untenable pregnancy and the obstacles 
different women might face in seeking abortion.  A central aim of contención is to teach 
volunteer advocates how to effectively respond to individual cases.  This requires that the 
advocate is able to imagine when certain protocols come into play over others, and that 
she is able to build “confianza,” or trust with the woman in need, while also maintaining 
emotional boundaries.  All advocates are given personal booklets made by Alma and 
Graciela that elaborately detail the accompaniment protocols.  The booklets list the 
NGOs, clinics and hospitals across Mexico that participate in the network, as well as the 
contact information for lawyers, physicians, and psychologists who are available to 
provide expert advice to the activists.  Over the six years that I worked closely with Red 
Paulina, volunteer advocates were mostly young women between the ages of 18 and 30, 
but there were also two women in their 50s, and two queer men in their early twenties 
who took part in the training.   
 For the core activists at Red Paulina, the longer duration of the network is under 
constant threat of dissolution.  It is a struggle to maintain a longer project for various 
reasons, one being the extremely high “burn out” rate of volunteers.  It is rare for 
advocates to fulfill their volunteer hours consistently for more than six months.  
Secondly, the availability of funding fluctuates dramatically depending on the ratio of the 
will of private donors to the number of women who contact the Red for help.  In the past 
couple of years, the demand for accompaniment has greatly surpassed donor 
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contributions, limiting the funding available to support women’s access to private clinic 
procedures, travel costs, food, and hotel stays in the city.   
 Accompaniment as encounter, in distinction from network-building, unfolds in a 
space-time of normative disjuncture: between competing state laws, private and public 
clinic regulatory frameworks, the protocols and aims of other feminist organizations, 
international norms and discourses, and the myriad of differences that make up the 
critical situation of untenable pregnancy for a particular woman.  Quite often 
accompaniment encounters broke away from protocols due to necessity.  On numerous 
occasions when I was already at the clinic with someone who had contacted the 
organization through the usual channels, I would meet other women and families in need 
of support.  This was not unusual in the chaotic public clinic environment where 
situations inevitably poured out of the bounds of regulatory frameworks and limitations. 
There was one occasion early on in fieldwork when I encountered two women leaving the 
clinic in a panic because they had been denied services.  The receptionist had suggested 
that they speak to me about their predicament, knowing I was outside waiting for one of 
the other patients.          
 The sisters had travelled from León, Guanajuato on bus the night before, arrived 
at the clinic and waited outside, unsure of how or where to enter until 9am.  As I 
described in previous chapters, the entrance to the ILE clinic is around the side of the 
health center, while in front a pro-life stand that masquerades as official information 
about ILE deters women from finding the actual entrance.  When the sisters finally found 
the entry, the doctor agreed to do an ultrasound but would not give the woman who was 
pregnant, named Marisol, an aspiration procedure because it was too late in the day. The 
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particular encounter made a lasting impression on me, maybe because I was a novice 
acompañante, I remember feeling completely ungrounded in the situation.  It retrospect, it 
has come to mark for me the way that accompaniment shores up the tension between 
ephemerality and aspirations of durability that are central to both feminist and 
anthropological engagements with the world.   
It was Marisol’s sister who spoke, her eyes filling up with tears as she told me in a 
hushed voice what had happened leading up to their arrival to DF.  She spoke so quickly 
and so under her breath that I only caught the major points: that Marisol had taken pills 
and vomited and so it was as though she hadn’t taken them at all, that they had then gone 
to the hospital in León where they were told that Marisol could not have an abortion… at 
which point it vaguely became clear to me that she had been sexually assaulted. They had 
come to Mexico City under a lot of pressure and then waited in front of the health center 
until 9 am or so instead of coming around the back side to the ILE clinic. They had no 
money to pay for a room to wait until morning, not even for food. As Marisol’s sister 
recounted the details, we sat on the bench outside the clinic, the two of them often 
holding hands, resting their knees against one another, and sharing a juice. 
I called Alma in the office to see if the feminist network could offer support. 
Listening to Marisol speak to Alma I gathered that she was just my age with a similar 
birthday, and that her sister was younger. She was very pretty, wearing a beige fuzzy 
beret, but her hair looked distressed and the skin on her arm was so dry and chaffed that it 
was flaking off around the inner crease of her elbow. As she spoke her voice seemed flat 
and she stared off into the distance.  How many weeks did they tell me? She asked 
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holding the phone away from her ear. 9.6, I said.  Huh? She asked again distractedly, 9.6 
I repeated, and she repeated it to Alma.  
Alma gave her directions to a private clinic where she could be attended that day 
and Red Paulina would cover the costs. I pulled out a paper and pen and handed it to her 
and she wrote diagonally across the page, Metro San Lazaro, Linea 1, 8, la Rosa.  It was 
the first time they had been to Mexico City.  Marisol seemed tender and grateful towards 
her sister; perhaps she was relieved not to have to muster up a voice, or perhaps not to 
have to demonstrate her feelings.  I stepped inside to let the clinic staff know they were 
leaving and when I came back outside they were no longer on the bench.  I thought to 
myself, both a bit relieved and perplexed, now that they know what to do they’ve gone on 
without me. Then I saw them gathering their things against the wall of the clinic.  Ready? 
I asked, yes, Marisol’s sister answered, and we all walked out to the street to catch a 
pesero (informal mini-bus).  The sister gave the driver 10 pesos for all of us, I tried to 
give her 5 pesos back but she refused. 
We didn’t speak during the bus ride, when we got off we awkwardly waited to 
cross the busy highway between the bus stop and the metro station. As they entered 
through the gate they turned around and asked if I would also take the metro. Yes, but in 
the other direction, I said, which was not true, but at that point I felt we should go 
separate ways.  We hugged and kissed on the cheek, as is common practice between 
acquaintances. I watched them walk down the platform from above and waited until their 
train came and left before going down myself. 
Afterwards I went home to sleep, exhausted. I awoke to the sound of a text 
message from Alma who let me know that Marisol had made it to the clinic and that 
 140 
everything was fine, punctuated with a smiley face. My heart sped up and my thoughts 
began to race, what if they are in danger in León, what kind of situation are they going 
back to? What if they are involved in a terrible mess that this abortion doesn’t come close 
to solving? Why didn’t I ask her, why didn’t I find out more?  Somehow it hit me then, 
sharply, that Marisol must have been through something awful. With just the piecemeal 
information about their situation and a series of complicated and painful impressions 
from our encounter, I found it hard to let go.  I was terrified by the sense that I would not 
know what could happen to her.  I would not know how she is, if or when she would 
come out of the blank state she had been in.  I wondered how old her sister was, who was 
now courageously taking care of her. And a sense of panic, the gnawing sense, that the 
“support” I facilitated was partial, superficial even, while at the same time dire and 
intense.  
 In retrospect much of the unease I felt from this accompaniment encounter 
stemmed from the inability to know how my actions would have effects in Marisol’s 
world. As an organization Red Paulina works hard to generate and apply measures of 
self-evaluation, but oftentimes they fallout in the spontaneous interactions between 
women seeking support and the volunteers.  There is an elaborate attempt on the part of 
Graciela and Alma to build accompaniment practices into a solid framework of 
reproductive rights, mobilizing discourses of women’s empowerment through choice and 
autonomy, maintaining contact with women at least until two months after the 
accompaniment so that they can respond to a series of questions about their experience, 
and in the best of cases, so that the women remain part of “the network” by facilitating 
access to safe abortion to another woman in need.  As I described in more detail above, 
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alongside the accompaniment activities geared towards actualizing women’s right to 
abortion are the professionalization activities aimed at supplying volunteers and workers 
in the organization with the language and expertise of transnational feminism. Annelise 
Riles describes how global feminist networks are composed of “institutions, knowledge 
practices, and artifacts thereof that internally generate the effects of their own reality by 
reflecting on themselves” (2001:3).  This is an apt description for many of the 
professionalization activities that the activists in Red Paulina value very highly, but at the 
same time Riles’ narrow focus on the self-reflexivity of knowledge practices obscures all 
of the potentially meaningful action in feminist activism. Here Arendt’s distinction 
between homo faber and “the man of action” is helpful, for as the former instrumentalizes 
the world while creating it, the latter is involved in the possibility of newness and the 
uncertain outcome of inserting oneself into webs of relationships.      
 But perhaps another discomfort arose from a sense that my encounter with 
Marisol and her sister was governed by the “time of mortality.”  That is to say if 
accompanying Marisol to a private clinic counts as political action, it could only be so 
within the ephemeral temporality that Arendt attributes to the laboring body in opposition 
to a durable world.  We acted together out of necessity in the present, with no anchor in 
the past or continuity with the future.  While the idea of the “feminist network” is the 
constant expansion of relationships, the accompaniment encounter actually relies on a 
partial connection, one that dissolves almost as quickly as it forms (See Mohanty 2003, 
Strathern 1991 and Pinto 2014).  How might we understand accompaniment practices, 
and ethnography for that matter, as political, when they have no claim on worldly 
durability?   
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Normative Disjuncture  
 In conversations with Alma, the coordinator of acompañantes, I began to think 
about the world-making effects of accompaniment practices. Alma described the ethics of 
her work as a counselor in an ILE clinic, and later as a feminist advocate in Red Paulina, 
as a kind of affective labor that counters the technocratic frameworks of clinical 
intervention and the moral pedagogies of punishment and redemption that characterize 
the ILE program.   Just before I returned to Baltimore after nearly two years of fieldwork, 
I invited Alma over to my one room apartment on the roof of an elderly woman’s house 
to do a recorded interview.  Beneath me lived a young woman from Venezuela who was 
carrying out some financial business in the city.  She called the Señora of the house 
abuelita (grandma), and they often yelled back and forth to one another across the patio.  
My apartment was accessible only by a rickety spiral staircase, affording me a little more 
privacy, which I tried in vain to maintain.  In the mornings, the Señora would stand 
beside the Poinsettia tree in the middle of the patio waiting for me to descend the stairs.  
If she caught me she would invite me inside for a boiled apple or a green juice made from 
her aloe plant to settle my stomach. Whether I felt sick or not she insisted these foods had 
incredible powers.  On the occasions that I was caught, I listened to long stories about her 
life.  
 The L-shaped house was nestled in a maze of cobble-stoned streets between the 
center of Coyoacán and a major four-lane road that edges the Southern periphery of the 
city.  The Señora would recount how the house used to be a farm when she was a little 
girl.  We had pear trees and where my room is now we kept pigs! she repeated many 
times. Her nephew had built the room on the roof two years ago so that she could make 
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extra income.  He’d painted the walls an earthy pink and the windows and door were 
covered with thick iron bars.  There was a small rooftop area outside my room where 
Alma and I sat that day until the thunder and rain clouds became too dramatic and we had 
to move inside. On the interview recording you hear the wild coming and going of a 
heavy storm, a daily afternoon occurrence during Mexico City’s rainy season that lasts 
from mid summer into early fall.        
 The interview begins with me asking Alma to recount how she started working at 
Red Paulina.  She had joined the core group in the office six months after I began my 
fieldwork in 2012.  Beforehand, I had known her as an important contact person at one of 
the clinics when I was doing volunteer accompaniment and was quite unsure of myself.  
She was calm and careful, and when we spoke in the clinic she redirected my nervous 
energy. Before working at Red Paulina, she had been an abortion counselor in one of the 
ILE clinics administered by MexFam, a national civil society organization that emerged 
in the 1970s at the height of population control policies and has since altered its central 
discourse to reproductive rights. MexFam is generally considered a trustworthy 
alternative to government clinics.  It operates with sliding scale services that are 
accessible and familiar to women with limited financial resources.  Alma described her 
work there as attending to the “affective part” of the abortion process in contrast to the 
physicians who worked like technicians.80  
                                                        
80 In her ethnography of clinical sexual assault intervention, Sameena Mulla discusses the peculiar role of 
forensic nurses hinged between the anticipatory structures of legal justice, and the evidentiary practices 
aimed at the production of legal truth, and the necessities of care-giving in the present (2014).  Following 
Mulla’s meticulous attention to the ethical tensions that emerge of forensic nursing, we might ask if care-
giving involves a set of specific activities or a quality of attention necessarily oriented to the present? (See 
also Kittay 1999) What kind of temporal horizon would allow a quality of care to flourish?  Mulla herself 
worked as a patient-adovocate as she conducted her fieldwork but did not turn the advocacy role itself into 
an object of ethnographic inquiry. Elsewhere though she discusses the ethics of ethnographic research with 
victims of sexual assault (2011). 
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“I saw to the affective part, how she felt that the decision had impacted her 
relationships, domestic life, aspects having to do with work and school... 
because sometimes the doctors concentrated only on the procedure and 
doing the technical part of the process, I mean oftentimes forgetting that 
on the other side there is someone who is feeling what is happening in this 
moment, and its importance, I mean... in their life. They (the doctors) were 
wrapped up in that and nothing else, so we (the counselors) worked on the 
human part of the process” 
 
She also said that the abortion procedures were performed in a modality of begrudging 
beneficence, which she connected with the way clinic doctors inflicted moral 
punishment.  
 
“Sometimes I think the doctors punish a little, because of their prejudices 
you know, as though they are doing- as though you made a mistake and if 
I’m going to help you resolve this error you made, you better give me 
gratitude for what I am doing, no? I mean, I would even hear some 
doctors say, not just any doctor would be willing do this, willing to deal 
with this issue, so she [the patient] would have to behave just so, as though 
we were doing her a big favor.” 
 
 
After working there for three years, Alma explained that the environment became heavy 
(pesado) and monotonous (tedioso), driven by quantitative goals inspired by funding 
sources.  In addition to the pressure to do more ILE procedures, she felt that the discourse 
of reproductive rights that framed her counseling sessions was undermined by women’s 
experiences during the procedure.  
“I mean to work in the counseling session with the purpose, I mean, 
talking with girls as though they were making a voluntary decision, as 
though it was legitimate, and based on their rights, and suddenly they went 
in with the doctor and it was... everything to the contrary... it was really 
frustrating... and then the clinic started to set goals, to do more and more 
ILEs, increase the numbers and I mean it was already the (MexFam) clinic 
where the most ILEs were performed, then it was increase, increase, 
increase the numbers and we were the same (number of) counselors, all of 
the weight loaded (se cargaba) onto us and there was no space for support 
(contención), for our own self-care, including, I mean even the basic 
things, you know? I mean our laboring conditions, security, health 
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insurance, a salary that was... dignified... I had to begin work at 8 in the 
morning but there was no set time for me to leave, I mean we were 
supposed to leave at 4 in the afternoon, but I never left at 4... So also... I 
think I was burning out, I mean it had become too much... and it wasn’t 
good for me or good for the women that I attended to...” 
 
 
Alma’s move to work in the feminist organization was prompted by the exhaustion of her 
labor in the clinical setting and the way she inhabits her feminist ethics, while the goals 
and kind of attention she gives to women in situations of abortion is linked to her 
working conditions in concrete ways.  I asked her how working in Red Paulina had 
improved her life and she responded that it had allowed her to be part of a process of 
empowerment. 
“...to respect women’s autonomy, with the idea that this experience could 
trigger a positive process in the woman, of empowerment, of citizen-
making (ciudadanización), as though to be able to exercise this right meant 
to continue exercising other rights... whereas in the clinic, well I paid 
attention to- a little of what I was telling you before, to numeric goals... 
and no, I mean no, looking back on it now, well it wasn’t totally respectful 
of women’s rights... with the lack of care-- of self-care—it was too easy to 
impose one’s own prejudices.  It was also a way of obstructing the 
woman’s decision, I mean by making it more complicated, by not making 
it simple” 
 
Alma’s admittance of her own failure to “totally respect woman’s rights,” appears almost 
as a mode of resistance to the pressure to achieve numerical goals in the clinic.  By not 
“making it simple,” counselors slowed down the mechanicity of clinical procedure, but in 
doing so they imposed their moral prejudices on women’s decisions.  In her work as an 
acompañante in Red Paulina, it wasn’t that reproductive rights gained a reality that they 
had lacked in the clinical environment, but rather that she had found a way to sustain her 
virtual relationship to them.  Through the feminist network, Alma was able to inhabit the 
awkward disjuncture between reproductive rights discourses of choice and empowerment 
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and the actualities of caring for women, who were oftentimes in dire situations. Alma 
grounded her action by paying careful attention to singular bodily and affective 
situations.  
“The accompaniment we give is based on the principal of respecting 
women’s decisions.  We don’t try to convince her one way or another, in 
this sense we have to be very attentive to what the woman says to us with 
her words, and to- well... to her bodily gestures too... It’s a moment in 
which she can exercise a right and feel that no one is doing her a favor, but 
it’s also necessary to acknowledge a little all of the violences she had to 
pass through in order to arrive to DF [Mexico City] ... a little bit to be that 
voice- a voice that makes those things visible.”  
 
I asked her what counts as a successful outcome of accompaniment and she said she felt 
good if it seemed as though it had reduced the burden on a woman’s shoulders.  Her 
response echoed the way she had described her own relief working in the feminist 
organization in contrast to the burden of working in the clinic.  
“...To know that she can get rid of, in a way, or reduce the burden, by at 
least being able to talk in a natural way about the experience... and to help 
her recognize that she is capable of doing...” 
 
Alma spoke clearly about the partiality of accompaniment in the broader context of a 
woman’s reproductive life, and the extent to which that life could not be known.  She 
evoked the gap, even incommensurability, between the fantasy of sovereign action that 
could shape either the subjectivity of the feminist activist who acts on behalf of another, 
or the imaginary subject of reproductive rights who decides to terminate her pregnancy. 
In fact, she describes the goals of accompaniment in other terms —to share the burden, 
however temporarily. When I asked her what she thought the limits of accompaniment 
were, she spoke of the particularity and noninterchangeability of each woman’s situation 
and the contracted temporality in which accompaniment takes place. 
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“I guess the fact that we are only there in this moment... of this woman... 
and she is likely to be living a situation of violence or something that goes 
well beyond what we can do, but the intention of accompaniment is 
exactly this: to support her so that she can search for other kinds of 
supportive relationships, by turning to other relationships or by broadening 
a little bit the networks (that she already has)”  
 
 
Feminist Action, Ethnography, and World-making 
 Lauren Berlant argues in her essay, Slow Death (Obesity, Sovereignty, Lateral 
Agency), that “the casting of the human as most fully itself when assuming the 
spectacular posture of performative action” has obscured the varied political horizons of 
ordinary life, while at the same time provided “an alibi for hygienic governmentality” 
(2011: 97).81  Indeed, contemporary regimes of reproductive governance have made it 
difficult for feminists to articulate abortion politics without dramatizing the termination 
of pregnancy as an isolated event of sovereign decision-making.  A view of agency in the 
spectacular temporality of the event of the decision circulates between biopolitical 
governmental logics, as well as prochoice feminist demands.  At the same time, the 
critical situation of untenable pregnancy casts a shadow of doubt on ordinary life, in so 
far as it might be understood as the daily repetitions and routines that reproduce a unified 
normative world. 
 Indeed, for Arendt, as human beings we must act to interrupt the automaticity of 
life, and it is only through such interruption that we become who, rather than what, we 
are.  Within this theory of action is a particular notion of the world as durable- one that 
                                                        
81 It thereby encourages a militaristic and melodramatic view of agency in the spectacular temporality of 
the event of the decision; and, in linking and inflating consciousness, intention, and decision or event, it has 
provided an alibi for normative governmentality and justified moralizing against inconvenient human 
activity (Berlant 2007). 
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outlasts or attenuates our mortality.  For Arendt, the world is made of human artifice, the 
“durability” of which transcends the individual cycle of life and death as well as the 
smaller-scaled cycles of production and consumption.   
 
“The only activity which corresponds strictly to the experience of 
worldlessness, or rather to the loss of the world that occurs in pain, is 
laboring, where the human body, its activity notwithstanding, is also 
thrown back upon itself, concentrates upon nothing but its own being 
alive, and remains imprisoned in its metabolism with nature without ever 
transcending or freeing itself from the recurring cycle of its own 
functioning” (1958: 135)                                                                               
 
In this sense, bodily necessity, and more broadly, a life based on endless repetition, 
threatens the capacity to create a durable world.  Like pain, which for Arendt is the most 
private of all bodily experiences, laboring throws the body back upon itself.82  Arendt 
implies that this condition of the body “thrown back upon itself” is a kind of 
imprisonment in our relation to nature, calling to mind a tension in feminist thought that 
either regards the reproductive cycle as an obstacle to women’s agency or as the 
experiential condition of feminine subjectivity (De Beauvoir 1949; Kristeva 1981; 
Ruddick 1989; Tronto 1993).  But it might also call to mind the phenomenology of illness 
and affliction.  How would our perspective on reproductive rights politics shift if we 
understood the situation of abortion as more, or at least as much akin to ordinary illness 
experience as to sovereign decision-making?   
 To sustain the durability of the world, Arendt draws a totalizing picture of the 
opposition between action and attachment and withdrawal and detachment- the body 
thrown back upon itself.  What if the fact of our insertion into the world with others were 
a bit more uncertain and ambivalent? Medical anthropologists have understood the 
                                                        
82 See Elaine Scarry (1987) for a similar account of pain and the loss of a shared world. 
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phenomenological experience of illness as the radical narrowing one’s relation to the 
world, echoing the entrapment of the body that Arendt fears (Kleinman 1988, Csordas 
1992, Good 1992).  Across her work, Veena Das has engaged with these concerns in a 
slightly different register in order to grasp the particular ways that ruptures in our 
relations with others, and with the world, are interwoven with repetition and the making 
of normalcy (2007a, 2009, 2012, 2015).  Ethnographic inquiry allows us to hesitate 
before assuming the way repetition, normalization, ethical agency, and governmentality 
are aligned, and to seek instead the particular ways they are embedded in one another 
(Poole 2005, Biehl 2007, Mahmood 2004, Han 2012, Goodfellow 2015, Das 2015). 
Lauren Berlant makes a similar point in her analysis of the discipline of normativity.  In 
her words: “fantasies and practices of social belonging operate imprecisely, in interaction 
with complicated and contradictory environments of living” (2008: 9).  If we are attuned 
to the imprecision of social belonging, illness experience might not correspond so fully to 
the radical loss of the world, as though one’s attachment could ever be total.  Rather 
ordinary illness makes visible the partial disconnections that are part of our life in the 
world.  In Das’s words, illness experience might be understood to “darken” the world, or 
make it “a little less benign” (Das 2015: 2).83  Alma’s description of accompaniment 
suggests that situations of abortion bring to light the uncertainty and tenuousness of 
ordinary life.  To support a woman so that she can “turn to other relationships or broaden 
the networks she already has” is quite a challenge given that who and what counts as 
supportive is never obvious and can dissolve and reform over the course of an abortion. 
                                                        
83 Das understands “the failures of the body in relation to the failures of one’s social world.” The body is 
never entirely private and is indeed capable of “speaking” (Das and Das 2007: 69, Das 2015, See also Mol 
2006). Arendt’s concept of the laboring body would then be transformed from a condition of radical 
alienation to a condition through which the world is unmade but also re-inhabited.   
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In this sense, we might revise Arendt’s aspiration for a durable world.  In light of the 
conditions of and actions involved in accompaniment, the world becomes multiple and 
contradictory. The “webs of relationships,” to return to Arendt’s way of characterizing 
the world we have in common, could always change in character, dissolve, and reform 
(See Mulla 2014, Pinto 2015).  
 In much of her ethnographic work, Sophie Day works with an Arendtian concept 
of action as a way to grasp how sex workers negotiate incommensurable public and 
private spheres. In a context in which sex work is understood in the global language of 
human rights as the immoral exchange of an inalienable property of the body, she 
considers how sex workers establish “particular values of freedom as much as 
exploitation or subordination” (2010: 28). Rather than assume that they uniformly orient 
themselves towards a “reproductive future,” Day shows how sex workers learn to 
“deflect shame as far as possible by turning her one self into many,” becoming experts at 
“practices of partitioning” (2010: 299).  Eventually these practices of partitioning give 
way to a fuller acceptance of the short-term and present-oriented freedom that sex work 
affords.  For Day, freedom in sex work thus entails a compromise between competing 
ethical ideals. In exchange for a normative reproductive future, sex workers come to 
inhabit an alternative, albeit precarious, counter-public.  
“Precarious because to transcend everyday dependencies implies death, 
figuratively, through the social death diagnostic of extreme dishonor, and 
literally, as shown by the high mortality figures in our cohort study. 
Precarious, because sex workers had to construct an alternative or counter-
public that did not acquire the usual solidity of social processes 
reproduced over time, transmitted to the next generation and built into the 
material landscape” (Day 2010: 830). 
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In Day’s account, Arendt’s vision of action as the freedom to interrupt and begin 
something new is tempered by the marginal and stigmatized status of sex work.  It is not 
that sex workers act heroically to make alternative ethical worlds, or if they do, such 
heroism is inseparable from the conditions of social stigma and punitive governance that 
pushes them to the margins of the social order and denies them a reproductive future in 
the first place.84  The making of a livable world is thus bound up with the loss of some 
other possible world.  
One could argue that feminist accompaniment networks generate alternative 
moral worlds or transient “counter-publics” when women find themselves on the edges of 
law and threatened moral stigma and the necessity of secrecy (See Fraser 1990 and 
Warner 2002). But where Sophie Day refers to the concept of counter-public in order to 
describe sex workers’ eventual “non-reproductive stance towards both biological and 
social life,” my ethnography suggests that the ephemeral temporality of the 
accompaniment encounter is world sustaining in the face of serious uncertainty.85 
Accompaniment encounters, perhaps like “practices of partitioning,” allow women in 
situations of untenable pregnancy temporary exit from, and return to, “ordinary life.”  
 Feminist theorists have considered how care, as “a politics of the ordinary,” is 
temporally oriented to what is important in the present, in so far as the present always 
bears the threat of losing our common ground (Laugier 2015, Gilligan 1982, Kittay 
                                                        
84 Their worlds, while sustaining their form of life and freedom, are less durable than the legally authorized 
and institutionalized world of heteronormativity (See Berlant and Warner 2008).  
 
85 I hesitate to valorize a “non-reproductive” stance as a privileged site of politics in part because it seems 
to reiterate a picture of political action as rupture with normativity (See Edelman 2004). Vaibhav Saria 
offers a very different picture of queer ethics in relation to social reproduction (2016). 
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1999).86  In the context of competing juridical and medical regimes of abortion 
regulation, the passage of time becomes an accumulating threat to the present. Time is 
running me over, the woman wrote in her solicitude for accompaniment.  Contradictory 
temporal exigencies threaten to overwhelm her, leading her to desperate measures that 
could place her life and reproductive future at risk.  Making the present livable in this 
context is indeed a political act. Perhaps women who participate in the feminist network 
do not exchange a reproductive future for a feminist counter-public, but rather find a 
transient agency or freedom “to move themselves,” to use Alma’s words, between 
rivaling moral norms and dispositions. Instead of a counter-public, perhaps we could 






















                                                        





Rosa and I had just walked up a spiral staircase overlooking a bugambilia filled 
patio on the way to her office in the private clinic.  We had about half an hour before we 
would go back downstairs and meet a 38-year-old woman named Gaby in the surgical 
room for her abortion procedure. Gaby had come to the clinic alone, but in the moments 
she found free from engagement with the clinic staff, she paced the hallways speaking 
anxiously to her husband on her cell phone.  Rosa used these breaks in the scheduled time 
of the clinic to write down her reflections about the counseling session.  In a session that 
lasts between 15 minutes and an hour and a half depending on each situation, Rosa 
usually began by asking the woman how she felt.  Sometimes she met with male partners 
– boyfriends and husbands, or with female members of the woman’s extended family – 
mothers, grandmothers, aunts, sisters and friends who waited in the clinic.  
As Rosa explained to me in our short conversation between the orientation session 
and the abortion procedure, almost always women’s speech was “dominated by external 
voices.”  Gaby, Rosa said, had mostly spoken in the voice of her daughter, as she 
described their everyday life together.  When Rosa asked Gaby how she was feeling, she 
said she was sure of her decision, but also that she was hurting over it.  “Que es que te 
duele? (What is it that causes you pain)?”  Rosa asked in response.  Gaby then told us 
that yesterday morning while putting on her shoes, her seven-year-old daughter revealed 
that she knew that mommy was pregnant, asking why she couldn’t have a brother. She 
told us that her neighbors had recently been talking about a common friend who was not 
able to have a child.  Then she spoke of her own mother, and began to cry.  She explained 
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how her mother had always urged her to have more children.  In the same breath she told 
us how her mother’s mother, Gaby’s abuela, perhaps accidentally, had authorized her 
mother’s sterilization while she was under general anesthesia after a cesarean section in 
the hospital.  Gaby said that it was a painful memory in the family, and that only having 
two children was a constant reminder. Gaby’s mother feared that if she died, Gaby would 
be alone in the world, as she would only have her brother to count on (she did not 
mention her father).  She then inserted the point that her brother lived his life and she 
lived hers, suggesting that in any case they were not close.    
Rosa listened and sometimes intervened, guiding Gaby towards a position in 
which she could make a decision. Possession of self was like a mood, indeed a 
grammatical tense, that had to be labored into being in the orientation room.  In many 
instances, Rosa worked to establish a limit in Gaby’s relationships.  For instance, in 
regards to the neighbor, for whom Gaby felt guilty because she was capable of pregnancy 
while the neighbor was not, Rosa asked her, “well if your neighbor was unable to have 
sex, would you have sex in her place?”  About Gaby’s mother, Rosa asked her, “do you 
really think you can repair the damage (daño) done by your abuela by having another a 
child?”          
 We might think about the voices of Gaby’s mother, grandmother, daughter, 
brother, and neighbor in the private clinic counseling session as expressive of the ongoing 
relations in which she is embedded (Han 2012).  Gaby imagines her relationship to a 
potential child through her existing relationships to particular others.  In this sense, 
having an abortion, or “cutting” the potential relation, brings her actual, as well as past, 
relationships into question, reconfiguring the distribution of attachments and perhaps 
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sustaining them in this reconfiguration.87  In this sense, Rosa focused on bringing 
relations to light and then putting each “back into their place.”  Yet as she wrote her notes 
about the session with Gaby, Rosa paused, “hay algo que no alcanzo ver (there is 
something I can’t see).” She meant, I think, that naming what it was exactly that caused 
Gaby pain was not possible.  The pain that accompanied her decision to discontinue a 
pregnancy, and the procedure itself, could not be explained with simple causality.  It is in 
this spirit that I take Rosa’s memorable statement, “Abortion is a limit situation that 
reveals the chaos of everyday life, of the political life of the country.”88  
Understanding abortion as an “everyday limit situation,” poses a particular 
challenge to notions of normality and rupture, as imagined in legal, clinical, as well as 
ethnographic terms.  Along these lines, anthropologists have approached the moral 
difficulty of abortion as a situation that throws normal life into question, such as in the 
context of new technologies of genetic testing that redefine the thresholds of abnormality 
and the domains of reproductive “choice” (Rapp 1999, Gammeltoft 2014, Ginsburg and 
Rapp 2016), or within tenuous attempts to mend reproductive lives in the aftermath of 
war and sexual violence (Mulla 2014, Mookherjee 2015). Conversely, anthropologists 
have studied the “normality” of maternal and infant mortality in conditions of structural 
violence (Scheper-Hughes 1989, Pinto 2008).  Sarah Pinto articulates a tension in the 
ways death can be thought of in connection to modern forms of government in such 
contexts.  On the one hand, we might consider death as that which underlies the 
                                                        
87 Marilyn Strathern takes up the figure of the fetus in the mother’s womb as a paradigmatic example of an impasse 
within Euro-American idioms of kinship, in which no vocabulary exists to describe the fact that “mother and fetus are 
both separable and parts of each other” (2005: 30).  In her essay, “Cutting the Network,” Strathern suggests that 
relations are infinitely extendable- “the concept (of network) can conjoin anything,” but that interpretation requires that 
this expansive potentiality to be stabilized, or “cut” in such a way that certain sets of relations become visible over 
others (Strathern 1996: 527). 
 
88 “… para mi el aborto es una situación limite, una situación que me revele el chaos de la vida cotidiana, de la vida 
política de este país” 
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possibility of biopolitics, “as that end point to the fostering or disallowing of life,” as it is 
unevenly distributed across zones of abandonment (Pinto 2008: 189, Das and Poole 2004, 
Biehl 2005, Povinelli 2011).  On the other, we might see how particular horizons of death 
are woven into the very institutions that are supposed to be life- sustaining and 
maximizing (See Chaterjee et all 1998, Das and Han 2016).  In this dissertation I have 
tried to bring the insights offered in these accounts to bear on situations of untenable 
pregnancy that are not necessarily framed by “new” biomedical technologies or marked 
by a single historical or personal event, and yet in Rosa’s words, reveal something 
chaotic in the folds of everyday political life.  I have sought, in other words, to think 
about ordinary situations of abortion as a vital aspect of reproductive politics “in the 
crevices between the everyday and crisis” (Das and Han 2016: 41).  In closing, I 
highlight three tentative concepts, or clusters of questions that have emerged in the 
process of writing with this aspiration. 
 
Normative disjuncture 
This ethnography shifts focus from rights debates as they are framed in 
transnational pro-choice and anti-abortion movements, to consider how competing 
normative claims about life (and death) are interwoven in the constitution of abortion as 
an object of government in the legal and political context of Mexico.  With the concept of 
normative disjuncture, I point to the specific way that abortion regulation vacillates 
between the production of the “normal” and the management of life in terms of 
population and the juridical powers of prohibition, punishment, and exception.  In 
chapters one and three, I examine legal debates in the Supreme Court and criminal cases 
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in the State of Guanajuato.  Examing the former, I show how arguments for the 
decriminalization of abortion in Mexico have historically been presented as exceptions 
within the penal code under specified conditions that concern the health of the 
population.  I argue that this route of argumentation led to the expansion of the legal 
circumstances under which abortion would not be punished in direct relation to the 
emergent objectives of family planning policy directed at poor, rural, and indigenous 
families.  As both a continuation and departure from earlier modes of regulating abortion, 
the Mexico City reforms have reinvented the logic of exception with the new terminology 
of “Legal Interruption,” creating a normative disjuncture between the definition of 
pregnancy termination in Mexico City and the criminalization of abortion in the majority 
of Mexican states.           
 In the third chapter, I explore how the confluence of competing moral, juridical, 
and governmental frameworks of life that arise in Supreme Court debates are parsed out 
and experimented with in the domain of criminal law.  I focus in particular on criminal 
cases of Homicidio en Razón de Parentesco, asking what is at stake in the state’s 
mobilization of this crime, rather than the crime of abortion. While feminists have 
struggled to expand exceptions to shift the rationality of abortion regulation from 
criminality to public health, the examination of these cases show how health, in its 
obverse form of illness or pathology, is introduced into legal reasoning in order to 
account for the crime. In the second and fourth chapter, I explore how the normative 
disjunctures generated in abortion law shape the daily practices and languages of clinical 




Temporality and Political Action 
 In chapters two and four, I explore the moral, ethical, and political difficulty of 
abortion in terms other than the individual body and sovereign decision-making.  This set 
of questions speaks to a tension in anthropology and feminist and queer theory between 
an understanding of ethical-political action as a break or rupture from normativity and 
what I would call the labors of mending and repair. Whereas the former tendency implies 
a picture of normativity as constraint, the latter, considers the fragility of normativity as a 
form of life.  For instance, Rayna Rapp’s ethnography of amniocentesis provides an 
example of how political action might be envisioned as an agency that emerges against, 
or inspite of, normative constraint (1999).  Rapp attends to the particular words and 
phrases women use to describe their experience of decision-making after receiving a 
diagnosis that signals the possibility of genetic abnormality and what is clinically 
configured as a high-risk pregnancy.  She explores the incommensurabilities between 
women’s languages of grief for the loss of wanted pregnancy and clinical languages of 
“reproductive choice.” Finding other women who have had similar experiences and 
developing a shared language for grief constitutes a new political community. In this 
regard, Rapp suggests that women, as consumers of new reproductive technologies, are 
“moral pioneers- at once conscripts to techno-scientific regimes of quality control and 
normalization, and explorers of the ethical territory it produces” (1999: 306).    
 As Veena Das has pointed out, the difference between what is sayable in everyday 
life and what remains unarticulated can mark the limit of what is recognizably human.  
Her ethnographic work on the domestic and sexual violence of the Partition of India 
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suggests that far from demanding to be spoken, endurance might demand silence, “so that 
ordinary life can continue, or begin again, amid the rubble that violence has created” 
(Reader 2007: 598). I take Rapp’s notion of the unsayability of grief in the clinical 
context as an occasion of pioneering, and Das’s understanding of unsayability as a mode 
of endurance to suggest different temporal and affective registers of the political. 
This dissertation dwells in the tension between these different registers. In chapter 
two, I explore how women find a temporary community in shared expressions of pain in 
the public clinic.  I suggest that women in the public clinic are intensely, however 
fleetingly, involved in a collective body-in-pain, that dissolves as they return to their 
waiting families and walk away. By attending to how pain temporarily constitutes an 
embodied sociality among patients, I give a picture of neither total subjectivization, nor 
resistance, but an ephemeral affective intensity through which women confront the 
routinized violence of the clinic.   
In chapter four, I grapple with the fleeting temporality of feminist accompaniment 
networks and how they might have lasting or durable effects in the world.  Here the 
ethnography speaks to a tension between theories of action that emphasize the world-
sustaining activities of care (Kittay 1999, Tronto 1993, Laugier 2015) and those that 
emphasize the world-making potential of interruption (Arendt 1958, Honig 2014). 
Focusing on how feminist advocates and women in situations of abortion navigate 
competing normative demands that threaten to overwhelm the possibility of action in the 
present, the chapter speaks to queer theorists and anthropologists who have explored how 
“worldly attachments” made in the margins of durable social institutions, such as 
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heteronormativity, might be fleeting but nevertheless world-sustaining (Warner and 
Berlant 1998, Day 2010, Saria 2016, Das and Han 2016).   
 
Ethnography and Feminist Advocacy 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to anthropological understandings of the 
politics of ethnography within and alongside the negotiation of state institutions and the 
“parainfrastructures” and assemblages of government (Biehl 2013).  Drawing on a long 
tradition of thought in anthropology about the limits and possibilities of ethnographic 
inquiry as a political practice, I understand the radical potential of ethnography less as a 
claim to “authentic experience,” and more as a conceptual and methodological shift away 
from “the romance of resistance,” towards historically grounded “diagnostics of power” 
(Abu-Lughod 1990, Poole 2006).  This shift implies a redefinition of what counts as the 
political. In this sense, my ethnography explores both how particular legal paradigms and 
governmental objectivies shape accompaniment practices on the ground (Riles 2001, 
Merry 2006, Speed 2006a), as well as the political potential of encounter, as both 
ethnographic method and as a constitutive condition of feminist action that resists being 
scaled up to formalized knowledge practices and protocols of intervention.  
 Perhaps the connections between feminist advocates, myself as ethnographer, and 
women in situations of abortion might be described as “collective action by noncollective 
actors” rather than organized feminist resistance or collaborative research (Bayat 2010: 
19).  As I describe in the introduction and chapters two and four, accompaniment 
practices are constituted by brief encounters with women in situations of untenable 
pregnancy.  These encounters are marked by particular temporal exigencies as well as 
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race, class and socioeconomic differences that challenge a sense of lasting collective 
solidarity.  Time is running me over, a woman writes in her solicitude for accompaniment 
from the feminist network.  In the context of competing juridical and medical regimes of 
abortion regulation, in which the passage of time may be an accumulating threat to the 
present.  In their introduction to the compendium, Living and Dying in the Contemporary 
World, Veena Das and Clara Han revisit to George Canguilhem’s concept of biological 
normativity to think about the mutual imbrication biological and social life (2016).  In his 
influential essays in Knowledge and Life (2008) and The Normal and the Pathological 
(1978), Canguilhem argues that health depends on the organism’s ability to create new 
norms adequate to the perpetually changing environment or milieu.  In his words, “health 
is a certain latitude, a certain play in the norms of life… man is truly healthy when he is 
capable of several norms, when he is more than normal” (2008: 132).  Following 
Canguilhem’s line of thought, we could say that freedom is not an absolute value that 
emerges in the interruption of, or liberation from, the necessities of the body, but rather 
inheres in the capacity to move between normative milieus. Perhaps women who 
participate in the feminist network do not exchange a reproductive future for a feminist 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Excerpts of Testimonies in Original Spanish in order in which they appear in Chapter 3 
 
“Soy enfermera del Centro de Salud de la comunidad, esto desde el año 1979, hace 
aproximadamente 29 años, por tal motivo conozco a la mayoría de las personas que 
viven en la comunidad, al demás de algunas personas de 29 comunidades que estan 
alrededor de la comunidad ya que por lo regular van a consulta al Centro de Salud, y 
además de que como referí en mis generales vivo en dicha comunidad, y es por lo que me 
doy cuenta que Maria Eugenia a quien conozco desde toda la vida ya que ella nacio en 
la comunidad y tiene aproximadamente como unos 22 aproximadamente y además de que 
...” 
    
“Yo veía a Vale que se vestía con ropa algo ajustada, no muy pegada, pero utilizaba 
pantalones de mesclilla y blusas un poco ajustadas y yo supe que Vale tenia novio quien 
vive en la comunidad y se llama JUAN PABLO, y que se que eran novios pero a finales del 
mes de diciembre 2007, este Juan Pablo ya no iba a ver a Vale a la casa, por lo que me 
supuse que se habían dejado, desconociendo el motivo por el cual se dejarían… y fue en el 
mes de diciembre sin recordar la fecha exacta que yo empecé a ver a Vale un poco más 
gordita…” 
 
“...y del primer embarazo que tuvo Vale, yo no me di cuenta hasta que tenía como unos 
cinco meses de embarazo, ya que se veía normal gordita como últimamente, y además de 
que la gente de la comunidad decía que Vale estaba embarazada, y fue hasta entonces 
que la mamá de Vale se entero que ella estaba embarazada,  y supe que si regaño mucho a 
Vale, y hasta que la mamá de Vale lloró, pero como no estaba la papá de Vale porque 
estaba en Estados Unidos no supe como reaccionaría él, sino cuando llegó al rancho el 
papá de Vale si la ha estado apoyando y ella tiene los apellidos ...ya que el papá de ella no 
la reconoció…” 
 
“… yo me di cuenta de que Vale andaba con unos muchachos de ahí en la comunidad… 
y sin recorder la fecha exacta pero fue hace aproximadamente como un año en Valentina y 
yo comenzamos a tener relaciones sexuales, y nos veíamos aproximadamete cada mes, y 
teníamos relaciones sexuales en mi carro y me di cuenta que durante este tiempo Valentina 
andaba con un muchacho de ahí del rancho de nombre GERARDO, y yo sé esto porque 
como lo referí yo vivo cerca de su casa de Valentina y siempre la veía con éste muchacho 
afuera de su casa como hasta las 12:00 de la noche, incluso como mi niña en ocasiones 
estaba afuera con ella y yo le comente a Valentina que no estaba bien que ella estuviera 
tan noche afuera de su casa…” 
 
“… yo si noté que Valentina estaba embarazada, ya que como Valentina es delgada se le 
empezó a notar que su vientre le crecía, y la cara se le empezo a manchar de paño un 
poquito, pero yo nunca pregunté a Valentina si estaba embarazada, ni ella me dijo 
tampoco nada, y por comentarios de la gente de la comunidad, sin poder precisar quien 




“Es importante reconocer cualquier motivación, decisión o acción de un ser humano 
conllevaba a una base psicológica, y en el caso de la valorada se observa que existe una
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estructura de personalidad con caracteristicas primitivas, es decir que presentan 
inmadurez, pobre red de apoyo emocional, pobres mecanismos defensivos en los que no se 
hace responsible de sus decisiones y responsibiliza a los demas de sus actos y de sus 
resultados, sin comprometerse en ella misma. Aun cuando la valorada muestra estas 
caracteristicas individuales, ella es una persona con la capacidad de elegir, de tomar sus 
propias decisiones,  pues  no  se  encuentra  capacitada  para  hacerlo,  y  en  ocasiones 
cuando toma decisiones lo hace de una manera impulsiva y poco asertiva, sin considerar 
los resultados o riesgos que implica dicha decision.  La violencia conyugal que se daba 
en su relación con RODRIGO es otro elemento que interviene en su estado emocional, pues 
siendo una persona dependiente, no encuentra en la relación el soporte y seguridad que 
busca en una pareja, elegiendo en una manera impulsiva involcrarse con otra persona, 
pues ella siente que lo que no tenga en su casa lo tiene que buscar afuera de ella, como 




“Como la procesada vivia con los suegros, decide guardar en secreto su embarazo, por lo 
que no acude a control del mismo con facultativo y al presentarse el parto premaduro 
tampoco acude a recibir la atencion medica, por lo que ella misma deja progresar el 
trabajo de parto y expulsa al producto de la concepcion sola y con las consecuencias 
inherentes a ese tipo de parto, es decir, en otras palabras, a la buena de Dios… vale la pena 
mencionar que el trabajo de parto, en condiciones normales requiere de una atencion o 
asistencia y que las mujeres no poseen el instinto de preservacion de la especie como 
el resto de los mamiferos… estas caracteristicas no las posee una mujer y mas ahora en la 
actualidad, por lo que se ha de menester contar con una atencion adecuada y cada vez mas 
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